Wealth, health, and inequality: a study of hyperinflation and households in Zimbabwe by Kurasha, Flora Marvellous Nyasha
Wealth, Health, and Inequality:  











The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 













The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No  
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be  
published without full acknowledgement of the source.  
The thesis is to be used for private study or non- 
commercial research purposes only.  
  
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms  
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 






3 | P a g e  
 
Abstract 
This study focuses on Zimbabwe’s first hyperinflation which began in March 2007 and peaked 
at 231 million percent in July 2008. Through a comparative pre-post analysis, the study 
investigates hyperinflation’s effects on the well-being of households, its empirical chapters 
assessing changes in asset poverty, asset inequality and child malnutrition before and after the 
hyperinflation.  
 
The first empirical chapter assesses the shifts in asset poverty. Household holdings of physical 
assets and recorded access to public utilities are drawn from the 1994, 1999, 2005 (pre-
hyperinflation) and the 2010 and 2015 (post-hyperinflation) Zimbabwe Demographic and 
Health Survey datasets. These are used to construct an asset index, with the 20th and 40th 
percentiles as relative poverty lines.  Asset-derived poverty headcount and poverty gaps are 
measured and compared across the two periods. The national asset poverty headcount ratio 
decreased by 27 percent largely driven by of the experience of rural households whose asset 
poverty headcount fell by 31 percent. In contrast urban households experienced a 51 percent 
increase in asset poverty in this period.  
 
The second empirical chapter assesses the shifts in asset inequality during the hyperinflation. 
Rather than focus on income inequality, it continues using asset holdings and constructs pre- 
and post-hyperinflation asset Gini coefficients for urban and rural households. These show 
decreased asset inequality during the hyperinflationary period. At a national level, inequality 
decreased by 7 percent and in rural areas by 2 percent. The decrease in inequality on a national 
level was mainly attributable to the increase in private assets among rural households. 
However, there was a 2 percent increase in inequality among urban households, largely 
attributable to ownership of private assets. Land and livestock were the main drivers of 
inequality. 
 
The final empirical chapter focuses on the changes in child nutrition during the hyperinflation, 
and the factors contributing to these changes amongst children under the age of 5. Using 
Mosley and Chen’s (1984) proximate determinants analytic framework, multivariate Logistic 
regression analyses revealed that wasting and stunting increased with inflation. Other related 
factors were poor access to electricity, safe drinking water, improved toilets and healthcare; 
as well as low levels of mother’s education and asset wealth.  
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Preface 
As I sit here in the Oppenheimer Library at the University of Cape Town in South Africa, I 
conclude my seven-year journey of my doctoral studies with a smile. I started my research with 
one goal; to tell the story of Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation and how it affected us – the ordinary 
people in the country. At the height of hyperinflation, in July 2008, I was working at PG Glass 
Industries as an accounting intern in charge of creditors’ accounts. My mammoth task was that 
of keeping track of price changes in order to determine how much we could pay suppliers of 
raw materials every day. Given the large quantities of cement, sand and other materials that 
we used as inputs to manufacture roof tiles and other construction material, I often had to 
write cheques in trillions and quadrillions of Zimbabwe dollars (Z$). At the end of the day, my 
work mates and I would be dropped off in town by the driver at work because at this point 
none of us could afford to service and fuel our cars for the daily work commute. Mostly, the 
fuel was not available and when it was there, it was expensive. Even then, we were better off 
than most in the country who did not have jobs and were not getting paid. By the time I finished 
my internship, half my salary was in cash and the other in the form of beans and rice. This was 
management’s way of keeping us happy because our salary was losing value within a week.  
 
This rough reality was short-lived when I returned to the United States of America (USA) to 
continue my Bachelor’s degree. I was very sad to leave my sister and mother in such horrible 
conditions. In a country with sporadic supply of electricity and clean water, where we could 
not drive normally because of the potholes on the roads, which often caused fatal accidents. 
When I got back to the USA, I was surprised by the attention I got from my classmates. They 
all wanted to know how life was in Zimbabwe. More importantly, they wanted to see and touch 
the 20 billion-dollar notes. The average college student in America who could not locate 
Zimbabwe on the map a year before, now asked about it with curiosity and concern. They had 
heard our embarrassing story on the news and I was now an object of pity. It was my task to 
defend my country and talk of a hopeful future where the government would have rectified 
the economy.  
Unfortunately, Zimbabwe’s happy day has not yet come and I decided to turn this issue of 
international mockery into a doctoral thesis. Much of the thesis will be technical, but I will do 
my best to keep highlighting the plight of the common man who had to sell assets in order to 
survive and who’s children suffered from malnutrition due to the lack of food and good 
healthcare. This thesis will teach us a few lessons on how government’s interference with 
monetary policy can lead to the destruction of an economy and the demise of an entire society. 
Africa, please learn and do not do what we did!  
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1.0 Introduction  
The first two decades of the 21st century saw the implosion of the Zimbabwean economy, an 
event with profound consequences for the nation’s citizens and the Southern African region 
as a whole. The implosion involved sharp declines in production, employment and life 
expectancy, as well as rapid rises in prices. These would include the country’s first episode of 
hyperinflation. At its peak in 2008, the monthly inflation rate was estimated to be 231 162 000 
percent, while real GDP fell by an unprecedented rate of 14 percent. Unemployment was in 
the range of 80 to 90 percent and 3 million of the country’s 7 million working-age adults, had 
migrated in search of jobs and education outside the country. In addition, there was urban-
rural migration. Between 2005 and 2010, there was an increase of 1.38 percent in the rural 
population, while there was a decrease of 2.67 percent in the urban population. Three reasons 
stand out: First, in the year 2005 there was Operation Murambatsvina, the expulsion from 
cities of informal traders and households dwelling in squatter camps and illegal shelters. 
Second, with the rising inflation rates the cost of living in urban areas rose faster than 
household incomes. Without alternative means of support some households moved back to 
their rural homesteads where they could grow their own food. Third, some urban households 
were given land in the land resettlement program. They to moved to the rural areas.  
 
 With the collapse of the nation’s healthcare, water and sanitation systems, disease became 
rampant and life expectancy declined to 45 years of age. While it is difficult to disentangle the 
order and causalities behind most branches of the economic crisis, there is one that stands 
out. This thesis will explore aspects of the first hyperinflation, its causes, its evolution, and its 
impact on households.  
 
Zimbabwe is a young nation; its modern economy is just over a century old, and it only gained 
its independence on April 18, 1980. At independence, though the nation had spent fifteen 
years under international sanctions, it was one of the best performing economies on the 
continent. The first decade of the independent Zimbabwe was marked by many improvements, 
particularly in human capital, as the new government emphasized investments in health and 
education. On the income side, the average GDP per capita was US$834. The main contributors 
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to national income were the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. However, cracks were 
already appearing and, between 1990 and 1996, and Economic Structural Adjustment Program 
(ESAP) was implemented under pressure from the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF); it was not a success. Following ESAP, in the years 1997 to 2002, came 
the rise of an internal political opposition, and its repression. The ruling party’s anxiety saw the 
rise of populism that culminated in a wave of cash hand-outs to ‘war-vets’ and then land 
invasions; the events which triggered the next round of price rises. The period 2003 to 2008 
marked the depths of the economic crisis, with hyperinflation reaching its highest levels in 
2008, which was coincidentally the year that the government lost a heavily contested election. 
Nonetheless, unwilling to concede power to the opposition party – Movement for Democratic 
Change – the ruling party yielded to the compromise of shared power in the Government of 
National Unity. In this new arrangement, the opposition party oversaw the Ministry of Finance 
and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and they managed to control inflation by dollarizing the 
economy in February of 2009. Thenceforth, the economy rebounded and Zimbabwe 
experienced stability and growth until the year 2015. However, in the past 5 years, since 2015, 
the ruling party has regained total control of the economy and it has begun to flounder again, 
with monthly inflation in May 2020 reaching 15.13 percent and annual inflation recorded as 
785.55 percent (Bloomberg, June 16, 2020).  
In this introduction, the reader will gain an understanding of what hyperinflation is, how it 
develops and how economic agents cope under such circumstances. Hyperinflations are not 
new, and have been well documented and analysed. The following brief overview is provided 
for any reader who is unacquainted with this literature. The Zimbabwean economy will be a 
practical example of this theory.  
 
1.1 Hyperinflation theory  
Cagan (1956) described hyperinflation as the state pertaining when general prices rise at a rate 
at or above 50 percent per month, and ending the month after the rate falls below 50 percent. 
Zimbabwe is not the first country to experience extreme hyperinflation. Hanke and Kwok 
(2009) suggest that there have been 4 other hyperinflations of similar calibre to Zimbabwe’s. 
They give the example of China, which experienced 2,178 percent inflation in May of 1949, 
such that prices were doubling every week. Greece had a monthly inflation rate of 13,800 
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percent in October 1944 and at this point, prices were doubling every 4 days. During the 
infamous German hyperinflation of October 1923, prices rose at a rate of 29,500 percent per 
month and doubled every 3.7 days. Hungary in July of 1946 had such extreme hyperinflation 
that prices doubled every 15 hours and the monthly inflation rate was 4.19x1016%. Only 
Hungary experienced inflation higher than Zimbabwe where, in November of 2008, the 
monthly inflation rate was 79,600,000,000 percent and prices would double every 24.7 hours. 
These are the worst cases of hyperinflation among many others, particularly in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America (Siklos, 1990).  
 
Dornbusch (1992) suggests that hyperinflationary experiences tend to follow similar patterns; 
a country is generally heading towards hyperinflation once its monthly inflation rate ranges 
between 10 and 15 percent consistently. He contends that hyperinflation is usually caused by 
recurrent budget deficits, often the result of quasi-fiscal expenditures necessitated by 
corruption or reparation payments owing to a certain segment of society. Citing examples such 
as Israel, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia and Argentina, he shows sources of budget deficits that 
vary from domestic mismanagement and institutional disintegration, to external shocks and 
foreign exchange crises. The budget deficits induce the printing of money and this drives the 
subsequent increase in prices. Siklos (1990) and Capie (1986, January) give the examples of 
Hungary, China, Lebanon and Peru. Importantly for the analysis of Zimbabwe’s experience, 
they show that these hyperinflations were the result of civil disorder and political unrest which 
led to both fiscal indiscipline and inefficiencies in tax collection, and thereafter to budget 
deficits - the printing of money, and ultimately hyperinflation. Cukierman, Edwards, & Tabellini 
(1989) as well as Huggard and Kaufman (2018) support Capie’s hypothesis that political 
instability leads to hyperinflation, suggesting that it holds true whether a country is democratic 
or not.  
Typically, hyperinflationary periods are characterized by extreme increases in money supply 
and price levels which compromise the value of real income. In the quantity theory of money, 
Friedman (1987) shows that prices rise in response to rising money supply. This indeed is the 
basic credo underlying monetary thinking (Mayer, 1980; McGee, 1989; Fischer, Hall & Taylor, 
1981; Pigou, 1917; Lucas, 1972). Inflation is an economy’s response to rapidly increasing 
money supply. When the growth in money is sustained over time it leads to consistent rises in 
prices. These become built into expectations and eventually manifest as hyperinflation (Cagan, 
1956).  
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Sargent and Wallace (1975) formalised this in terms of rational expectations. As the public 
experience money growth, they determine the rate of inflation. The history of money growth 
influences expected inflation. As the actual inflation rate matches the expected inflation, it 
induces further money growth and this cycle leads to hyperinflation. Generally, the value of 
money and real cash balances drops. Overall, real cash flow balances decline because of the 
rate of depreciation in the value of money as a result of the fluctuating prices. Cardoso (1992) 
proves this point in her study of Brazil’s hyperinflation and shows that real cash balances and 
the share of the real monetary base decreased as inflation increased. This shows that the effect 
of inflation on households is through real wages, due to imperfect indexation. Wages do 
usually rise at a slower rate than inflation. As a result, households are not able to consume as 
much as they did priori to hyperinflation because the purchasing value of their money 
decreases.  
As the value of money continues to decline with hyperinflation, the amount of money held by 
households decreases as they store their wealth in assets. Keynes (1923) asserts that 
households will often substitute money for inflation-proof assets as inflation rises. Ball (1969) 
agree that hyperinflations are marked by drastic changes in the amount of real cash balances 
held by households in an economy. In fact, as inflation rises and the desire for real cash 
balances decreases, the quantity of assets held increases.  This is because the assets held by 
households, in the form of equity, land and non-perishable consumer goods are seen as a form 
of reserves.  
 
1.2 The case of Zimbabwe  
Any who lived in Zimbabwe through the hyperinflation period witnessed this theory in reality. 
By 2005, the local currency – the Zimbabwe dollar (Z$) – was effectively out of use. Barter 
became a norm; trade took place using with petrol coupons, bags of maize meal, bricks and 
consumer goods taken from homes. Any asset considered a luxury was sold in exchange for 
food, which had become extremely expensive due to low availability. Those in business who 
had access to foreign currency began trading with US dollars and those closer to the southern 
border, were trading with the South African Rand. However, the majority of the populace 
resorted to barter trade, they could not access foreign currency and had lost faith in the local 
currency. The Zimbabwe dollar was no longer functional as a medium of exchange, unit of 
account, store of value and definitely not a standard of future payment (Jevons, 1882). The 
public did not want to hold the Zimbabwe dollar at all.  
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Instead, the US dollar was in demand and the public would not take it to the bank because it 
would not be released thereafter. It became common knowledge that only certain elite 
members of the society, with networks in the RBZ, were recipients of the US Dollar. As a result, 
most minerals and crops were often exported through illegal means and the earnings also 
remitted through unofficial channels in order to avoid the RBZ at all costs, where the foreign 
currency earnings would be exchanged at a discount. It was an abnormal form of existence and 
it was remarkable that households and firms survived. But before reflecting on household 
coping mechanisms, it is important to survey the processes that led to the hyperinflation. 
 
1.2.1 Macroeconomic deterioration 
Cross (pers. com. 2020) says that Zimbabweans began to suffer the real effects of 
hyperinflation on the parallel market in 2005. However, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2014), 
Robertson (pers. com. 2020), Hanke and Kwok (2009) show that hyperinflation began in March 
of 2007 when the monthly increase of the price level exceeded 50 percent. As seen in Figure 
1, while inflation was high from 2003 onwards, the hyperinflation really manifested itself in the 
years 2007 and 2008. 
 
 
Figure 1: Zimbabwe’s annual inflation trend, 1990 to 2015 
Source: The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe  
Notes: The y-axis shows the year on year change in prices. 
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2008 was the year when Zimbabwe’s economy reached the bottom of the trough of its 
recession. Real GDP was estimated to have fallen by 14 percent over the year (Robertson, pers. 
com. 2020), on top of a cumulative decline of 40 percent from 2000 to 2007. Using the official 
exchange rate, the value of the local currency declined so much that bank deposits whose 
purchasing power had been the equivalent of US$1 billion in 2005, were only worth US$300 
million 3 years later. Government expenditure, which was worth US$1.4 billion in 2005 in terms 
of purchasing power parity fell to US$258 million in 2008. An even worse story is told of 
national revenue which in 2005 was equivalent to US$1 billion and by 2008 was US$133 
million; along with a consolidated budget deficit amounting to 80 percent of GDP (Robertson, 
pers. com. 2020).  The IMF (2009) reported significant expenditure by the RBZ on quasi-fiscal 
activities in 2008. National finances spent on elections, parastatals, subsidized direct lending, 
provision of capital to farmers and so on, amounted to US$1.1 billion which was 36 percent of 
the GDP that year. According to Robertson (pers. com. 2020), monthly inflation was 231 162 
000 percent by July of 2008, up from 585.8 percent in 2005. Year on year food inflation had 
reached 1.1 trillion percent.  
After reading and discussing the country’s earlier with local economists (Leiman, Kanyenze, 
Ndlela, Robertson and Cross, pers. com. 2020), it became apparent that the year 1997 was the 
tipping point of the Zimbabwean economy. This was soon after the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program (ESAP) ended. On November 14, 1997, the so called ‘Black Friday’, the 
value of the Zimbabwean Dollar (Z$) against the US Dollar (USD$) dropped by approximately 
74 percent1.  
Importantly, the inflation was not a purely monetary phenomenon, neither in its causes nor in 
its consequences. There were a number of reasons for the downfall of Zimbabwe. First, the 
failure of ESAP and the subsequent negative rebound effect. Second, the government of 
Zimbabwe overspent on the military for the Congolese war, with expenditure estimates in the 
range of US$33 million a month2. Third, the Shoko (2013) attributes the currency devaluation 
to the compensation of Z$50,000 plus monthly pensions of Z$2,000 to each of 50,000 war 
veterans in 1997. These gratuities were demanded by the war veterans in repayment for their 
contribution to the liberation war of 1964 to 1979. Due to the fact that these expenditures 
were not budgeted for, they necessitated a large deficit, seen in the Figure 3 below, and as the 
RBZ printed money to meet this demand, inflation soared. The fourth, and arguably main cause 
of hyperinflation, was the decline in agricultural output, due to unsystematic land reform of 
1997. This resulted in a scarcity of commodities such that by January 1998, the price of maize 
 
1 See Ndlela, D. (2002). “Zimbabwe’s Economy since 1990”. 
2 See Kanyenze, G., Kondo, T., Chitambara, P., and Martens, J. (2011) “Beyond the Enclave”. 
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meal had risen by 47 percent. By 2001, the IMF reported that the economy had suffered a 23 
percent cumulative decline in output since 1997.  
In an interview about the Zimbabwean economic crisis, Robertson (pers. com. 2020) said that, 
“Hyperinflation was caused by the land reform because it broke the back of Zimbabwe’s 
biggest industrial sector – agriculture – and we have been suffering ever since. The government 
has not fixed that problem.” When land was taken off the market, the country’s biggest single 
business sector, commercial farming, was literally brought to its knees. Previously, commercial 
farming had been the biggest employer in the country; producing the biggest proportion of 
export revenues; producing the bulk of raw materials for the manufacturing sector in 
Zimbabwe (which was the 2nd biggest industrial sector in the country); and generating a very 
high percentage of government’s tax revenues (directly and indirectly).   
The economy’s sensitivity to disruption in agriculture can be seen in the diagram below. The 
period of the land reform and the first land invasions, and the drought of 1998, being 
highlighted.  
 
Figure 2: Zimbabwe’s deficit to GDP ratio trend, 1990 to 2013 
Source: Unpublished CSO statistics3 
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Sectors with backward and forward linkages to agriculture employed tens of thousands of 
people who paid income tax. So, the linkages between manufacturing, commerce and 
commercial agriculture were important and the government virtually closed down this major 
industry. The land reform process was accompanied by a poor rainy season. He combination 
led to a significant decrease in crop production, which affected local consumption as well as 
agricultural exports. For example, in 1997, Zimbabwe produced approximately 250 000 tons of 
(irrigated) wheat, which was the national average historically. However, this decreased to 25 
000 in 2008. This was not only in the case of wheat, but as seen in Figure 3, volumes of maize 
fell by 80 percent; tobacco production declined by 60 percent; cotton by 70 percent; sugar by 
30 percent; tea and flowers by 40 percent.  
  
Figure 3: Zimbabwe’s Agriculture Sales trends, 1998 – 2015 
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services 
 
In agreement, Cross (pers. com. 2020) estimates a 70 percent decrease in production across 
the agricultural sector between 1997 and 2008. These declines in output in the agricultural 
sector drove a decline in GDP. Figure 4 shows that from 1998 to 2008, GDP growth became 
negative, with annual falls ranging from -1 percent to -14 percent.  
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Figure 4: Zimbabwe’s GDP growth rate trend, 1990 – 2015 
Source: World Bank Data Portal 
 
It is worth noting that, apart from land reform, another contributing factor to the significant 
decline in agricultural output was poor rainfall. Zimbabwe suffered severe droughts in 1991, 
1998, 2002 and 2012. Figure 5 shows the maize output patterns in Zimbabwe over the period 
of the study. The quantity of maize produced declined during low rainfall years. 
 
Figure 5: Zimbabwe maize yield trend, 1980 - 2018 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations4 
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Both the drought and land reform resulted in a decline in agricultural output and the expected 
export revenues. This implied the significant decline of foreign earnings which affected 
Zimbabwe’s ability to service international debt. From independence till the land reform era 
the nation had enjoyed lines of credit with more than 100 international banking institutions. 
These lines of credit meant that Zimbabwe could import on credit and pay later. The ability to 
incur international debts was predicated on a steady inflow of foreign earnings from export 
industries, of which commercial agriculture was the biggest. With its closure, the ability to 
meet debt service payments disappeared. The international banks that had previously offered 
Zimbabwe credit, simply withdrew their lines of credit.  
When foreign finance to Zimbabwe was eventually suspended in 1999, the nation’s arrears to 
the World Bank had reached US$27 million, to the IMF were SDR53.7 million, and the 
government’s external debt was US$381 million (IMF, 2001). The resumption of foreign 
funding was made conditional upon improved macroeconomic policy and debt repayment 
until which time the World Bank would shift to funding social protection and AIDS related 
activities only.  
The government, wholly unprepared, now had to find foreign exchange to meet import bills 
which had previously been funded through credit lines. The biggest were fuel imports for which 
Zimbabwe was accustomed to having 6 months’ credit. Suddenly, cash payment was required 
for new fuel as well as for the fuel that had been bought on credit over the previous 6 months. 
The government had difficulty doing both so debt accumulated quickly and the nation’s credit 
rating slumped. In order to cope with the new reality and sustain itself, the government of 
Zimbabwe engaged in a cycle of short-term borrowings which resulted in ever greater external 
debt accumulation. These short-term loans, mainly from private creditors, were characterised 
by high interest rates (Bond, 1998; Jones et al. 2011). According to Ndlela (2010), the nation’s 
total debt by 2010 was US$5.7 billion, of which 91 percent was external. This external debt 
included arrears of US$3.65 billion and sovereign debt of US$1.1 billion. Between 1980 and 
June 2009, Zimbabwe owed domestic creditors US$460 million; the IMF US$135 million; China, 
US$950 million and the Paris Club, US$2.1 billion (Leo and Moss, 2009). 
The IMF and WB did a joint analysis of debt sustainability in Zimbabwe5; it found that Zimbabwe 
owed US$8.8 billion to the rest of the world by the end of 2010. This amounted to 118 percent 
of GDP, implying that the nation was fully leveraged at that stage. Arrears of US$5.95 billion 
accounted for 68 percent of this debt of which 19 percent was owed to International Financial 
Institutions. 
 
5 See IMF, (2011). “Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis”. 
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The government’s loss of access to foreign credit and of the shortage of foreign currency also 
curtailed the ability to import the raw materials, intermediate goods and capital needed to 
produce manufactures, many of which would ordinarily have later been exported.  Most of the 
country’s exports had some imported content, and as result the country’s foreign earnings 
declined even further. Figure 6 illustrates the declining trade balance from 1998 to 2008. 
Evidently, the country mostly had a positive trade balance until the year 2000. Thereafter it 
progressively became negative with really bad period beginning during the hyperinflation 
period of 2007 and 2008. Ever since, the nation has not recovered from import dependency.  
Once started, the country’s economic decline fed on itself: With less foreign currency, 
Zimbabwe struggled to import fuel. Motorists were forced to spend long hours in queues of 
cars at fuels stations, reducing the productivity of labour. The shortage of funds meant that 
government failed to maintain infrastructures such as roads, railways, water and sanitation 
systems, again lowering factor productivity. Zimbabwe’s urban infrastructure broke down, 
potholes and broken street and traffic lights raised the cost of running a vehicle, and again 
commerce and industry suffered.  
  
Figure 6: Zimbabwe’s External trade trend, 1990 – 2018 
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services 
 
As the farm invasions of the land reform period disrupted agricultural production, the 
government’s main import priority became food. Zimbabwe’s farming sector had extensive 
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of the multitude of firms that depended on them. The invasions also meant the loss of many 
elementary schools, high schools and clinics located and supported on the farms, and the 
incomes of farm workers. When the 4 500 farms were forced to close, approximately 496 000 
farm workers lost their jobs and livelihood. However, the agricultural sector’s close ties to the 
rest of the economy meant that many others lost their jobs indirectly. (Robertson, pers. com. 
2020). 
In many cases the farms were taken by party political functionaries. However, where small-
scale farmers were given access to the land, they did not get title, could therefore not secure 
bank loans, and largely depended on government subsidies. Unfortunately, these subsidies 
were an unbudgeted national expense. The only alternative was to monetize the deficit; 
effectively to print more money. The result can be seen in figures 7a and 7b below.  
 
Figure 7a: Currency in circulation in the Zimbabwean economy, 2001 – 2008 
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services 
 
 
Figure 7b: Currency in circulation in the Zimbabwean economy, 2004 – 2007 
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services 
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An increase in the amount of cash circulating in the financial system was apparent from 2001 
to 2008. As was mentioned in the theoretical section above, money supply increases result in 
increased inflation rates. Just before hyperinflation, in February 2007, the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe added Z$137 billion worth of cash to the economy. In March, the currency in 
circulation was increased by Z$372 billion. In April, currency in circulation rose by Z$658 billion 
and in May, by Z$1 470 billion, consisting of 14.7 million Z$100 000 notes. By June, the Reserve 
Bank had added 43 million Z$100 000 notes into the system and in July, 24.5 million Z$200 000 
notes. In September 2007, the currency in circulation increased by Z$8 500 billion, in the form 
of 42.5 million Z$200 000 notes. The trend continued and the Zimbabwean economy received 
and extra 61.5 million Z$200 000 notes, amounting to Z$12 300 billion in October 2007. In 
November 2007, the currency in circulation was increased by Z$18 400 billion in the form of 
92 million Z$200 000 notes. This amounts to an average of Z$3 million injected into the 
economy daily. In December 2007, the currency in circulation increased by Z$33 000 billion, 
which is tantamount to Z$1.5 million a day in the form of 44 million Z$750 000 notes. All this 
information was given by Robertson (pers. com. 2020).  
As a result of this extreme growth in money supply, the Zimbabwean dollar lost its value. 
Between September 2007 and September 2008, the daily foreign exchange rate on the parallel 
market had increased by 20 billion percent. For the politically connected few who were able 
to access foreign currency, the cross-rate gap between the official and parallel exchange rates 
became a source of income (Leiman, pers. coms. 2020). As a means of controlling the exchange 
rate and inflation, the Reserve Bank truncated the currency. On the 1st of August 2008, ten 
zeros were dropped from the currency. Immediately after this change US$1 was officially 
worth Z$100, but a hundred days later, on November 17, 2008, US$1 was worth Z$100 
quadrillion. In these four months, there was tremendous currency depreciation. This is clearly 
seen in Figure 8, which shows the exchange rate depreciation between January 2006 and 
November 2008. In January 2006, on the official market, US$1 converted to Z$99 201, but on 
the parallel market US$1 was worth Z$115 500. By November 2008, US$1 was worth Z$70 179 
010 in official circles, yet it would fetch Z$20 000 000 000 000 000 000 on the parallel market 
(Robertson, pers. com. 2020).  
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Figure 8: Currency conversions in the Zimbabwean economy, 2006 – 2008 
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services 
 
Evidently, the zeros still came back after a series of truncations of the Zimbabwean dollar. In 
July 2006, 3 zeros were removed and in August 2008, 10 more zeros were removed. After a 
number of other instances, a total of 25 zeros were removed between June 2006 and 
November 2008. All this was done in an effort to control the extreme hyperinflation which was 
necessitated by printing and adding large amounts of money into the economy.  
As money supply grew, Zimbabwe experienced very high levels of inflation until firms began to 
anticipate the inflation. Unfortunately, even attempts to control money supply growth would 
probably have failed due to the politicization of the RBZ at this point. By 2008, the RBZ’s quasi-
fiscal expenses on agricultural equipment, parastatals, elections and lending subsidies had 
reached US$1.1 billion (IMF, 2009). These necessitated the printing of money, which resulted 
in rapid growth of money supply and eventually uncontrollable inflation. In response, inflation 
was built into firms’ daily pricing policies. The resulting momentum ensured that inflation 
continued to rise. Expectations made inflation a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since people expected 
inflation to rise, firms factored it into pricing their product and households converted cash into 
goods as fast as they could. The combination of rapid price increases in shops, money printed 
by the government and rising transactional velocity of circulation ensured hyperinflation. 
Inflation continued to increase as government borrowed and printed more money to meet its 
recurring expenditures. They borrowed more money by selling treasury bills. However, since 
they set interest rates below the rate of inflation, investors experienced negative real interest 
25 | P a g e  
 
rates. The government had statutory reserve ratios for pension funds and insurance 
companies. This was a forced lending system with interest rates for those far below the rate 
of inflation.   
 
Figure 9: Zimbabwe’s savings and investments trends, 1980 - 2012 
Source: Unpublished CSO statistics6 
 
Indeed, as seen in Figure 9, savings as a percentage of GDP decreased and fixed capital 
formation investment followed the same trajectory. Indeed, on the ground, industry was 
closing down and infrastructure was collapsing. The Zimbabwean economy visibly deteriorated 
as both government and private sector did not have the money needed to invest in 
maintenance. This is because national and corporate reserves were losing value due to 
negative real rates of interest. So, the money that was available was used entirely to maintain 
daily activity, not to repair plants and equipment. The visible rise in investment at the height 
of hyperinflation alongside a decrease in savings is most likely a sign of firms hedging against 
inflation through the purchase of fixed assets. Property was a classic investment at this time, 
as buildings and building materials were being purchased to safeguard against inflation. 
Chirongwe (pers. com. 2020) says that residential property sales in the country increased by 
27 percent, from 11,061 in 2000 to 14,024 properties in 2004. This available data indicates an 
upward trajectory in property acquisition during the economic crisis and times of high inflation.  
 
1.2.2 Assets  
According to Leiman (pers. com. 2020), this culture of investing in property is part of the fibre 
of the Zimbabwean society. In Zimbabwe, there is a long tradition of home ownership, 
ownership of livestock in the rural areas, and of trading in equities. The first stock exchanges 
 













26 | P a g e  
 
opened shortly after the arrival of the pioneer column. With such a long history of asset 
ownership, it is no surprises that Zimbabwean households would resort to securing their 
savings in property. In hyperinflation, savings that are held in such real assets are far more 
secure than savings in cash, bank accounts or bonds, which are common to urban households. 
The urban poor were therefore the worst affected. In the rural areas, the life of small-scale 
farmers was affected – productivity declined as farmers saved rather than selling an entire 
crop and purchasing new hybrid seeds, as usual. Livestock held their value. The biggest 
problem was the attempts by government to control food prices. Production of cash crops 
suffered, but the rural population could at least feed themselves. In cities, the rich owned real 
assets, while the poor had savings accounts at the post office. As savings lost their value to 
inflation, many households converted them to assets; ranging from televisions to homes.  
 
Businesses were similarly affected by the persistently high inflation and their coping 
mechanism was to invest in equities as a means to secure the value of their money. The Chief 
Executive Officer of a local asset management firm, agreed with the previously cited 
economists that the printing of money by the Reserve Bank, in order to fund government, was 
the root of hyperinflation. This was similar to what happened in Brazil in 1980. In Zimbabwe, 
much like it was in Brazil, trading in equities for the money market was not wise because the 
government was expected to default on treasury bill interest payments. If they paid, the 
interest rates would be lower than the prevailing inflation rate, such that investors would 
experience a loss. As a result, the best investment strategy during the hyperinflation period 
was to create a diverse portfolio of equities, instead of gambling with the volatile money 
market. The reliable equities were for high quality listed companies. Such companies have 
“…simple sustainable business models with strong cashflows and low debt levels… By their 
nature – such stocks tend to be defensive…” The certainty of returns was higher with such an 
investment. The resultant, dividend income, capital gains and interest were reliable sources of 
cash for retired investors and the capital kept growing (Legat, pers. com. 2020).  
 
While asset managers looked at business models, cash flows and debt levels, investors 
evaluated companies differently during the hyperinflation period. Investors became practical 
and stopped evaluating companies based on profits or future cash flows. Instead, firms were 
valued by the assets that they owned such as properties and plants. For investors, plant 
maintenance became a higher priority than sustaining high levels of production.  
Regardless of the evaluation method it was clear that equities were regarded as a safe haven 
by investors because there was a perception that returns would recover if firms survived the 
high inflation period. The stock market was therefore a good hedge against hyperinflation. This 
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is seen in that, in spite of the extreme inflationary fluctuations from 1998 to 2006, the stock 
market was stable in US dollar terms. For example, from September 1999 to September 2006, 
the Imara Asset Management equity fund increased by 37 percent in US dollar terms and 
specifically, from 2001 and 2006, the equity fund doubled (Legat, pers. com. 2020). Clearly, 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) was a store of value for the small segment of the 
population which invested there, mainly the upper-middle-class.  
Even in at the peak of hyperinflation, in May of 2008, the stock market remained a place of 
refuge for those who could afford to invest and it protected pensions and insurance schemes 
against hyperinflation. At this stage, tobacco farmers were earning US$4 per kilogram (Cross, 
pers. coms. 2020). With the exchange rate floating at Z$230 million for US$1, this translated 
into many millions of Zimbabwean dollars. The only point of caution was that the local currency 
had to be used quickly before losing its value. As a result, as soon as farmers received their 
foreign earnings from exports, they directed them into the stock market and kept just enough 
to purchase inputs for the next season as well as to meet their daily needs. Indeed, the stock 
market proved to be a store of value and a vehicle of wealth accumulation during the 
hyperinflation period.  
 
1.2.3 Microeconomic effects   
The previous sections have shed light on how hyperinflation occurred, progressed and its effect 
on investment. It is clear that investment patterns were distorted by the high levels of inflation. 
Financial investment in interest bearing assets such as bonds decreased, while purchases of 
equity and property held up. It is also important to explore how the few businesses that 
survived were coping in this environment. Hyperinflation affected firms through finance, 
infrastructure and labour. As the nation’s economic and political conditions worsened, investor 
confidence fell with it, and many companies suffered from a lack of financing. In addition, many 
firms’ Foreign Currency Accounts were frozen when the country ran out of foreign reserves. 
As a result, such companies could not access the foreign earnings from their exports. This had 
short term impacts is it stopped them from importing inputs needed for production. It also had 
longer term consequences for production as it precluded, investment in new capital and 
hindered maintenance of the equipment that they were using. As expected, this negatively 
affected production and profits for firms.  
 
Apart from the investment aspect, consumption rates were significantly lower due to 
unemployment and imperfect indexation. This had an adverse effect on the sales volumes of 
many companies. The Chief Financial Officer of Lafarge Cement, makes it clear that volumes 
and revenue from cement sales, in real terms, were declining due to currency devaluation 
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(Matanhire, pers. com. 2020). A similar trend was observed at Total Petroleum, where the 
volumes of fuel sold decreased by 40 percent between 1999 and 2008 (Mukamura, pers. 
com.2020). Similarly, the Chief Executive officer of Nyaradzo Funeral Service, (Mataranyika, 
pers. com. 2020), concluded that the main cause for declining sales volumes in industry was a 
lack of affordability. Households resorted to basic lifestyles and cut out unnecessary 
expenditure, accordingly real demand fell and the private sector suffered.  
 
Hyperinflation also had a negative effect on firms’ daily operations. At Lafarge, for example, 
procurement procedures became inefficient because of foreign currency shortages. This 
resulted in poor maintenance of the company’s plant and heavy equipment. In addition, 
employees complained about the rapid loss of value of their locally denominated salaries due 
to inflation. As a result, Lafarge resorted to using fuel coupons as a currency to pay employees 
and creditors. In general, daily productivity was very low as transactions were limited due to 
fast rising prices. The business lost a number of critical skills as employees migrated to other 
countries for better employment opportunities. This brain-drain negatively affected product 
quality and customer satisfaction.  
 
In an attempt to minimize the effects of the inflation persons receiving money tried to effect 
purchases as soon as possible; one result was the increasing appeal of payments against future 
delivery. In the case of Lafarge, cement was paid for in advance and customers would be 
advised when to collect. The prepayments were meant to preserve value, but even this failed 
once the local currency was no longer accepted. Eventually the company resorted to barter - 
clients would bring various goods and service in exchange for cement. In some instances, the 
Lafarge received cars in exchange for cement. Daily operation at Lafarge suffered most in 2007 
when the government introduced price controls. Overnight, there were no inputs for 
production in the formal market. Inefficiency became the norm as permission to review prices, 
despite the extreme inflation, had to be sought from the government’s Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce.  
 
Total Petroleum tells a similar story of how operations suffered due to the shortage of foreign 
currency. It became increasingly difficult for them to pay for imported products such as fuel 
and lubricants. Even the maintenance of petrol stations was nearly impossible due to the 
liquidity crisis, along with the emigration of the company’s skilled engineers.  
 
The situation of firms worsened further in March 2007 when government began to charge an 
export tax of 32.5 percent of their export proceeds, at the official exchange rate. The real cost 
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was even greater as the official rate was far below the unofficial de facto rate. However, this 
did not deter firms from exporting, as this was the only way to earn the foreign currency 
needed to buy manufacturing inputs. At this point, foreign investors had largely withdrawn 
their support for local businesses. Despite the export tax and the disruptions some firms, 
mostly large companies that had economies of scale, continued to earn from exports, were 
able to sustain production and pay dividends to shareholders. An observation of the market 
showed growth in sales volumes for the firms that survived, which is counter-intuitive as prices 
had become inhibitive at this stage. However, this was because the few surviving retail firms 
were producing cheaper brands which cost them less to make. This along with the formation 
of syndicates, increased marketing and shorter pay periods were survival strategies that were 
adopted by firms in response to cash, credit and input shortages during the hyperinflation 
period (Gumbe and Kaseke, 2011).  
Another problem affecting production, especially in the manufacturing sector, was the poorly 
maintained national infrastructure. As previously mentioned in this account, government 
progressively failed to maintain and improve the water purification system, electricity supply, 
road networks and railways. As a result, the transportation of raw materials, the operation of 
electrically powered manufacturing equipment, as well as hydro-based systems suffered. 
Again, this had an adverse effect on production, which led to the closure of most of 
Zimbabwe’s industrial sector. According to Gumbe and Kaseke (2011), between 2006 and 
2008, capacity utilization of the manufacturing sector decreased from 95 to 31 percent. The 
estimates in Figure 10, show that recorded gold production decreased from 25 tonnes in 1997 
to 2,5 tonnes in 2008. This decline corresponds with the official statistics that show a decrease 
in gold production, from 11 tonnes in 2006 to 7 tonnes in 2007 (Spiegel, 2015). Unrecorded 
production, especially from informal operations, may well have risen. In the same decade, the 
output from coal mines decreased from 5 000 000 tonnes in 1999 to 1 500 000 tonnes in 2008. 
This quantity produced in 2008 was the lowest since 1947. Figure 11 shows the progressive 
decline in production based on quantities of coal transported by the National Railways of 
Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2004.  
As mentioned, one common coping mechanism for firms was barter trade; customers paid for 
services with fuel coupons, building tiles, bricks, cars, and other assets. As an unspoken rule, 
the functional currency in industry was fuel coupons. These became the unofficially recognised 
store of value and medium of exchange when foreign currency was still illegal tender.  
It is evident that the hyperinflation period had a severe adverse effect on firms, especially 
around August 2007 when the government fixed prices below the market clearing levels. 
Businesses could not sell at prices high enough to recover costs. This resulted in shortages of 
goods in the official market and increasing supply in the parallel market. Once the economy 
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had effectively moved to the parallel market, it became difficult to quantify inflation. By the 
end of June 2007, year on year inflation had increased by 22 000 percent according to the ZSE 
index.  
  
Figure 10: Zimbabwe’s mineral production trends, 1997-2008 
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services 
 
  
Figure 11: Zimbabwe’s overall production trends, 1998-2008  
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services 
 
Investor confidence faltered even more after the announcement of the new Indigenization and 
Economic Empowerment Program (IEEP) in 2010, which required foreign investors to sell 51 
percent company ownership to the government (Chigudu, 2019; Chowa and Makuvare, 2013). 
It is capital intensive businesses that were most negatively affected by this policy, as they tend 
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In such a hyperinflationary environment, most retail companies could not afford to purchase 
new stock and pay their overhead expenses. As a result, many employees were sent on unpaid 
leave. Retailers were no longer able to rely on local manufacturers as production became 
impractical at the controlled prices. As a result, most retailers chose to import their stock. 
Approximately 40 percent of retail products were imported. Mawowa and Matongo (2010) 
show that retailers purchased foreign currency from the roadside traders and then used it to 
procure imports. They were an integral part of the parallel market.  
Over the year 2007, the annualized inflation rate was estimated to be in the range of 500 000 
percent to 1 000 000 percent; the official Z$ to US$ exchange rate had increased by 1 100 000 
percent; and the stock market had risen by 1 400 000 percent (Robertson, pers. com. 2020). 
In terms of currency, the largest denomination was now a Z$250 million bill. Importantly, 
wages were lagging behind the price level; as a result, consumption dropped and poverty was 
increasing in households. Poverty also increased as a result of unemployment which became 
a continual problem over the decade. According to Chipika and Malaba (2011), structural 
unemployment rose from 63 percent in 2003 to 80 percent in 2008. Jobs that were lost in the 
formal sector, added to the informal sector which was inherited as a part of the colonial dual7 
economy. 
As expected, with these high levels of unemployment, household income poverty increased 
rapidly during the hyperinflation period. In 1995, the Poverty Assessment Study Survey8 
showed that the national poverty headcount ratio, based on the Total Consumption Poverty 
line, was 42 percent. A follow up study conducted in 2003 showed that the national poverty 
rate had increased to 63 percent, with at least 50 percent poor households in all of Zimbabwe’s 
10 provinces9. In the same study, ZimSTAT (2003), used per capita income as a measure of 
living standards and found the national Gini Coefficient of Zimbabwe to be 0.59 and 0.64 in 
1995 and 2003 respectively, suggesting that income inequality increased during the economic 
crisis. Robertson (pers. com. 2020) agrees and in Figure 12 shows that income per person fell 
below the global poverty line of US$1 a person a day in 2008. Post-dollarization, there was 
significant improvement.  
 
7 According to Kanyenze, G., Kondo, T., Chitambara, P., and Martens, J. (2011) in their book, “Beyond the 
Enclave”, the dual economy consists of two sectors. The formal sector is the one where capitalist production 
occurs and involves less than 20 percent of the nation’s labour. Coexisting with the formal, is the informal 
sector which is based on pre-capitalist activities like subsistence farming and engages the rest of the labour 
force participants in unproductive labour. 
8 Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, (2006). “ZIMBABWE 2003 Poverty Assessment Study 
Survey   Main Report”, MPLSW, FilMAZ, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
9 See Table A2.1 in the appendix. 
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Figure 12: Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita trend, 1990 - 2019 
Source: World Bank Data Portal 
 
Further information on household wellbeing is provided by Zimbabwe’s Scientific Industrial 
Research and Development Centre (SIRDC) who, through the Food and Nutrition Council, 
publish the Zimbabwe Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment Report (ZimVAC) annually 
for rural households and once every three years for urban households. The greater reporting 
frequency for rural households reflects their higher levels of food insecurity and their 65 
percent share of the nation’s population. For the purposes of this study, findings from ZimVAC 
(2002; 2003; 2005; 2006; 2009; 2010) will be used to show the state of households during the 
period of study. The reports before 2007 give details of the pre-hyperinflation situation, while 
those after 2008 give information about the post-hyperinflation situation.  
The decline in agricultural output during the hyperinflation period, led to a food security crisis 
in the country. According to ZimVAC (2005), a household is food insecure when its food 
entitlements, from own crop production and income, are less than its food requirements. This 
situation results in households not having sufficient food for survival and resorting to coping 
mechanisms such as cutting out meals or decreasing expenditure in health and education, 
which is what happened during the economic crisis.  
During the year 2002, Zimbabwe suffered a food deficit of 239 000 metric tonnes (Robertson, 
pers. com. 2020). This scarcity resulted from both the ongoing drought and the land reform 
program and associated land invasions. The land tenure changes left 496 000 former 












































































































































Gross Domestic Product 
Per Capita  
33 | P a g e  
 
individuals rose to 7 182 000 between September 2002 and March 2003. These farm workers 
that were retrenched due to land reform faced deficits of up to 75 percent of their food needs 
(ZimVAC, 2003).  
With this reality, the government planned to import 617 727 MT of cereals. Unfortunately, 
there was corruption in food distribution with apparent discrepancies between the reported 
quantities of imports and the volumes of grain that were received in communities (ZimVAC, 
2002). Due to the shortages in agricultural output, the parallel market price for maize increased 
by 167 percent in a year. One kilogram of maize was selling at Z$130. Over the course of the 
year 2002, the market saw an increase in livestock prices as well. The prices of chicken, goats 
and cattle increased by 40, 72 and 47 percent respectively. Given the annual inflation rate of 
133 percent in 2002, the real prices of livestock during this period are shown in Table 1. Food 
inflation was high and households that bought food, felt the difference and began selling some 
assets in order to afford to buy food at the at the higher prices, in an effort to maintain the 
same levels of consumption. For instance, in 9 out of the 10 provinces in Zimbabwe, 
households sold more cattle and goats than they had done in previous years, in order to raise 
money to buy food. This observed rise in demand and prices of livestock was mainly because 
rainfall was low and Zimbabwe suffered a drought in the year 2002 (Richardson, 2007). Then 
more livestock was lost due to drought and disease during this time.   
Table 1: Changes in real livestock prices, August to December 2002 
Animal August Price (Z$) December Price (Z$) Percentage change (%) 
Cattle                   172.53                          253.02                                 46.66  
Goat                      19.47                            33.51                                 72.08  
Chicken                       4.29                              6.02                                 40.53  
Source: ZimVAC (2002) 
In 72 percent of the communities that were surveyed (ZimVAC, 2002), many in the work force 
had lost their jobs and remittance flows declined by 96 percent due to the increase in 
unemployment. Unemployment was highest in urban and commercial farming areas. Most 
jobs were lost in the urban centres of Harare, Bulawayo, Midlands and Masvingo. On 
commercial farms, jobs were mainly lost in Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland East. Out 
of the people who remained employed, 41 percent were employed in government’s public 
works program. In order to meet their expenses, individuals who were officially unemployed 
sold fruits, insects such as termites, livestock, vegetables and engaged in casual labour. 
Nonetheless, others were engaging in high risk activities such as prostitution, livestock theft 
and gold panning. Another common feature of the hyperinflation era, especially in urban areas 
was the sale of household assets (ZimVAC, 2002).  
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Food shortages after the land reform and drought season, especially shortages of cereals, led 
to the consumption of wild foods, some of which are acidic when eaten raw (ZimVAC, 2002). 
As a result, 70 percent of women reported an increase in the incidence of diarrhoea among 
children. Some deaths resulted out of this new reality. Zimbabwe’s infant mortality rates were 
the highest in the world at this time. Historically – in the first 20 years of independence – 
Zimbabwe’s death rate has been an average of 10 in every 1,000 individuals a year, but during 
the hyperinflation period, the official death rate in Zimbabwe was double this amount, as seen 
in Figure 13. These hyperinflation years were also marked by low life expectancy.  
 
Figure 13: Zimbabwe’s death rate and life expectancy trends, 1980 - 2018 
Source: World Bank Data Portal 
 
Nonetheless, Cross (pers. com. 2020) claims that the average migrant seems to be sending 
roughly US$1000 to their family in Zimbabwe every year, though some send back far more. It 
is quite clear that remittances have been the lifeline of many households in Zimbabwe. Some 
of the remittances come as goods, but much comes as financial transfers. These are typically 
lumpy. With the inflation, much of the money has been secured by using it to purchase building 
materials and consumer durables. The majority of these remittances are directed to rural 
households and over the years, rural homes have become more modernised as their members 
working abroad send money and other durable items such as televisions, refrigerators, 
vehicles, and so on. Figure 14 shows the estimates of total remittance inflows provided by the 
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Figure 14: Zimbabwe’s foreign currency inflows from Money Transfer Agencies, 1990 – 2018  
Source: The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe  
 
It is evident that recorded remittances increased as the economic crisis worsened, and 
anecdotal evidence suggests that unrecorded remittances, and remittances in kind did so too; 
households depended on them for survival. But even with these extra resources coming in, 
households were cautious with their expenditure as the nature of remittances is 
unpredictability. This is what makes them different from a salary. In light of this, households 
employed the coping strategies in Table 2 during the hyperinflation period.  
These coping strategies were applied across the country, but were especially evident in urban 
households. Having little or no land to grow their own food, a greater part of their budget was 
assigned to food expenditure and they had to find ways of coping with hyperinflation in order 
to maintain food consumption at the best possible levels. A closer look at the urban 
demographic shows that 72 percent of the urban population were poor (ZimVAC, 2003). These 
households typically stayed in squatter camps, backyard shacks and peri urban areas. The most 
vulnerable and food insecure were households with more than 7 members, and those headed 
by females and elderly people. Approximately 2.5 million individuals, 64 percent of the urban 
population, were unable to meet the minimum daily food requirements. Of these, 1,2 million 
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Table 2: Household coping strategies during hyperinflation 
Coping Strategy  Proportion of households 
Consumption strategies 
Regularly limit food portion sizes 86% 
Regularly reduce the number of daily meals 86% 
Borrow food 57% 
Skip whole days without eating 49% 
Consume food from relatives or friends 28% 
Purchase food on credit  21% 
Income strategies 
Sell all poultry  11% 
Sell all assets 9% 
Sell all goats 8% 
Sell breeding and draft power cattle 6% 
Sell land 1% 
Expenditure strategies 
Reduce expenditure on healthcare 42% 
Reduce expenditure on education 39% 
Reduce expenditure on beer 34% 
Source: Zimbabwe Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2002 
Over 60 percent of cereals that were consumed in households were sourced from the parallel 
market by half of the urban population who could get them. The rest rarely got access to maize 
and other cereals. The result was that households significantly reduced their dietary intake. In 
urban areas, only 43 percent of the households ate 3 meals a day. The rest of the urban 
population ate 2 meals or less. This was the case for both the poor and middle class. The poorer 
the household, the less protein and more carbohydrates they consumed.  
While this was the case in urban areas, out of the sampled rural households in the survey, 36 
percent were food insecure (ZimVAC, 2005). Among many contributing factors, 70 percent of 
the rural household heads mentioned erratic rains and 57 percent complained about price 
increases as part of the causal factor for food insecurity in 2005. Rural households produced 
45 percent of the food that they consumed, while urban households only produced 12 percent 
of their food. As a result, food insecurity for urban households increased to 33 percent by the 
end of 2009 while it had decreased to 15 percent for rural households.  
Figure 15 shows the income sources for rural households and makes it apparent that they 
benefited from selling food to urban households. Sales of vegetables, food and cash crops fast 
became the main source of income as inflation rose. While these sales constituted 37 percent 
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of income for rural households in 2003, it rose to 54 percent in 2005 and 83 percent in 2009 
(ZimVAC, 2003, 2005, 2009). This resonates with Darnton-Hill and Cogill’s (2010) view that 
rural households are at an advantage during times of inflation because they produce their own 
food to eat and sell to urban households. The graph shows vegetable forming the bulk of food 
sales and this is very important because ZimVAC (2009) shows that, in an average week, urban 
households were consuming vegetables for 6 days and animal protein only one day in the 
week. If 70 percent of their food was purchased, this gave rural households an advantage over 
urban households in terms of income.  
 
Figure 15: Zimbabwe’s rural household income sources, 2005 and 2009 
Source: ZimVAC (2005; 2009) 
 
While rural households were self-employed, earning money from producing and selling 
vegetables, ZimVAC (2009) states that unemployment was 80 percent in the urban areas in 
2009. As a result, there was a shortage of income, which hindered households from accessing 
food. Apart from the loss of employment (therefore income), other shocks which affected 
urban households’ access to food where salary reductions, high food prices, high utility bills, 
low cash withdrawal limits and the pricing of food in foreign currency which was not available 
to all (ZimVAC, 2009). As a result, urban households suffered from food insecurity. Figure 16 
shows how the eating habits of urban households changed. The proportion of households 
eating 3 meals a day fell substantially, as most resorted to eating one or two meals in a day. By 
2009, only 59 percent of urban households had access to an adequate diet. This reinforces the 
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Figure 16: Zimbabwe’s daily urban household eating patterns, 2006 and 2009 
Source: ZimVAC (2009) 
 
The picture painted in Figure 16 suggests that the impacts of the economic crisis, which was 
characterised by hyperinflation may extend far beyond the actual period of rising prices. 
Clearly, urban households did not recover immediately prices stabilised, individuals continued 
to suffer a lack of income and food. Basing on evidence from other developing countries, the 
decrease in food quantity and alteration of diet to minimal protein intake most likely affected 
the health of adults and the growth of children (Ferreira and Schady, 2009).  
Apart from changing their diet, another coping mechanism that urban households used was 
the selling household assets. ZimVAC (2009) shows that 7 percent of urban households sold 
their livestock in order to buy food. In addition, 31 percent of the households had sold assets 
in the previous 3 months in order to buy food. Only 6 percent of urban households had 
purchased assets in the 6-month period prior to the survey. From the total sample of urban 
households interviewed, 41 percent of food insecure households and 24 percent of food 
secure households reported the disposal of assets in order to purchase food.  
Considering the fact that, 37 percent of transactions in rural areas were conducted through 
barter trade, there is a high likelihood that, in addition to cash purchases, urban households 
also traded their physical assets for food, to the benefit of the rural suppliers. Cross (pers. com. 
2020) confirms that urban households became dependent on rural households for food during 
the hyperinflation period. There was a reversal of the flow of resources during this time. 
Apparently, people in urban areas sold cars, consumer durables, houses, flats, and other assets 
in order to get cash for food purchases. The problem was that the Zimbabwean dollar was 

















1 meal 2 meals 3 meals 4 meals
Urban Households' Eating Patterns
2006 2009
39 | P a g e  
 
currency. Many were willing to take discounts because selling assets at a discount in US dollars 
was better than selling them for their full value in local currency. In 2008, prices were doubling 
every 3 hours. It was difficult to keep up, so the only way to avoid losing the value of earnings 
was to trade most of their earnings in for foreign currency or durable assets; either option was 
a store of value. Then the urban households would keep just enough local currency to buy food 
and pay for transportation. Unfortunately, the local currency was also unpopular with the 
farmers as it would depreciate before they could buy seed for the next crop. The result was 
that many farmers took to saving seed, even though it resulted in yield depression (Leiman and 
Behar, 2011). 
Indeed, rural households told a different story from their urban counterparts in ZimVAC (2009; 
2010). Apparently, food insecurity had decreased from 36 percent in 2005 to 18 and 15 
percent in 2009 and 2010, respectively. This could be attributed to the 31 percent increase in 
staple cereal production and the proceeds thereof. As well as the 215 percent increase in 
vegetable sales. Casual labour income also increased with the greater demand for agricultural 
produce. While in 2005, the proportion for casual labour among income sources in rural 
households was 11 percent, ZimVAC (2010) shows that it increased to 32 percent over the 5-
year period. With more income from these various sources, it is highly likely that rural 
households were able to purchase more assets after hyperinflation.  
Indeed, ZimVAC (2010) shows that the proportion of income spent on education, loan 
repayments, agricultural inputs and clothes increased significantly among rural households. In 
addition, access to improved water sources increased. While only 52 percent of rural 
households had access to improved water sources in 2005, by 2010, the proportion had 
increased to 67 percent. Access to improved sanitation, mainly Blair toilets, had improved 
marginally with an increase from 36 to 40 percent between 2006 and 2010 (ZimVAC, 2010).  
On the other hand, sanitation and water supply became dysfunctional in urban areas. ZimVAC 
(2009) does not quantify the access rates for sanitation in urban Zimbabwe. However, there is 
mention of infrastructure breakdown which resulted in the cholera outbreak of 2008/9 that 
claimed approximately 4 600 lives of the 98 000 who fell ill in 60 of the country’s 62 districts 
(World Health Organization, 2008). Causal factors mentioned were the absence of a refuse 
collection system and purified water, as well as the collapse of the sewage and public health 
systems; which all occurred progressively during the economic crisis. In support, the World 
Bank (2013) mention that only 24 percent of urban household sanitation systems were 
connected to sewer. As a result, the rest of the households use open defecation and often 
untreated sewers run into water sources. According to the report, water and sanitation 
systems collapsed because of insufficient treatment chemicals and chronic power shortages 
which disrupted the pumping and treating process of water. 
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Chapter 2 
Hypothesis and Research Questions    
 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation had consequences for 
asset poverty, asset inequality and child malnutrition in Zimbabwe; the nature and extent of 
these impacts provides its subject matter. The empirical chapters, answer the following 
research questions: 
Chapter 3: How did the hyperinflation of 2007 to 2008 affect asset poverty in Zimbabwe? 
Chapter 4: How did the hyperinflation of 2007 to 2008 affect asset inequality in Zimbabwe? 
Chapter 5: How did the hyperinflation of 2007 to 2008 affect child malnutrition in Zimbabwe? 
 
The Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys (ZDHS 1994, 1999 2005, 2010, 2015) provide 
much of the data used to address these questions. The first three datasets represent the pre-
hyperinflation period, while the last two represent the post-hyperinflation period. Using this 
nationally representative data, an asset index is created as a proxy for household income. This 
asset index is the main thread that ties the empirical analyses together.  
In the first empirical chapter, the asset index is used to assess changes that occurred in 
household poverty across the hyperinflation period. Following Sahn and Stifel (2000) and 
Booysen, Van Der Berg, Burger, Von Maltitz & Du Rand (2008), the 20th and 40th percentiles 
are used as relative poverty lines. Private asset ownership and public asset access rates before 
and after hyperinflation are compared. It is expected that asset poverty will increase as was 
the case with income poverty in other countries that experienced extreme inflation (Cardoso, 
1992; Powers, 1995; Datt and Ravallion, 1997; Ravallion, 1998; Romer and Romer, 1998; 
Agénor, 1998; Easterly and Fischer, 2000; Braumann, 2004; Chaudhry and Chaudhry, 2008). 
Particular attention is given to urban households because the literature (Dessus, Herrera, & De 
Hoyos, 2008; Robilliard, Bourguignon, & Robinson, 2001; Suryahadi, Sumarto, & Suharso, 
2000; Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002) shows that, during economic crises marked with high 
inflation, urban households are more negatively affected than their rural counterparts. This 
chapter contributes to the existing empirical literature by being the first to explore the 
hyperinflation-poverty link using Zimbabwe DHS data.  
In the second empirical chapter, the asset index is used to assess the changes that occurred in 
asset inequality during hyperinflation. The Gini Coefficient and other measures of inequality 
are applied to the asset index and compared before and after hyperinflation. This study adds 
to others which give evidence that a positive correlation exists between inflation and 
household income inequality (Blinder and Esaki, 1978; Adelman and Fuwa, 1992; Cutler, Katz, 
Card, & Hall, 1991; Cardoso and Urani, 1995; Bulir, 2001; Fereirra and Litchfield, 2001; 
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Bittencourt, 2009). The results of this chapter are a key contribution to the literature on the 
link between hyperinflation and inequality because of the use of a non-monetary measure of 
inequality and the application to the African context.  
In the last empirical chapter, the asset index along with inflation, is used among a number of 
proximate determinants of child malnutrition in Logistic regression analyses. The main 
objective is to assess the relationship between inflation and malnutrition. Malnutrition is 
measured by two indicators – stunting and wasting. Literature (Darton-Hill and Cogill, 2010; 
Paxson and Schady, 2005; Christian,2010; Kiguel and Liviatan, 1995; Waters, Saadah, & 
Pradhan, 2003; Block et al., 2004; Stillman and Thomas, 2004; McKenzie, 2006; West and 
Mehra, 2010; Pelletier, Frongillo, Schroeder, & Habicht, 1995; Black et al., 2008; Brinkman, De 
Pee, Sanogo, Subran, & Bloem, 2010) shows mixed results for this relationship, as it depends 
on other socioeconomic factors at individual, household and community level.  Nonetheless, it 
is expected that child malnutrition would increase with inflation because of the prevailing 
conditions at the time. The aforementioned shortages in electricity, clean water, food and 
healthcare which were characteristic of the hyperinflation period, are probable contributors 
to a rise child malnutrition. In addition, the rates of malnutrition would most likely differ among 
children depending on access rates to various amenities. Hence the chapter ends with an 
assessment of malnutrition inequality showing the most affected segment of population. This 
chapter adds to the slim body of literature (Frankenberg, Beegle, Sikoki, & Thomas, 1999; 
Paxson and Schady, 2005; Waters et al., 2003; Masgrove, 1987; Abel-Smith, 1986) that shows 
a decline in health during economic crises that are characterized by high inflation. To date, 
there exists no literature on the link between hyperinflation and child malnutrition in Africa, 
but especially in Zimbabwe. As a result, this is a significant contribution to that research area.  
The lessons of this thesis can be summarised in three key points10: 
First, that unsustainable external borrowing, coupled with excessive money supply plus 
corruption, can plunge an economy into a hyperinflationary spiral that is hard to reverse.  
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation did not just happen; it was a consequence of deliberate actions 
taken by policy makers.  
Second, the people who suffered most were those who had things that are intensely sought 
after in a modern economy: a decent  wage earning job, a mortgage, a bank account, a pension 
scheme, and easy access to social infrastructure, such as municipal supplies of water and 
electricity.  
 
10 My thanks to an anonymous examiner for suggesting these three points. 
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Third, that Zimbabwean hyperinflation incentivized rural households to accumulate physical 
assets while forcing their urban counterparts to de-cumulate financial assets. Consequently, 
and to the surprise of the author, overall asset poverty in the country decreased when inflation 
was at its peak. This suggests that an anti- inflationary policy applied uniformly in urban and 
rural areas is unlikely to have the desired welfare effects.  
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Chapter 3   
Household poverty and hyperinflation in Zimbabwe 
 
3.1 Introduction    
This empirical study seeks to answer the question: How did household asset poverty change 
during the hyperinflation period in Zimbabwe? To answer the question, an objective analysis 
is conducted, and results are explained taking the Zimbabwean context into account. The 
analysis focusses on shifts in the incidence and severity of poverty between Zimbabwe’s pre-
hyperinflation and post-hyperinflation periods. As mentioned in the thesis introduction, 
hyperinflation in Zimbabwe destroyed many people’s savings and left some absolutely 
impoverished. However, the impacts were not felt equally by all. As expected, those who had 
their savings denominated in Zimbabwe Dollars as cash or in banks and building societies 
effectively lost everything. Those who held equity quoted on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
(ZSE) were somewhat better off; a study of share portfolio values in real terms shows that 
some value was kept; indeed pension/insurance companies like Old Mutual did well (Mpofu 
and Nyamadzawo, 2016). People holding land, developed property, livestock and real capital 
assets such as farm machinery or mining equipment merely lost the natural depreciation on 
them. There have been only two other studies (Larochelle, Alwang, & Taruvinga, 2014) that 
attempt to compare the impacts of the inflation on the real worth of households, measured by 
their asset holdings. What distinguishes this study, however, is the use of the ZDHS datasets. 
Since similar datasets are available for other countries, it becomes possible to compare the 
results with relatively similar sized economies. This is an issue of real moment, both politically 
and economically, and a gap that this paper attempts to fill.  
 
The significance of a household’s asset base for its well-being has been well-addressed in the 
global literature. According to Oliver and Shapiro (1990), financial and durable assets are the 
resources that enable households to move beyond basic needs and to achieve economic 
mobility. As examples they cite assets such as savings for college or retirement, investments, 
and real estate. These buffer a household against financial loss and are also a source of 
economic security and upward mobility. Caner and Wolff (2004) echo this sentiment, stating 
that assets provide liquidity in times of economic hardship, specifically citing owner-occupied 
housing as an important part of household wealth. In addition, Rothwell and Robson (2018) 
say that assets allow for consumption smoothing, increased social engagement and contribute 
towards social and economic mobility. Carter and Barrett (2006) also argue that the asset-
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based approach to poverty analysis sheds light on the persistence of structural poverty in a 
society; an issue of significance in Zimbabwe.   
A household’s assets, being a store of wealth over time, provide a stable measure of household 
well-being. This is especially important in a country like Zimbabwe where the value of money 
is unstable. Over a 30-year period, the annual inflation rate increased from 15.5 percent in 
1990, to 351,410 percent in 2008, declined to 3 percent by 2010 and in mid-2020 is again back 
above 800 percent (RBZ, 2014). During the hyperinflation, money ceased to be a store of value 
because it lost its purchasing power within minutes. As stated in the thesis introduction, at the 
peak of hyperinflation in 2008, prices were being changed hourly, and were doubling every 
day. Given that wages are the price for labour, they also fluctuated unpredictably, though not 
as frequently as inflation. The result is that household income and expenditure data over this 
period are generally unavailable, and where present, they are unreliable and unmeaningful. 
Financial assets such as pensions, which are beyond the scope of this study, are only addressed 
tangentially. Their values fluctuated sporadically and meaningful data on them are scarce.  
Noting the clear and well-defined impacts of Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation on cash, bonds, 
equities and other financial assets; this paper focusses on its implications for the stock of 
durable assets held by households. These include televisions, radios, refrigerators, vehicles, 
toilet facilities, water sources, electricity connections, and the construction material of the 
dwelling. These, and others like them, are used in the standard asset index literature (Sahn and 
Stifel, 1999; Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). A significant contribution made in this analysis will be 
the inclusion of assets that are more relevant to rural areas, such as land and livestock. As a 
robustness check, the analysis is done twice. First with just the 2005 and 2010 datasets that 
are closest in time to the hyperinflation period, then the analysis is repeated after adding data 
from 1994 to 2015. The first scenario is shown in the results section of the main paper, while 
the second has been placed in the appendix. In this study, the chosen assets are useful in 
revealing certain unexpected consequences of hyperinflation, one of which was enhanced 
accumulation of household assets as it incentivised them to transform any spare cash into 
consumer durables or home improvements.  
The link between inflation and poverty has been explored in many contexts, but there is a 
growing consensus that consumption poverty increases with inflation (Cardoso, 1992; Powers, 
1995; Datt and Ravallion, 1997; Ravallion, 1998; Romer and Romer, 1998; Agénor, 1998; 
Easterly and Fischer, 2000; Braumann, 2004; Chaudhry and Chaudhry, 2008). These concur 
that inflation erodes the purchasing power of money, reducing real incomes and resulting in a 
decrease in consumption and subsequent increase in consumption poverty. The main 
assumption is that indexation is imperfect, i.e. wages do not increase as fast as general prices. 
In Zimbabwe, public sector wages were being reviewed bi-annually, while private sector wages 
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were reviewed quarterly and at most monthly during hyperinflation, yet inflation was rising 
hourly (Makochekanwa, 2007). As a result of the lagging wage increments, households 
experienced loss in real income. In such a case of persistent inflation and loss in real income, 
the compositions of households’ asset portfolios change; equity holdings and real cash 
balances decreasing while tangible assets increase (Cagan and Lipsey, 1978). Like American 
households in the 1970s, affluent Zimbabwean households initially flocked to the stock market 
(Njanike and Mudzura, 2009); however, at the peak of hyperinflation, the common stock failed 
to be an adequate means of hedging against inflation because financial assets depreciated in 
real terms (Ben, 2016). Hyperinflation theory (Kiguel, 1989) suggests that real money balances 
decline below steady state during times of hyperinflation. In essence, households respond to 
rising inflation and negative real interest rates, by spending while they can. On receiving 
income from labour or investments, they immediately move into real assets, such as the 
consumer durables used in this analysis. Taylor (1974) describes this hedging mechanism by 
acquiring assets as, a form of saving during times of uncertainty. Saving by purchasing durables 
can have profound implications for economic growth. As savings are withdrawn from bank 
accounts and channelled into durables, liquidity in the banking sector declines and corporate 
investment dwindles.  
The implications of inflation for poverty have also been studied in Zimbabwe by Stoeffler, 
Alwang, Mills, & Taruvinga (2016), who measured the multidimensional poverty index11 (MPI) 
from 2001 to 2008 and found a 22 percent increase in multidimensional poverty from 2001 to 
2007, followed by a 16 percent decrease as the economy recovered post-2008. The MPI used 
by Stoeffler et al., (2016) included education, health, employment, while the assets that 
represented living standards were access to water and electricity, as well as sanitation type. 
Amongst rural households, land, livestock and farm equipment were also included. Using 
polychoric principal components analysis Larochelle et al., (2014) noted a similar pattern and 
found that poverty worsened during the hyperinflation. In their analysis, the value of durable 
goods formed part of total household consumption, which included food, education, health, 
along with other goods and services. What distinguishes this analysis from the aforementioned 
studies is that it identifies periods ‘before’, and ‘after’ hyperinflation, and captures the changes 
in poverty between them. Like Stoeffler et al., (2016) this study recognises rural households 
through the inclusion of assets such as livestock, but has opted to use Uncentered Principal 
Components Analysis to create the asset index.  
 
 
11 According to Alkire and Santos (2010, p7), “The MPI is an index of acute multidimensional poverty. It reflects 
deprivations in very rudimentary services and core human functionings…”  
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In this study, the asset index relies on data from the ZDHS waves of 2005 and 2010. Variables 
reflecting ownership of assets and access to services are used to generate an index, which is a 
proxy for asset wealth. Asset ownership rates and cumulative density functions are analysed 
in order to quantify the changes in asset wealth during the hyperinflation period. These 
changes in asset wealth give a direct indication of the shifts in asset poverty, which are further 
assessed using the conventional poverty measures.    
 
Prices having been so unstable; a non-monetary measure was imperative; benchmarks 
expressed in cash terms would be meaningless in a hyperinflationary context such as 
Zimbabwe’s. The asset index was the most suitable measure allowing for the comparison of 
household welfare over time. Sahn and Stifel (2003) explored the uses of alternative welfare 
measures using data from 10 relatively stable economies, with less extreme inflation than 
Zimbabwe’s. Their findings suggested that asset indices are acceptable predictors of household 
economic welfare and can outperform conventional indicators such as income or expenditure, 
which may be subject to error due to recall bias and unreliable price deflators - which are 
especially likely if (as in Zimbabwe) there have been rapid and uneven changes in inflation.  
 
The absence of any measure of debt or liquid assets from the index built for this study is 
conspicuous. Although authors such as Haveman and Wolff (2004) used them when examining 
asset poverty, both were wiped out, first by the hyperinflation and then by the replacement of 
the Zimbabwe Dollar. Durable assets and access to key public services remained the only viable 
measure of household welfare over time in Zimbabwe.   
 
3.2 Review of related literature 
According to Deaton (2003), “What happens to poverty depends on what happens to the 
distribution of income and consumption.” Grootaert (1983) had suggested that, “Households 
can be ranked on the basis of their total expenditures (appropriately deflated), while income 
and assets are the key variables necessary to analyse the sources of varying levels of welfare.” 
Both seem to suggest a logical division of the literature into two segments. The first consists of 
monetary measures such as income and consumption, while the second uses non-monetary 
measures of welfare such as assets.  
 
In the first group which measures flows of welfare, money is the common denominator. 
Income, for example, includes salaries, wages, grants and any other proceeds from productive 
activities. Consumption measurements are based on household expenditure. They show the 
value of durable and perishable goods and services, consumed by a household in a given period 
of time, whether home produced or obtained from the formal or the informal sector. Due to 
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this level of inclusivity, consumption expenditure is the better measure in developing countries 
where many households produce their own food (Blundell and Preston, 1998; Cutler and Katz, 
1992; Deaton, 2016; Meyer and Sullivan, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2013; and Poterba, 1989). 
Such food as is produced and consumed at home would be excluded from purchases made 
using income. However, once the quantity of home-produced food is known, its value at 
market prices can be estimated and added to income. Apart from inclusivity, measurement 
error is likely to be lower for consumption than for income which is more likely to be over- or 
under-reported.  
 
While income and consumption are common measures of household welfare, they can be 
problematic in developing country contexts. First, developing countries are often characterised 
by high levels of unemployment. As a result, many households do not have consistent income. 
Second, where household earnings are generated in the informal sector (as is common in LDCs 
including Zimbabwe) the income is rarely regular and pay slips are not available for verification 
during data collection. Third, where households produce food for sale, the resulting income is 
seasonal. These three factors contribute to recall bias amongst respondents. Errors are prone 
to happen. Although income and consumption are the most commonly used measures, neither 
would have been a viable welfare measure during Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation because the 
attendant price volatility would have made measuring the real values of either impossible.   
 
Unfortunately, in Zimbabwe, both income and consumption were unreliable measures of 
household welfare during the hyperinflation period. Not only because of the aforementioned 
sources of measurement error, but also due to price distortions arising from the extreme 
inflation. The prices of goods and services were changing rapidly and unpredictably, making 
any form of standardization meaningless. Accordingly, in order to measure household welfare 
while avoiding price related complexities, uses an asset index. Asset indices falls in the broader 
class of welfare indices, which are used as proxy measures of household welfare in cases where 
income and consumption variables are either unreliable or unavailable (Bollen, Glanville, & 
Stecklov, 2002; Booysen et al., 2008; Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Kolenikov and Angels, 2009; 
Larochelle et al, 2014; Montgomery, Gragnolati, Burke, & Paredes, 2000; Moser and Felton, 
2007; Sahn and Stifel, 2000, 2003; Wall and Johnston, 2008).  
 
According to O’Donnell et al., (2007) there are three main methods used when constructing 
welfare indexes; this study uses a variant of the third. Welfare indices can be constructed by 
predicting consumption, using arbitrary weights or using Principal Components Analysis (PCA). 
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When constructing a welfare index by predicting consumption, one dataset (typically from an 
earlier time period) will include a consumption variable, while the other does not. A regression 
is computed using the old consumption data and the coefficient estimates are used as weights 
for a welfare index in the more recent dataset. Such a welfare index would include indicators 
of welfare such as durable assets, as well as determinants of consumption such as education 
status (Coady, Grosh, & Hoddinott, 2004; Grosh and Baker, 1995).  
 
In the case where a welfare index is computed using an arbitrary approach, this is done by 
adding up asset ownership variables and assigning equal weights (Montgomery et al., 2000; 
Morris, Carletto, Hoddinott, & Christiaensen, 2000). 
 
To construct a welfare index using Factor and Principal Components Analyses, a weighted 
combination of assets is constructed, but this time, the weights are not arbitrary. Instead, they 
are assigned by statistical techniques applied to the particular dataset in use (Galbraith, 
Moustaki, Bartholomew, & Steele, 2002). Nonetheless, the choice of variables is arbitrary, and 
depends on the asset variables that are available in the dataset. The approach uses a 
combination of indicator variables to represent ‘welfare’, which is unobserved in the absence 
of consumption and income. Filmer and Scott (2008) show that Factor Analysis and Principal 
Components Analysis produce indices that are highly correlated with each other and that yield 
similar rankings for households. The index is a linear combination of asset variables; the model 
for it can be seen in equation (1) of the methodology section below.  
 
The asset index is the first of many uncorrelated linear combinations of asset variables. Each 
combination produces weights that show variation in the data. The first linear combination, 
which gives the asset index, is called the principal component. The most appropriate PCA 
format will depend on the nature of the data. According to Adbi and Valentin (2007), when the 
asset variables are continuous, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is the most suitable 
method. On the other hand, when the asset variables are ordinal, Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis (MCA) is preferred (Larochelle et al, 2014). When some of the asset variables are 
categorical in nature Kolenikov and Angles (2009) suggested polychoric PCA (p-PCA).  
 
An alternative to the PCA indices is Factor Analysis (FA). The aforementioned linear 
combinations are much fewer when the FA method is used. As a result, the FA method yields 
a much smaller covariance matrix to influence the weights in the first combination (Sahn and 
Stifel, 2003).  
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There are shortcomings visible in the household welfare literature concerning Africa. One 
reason is the lack of reliable income and consumption data. The few authors who have written 
about household welfare in Africa have opted to use welfare indexes (Booysen et al., 2008; 
Rustein and Johnson (2004); Sahn and Stifel, 2003). Second, with the exception of Larochelle 
et al (2014), there is little on changes in household welfare in hyperinflationary environments 
despite the distortionary effects of hyperinflation on household welfare. Third, the welfare 
measures used have tended to be biased in favour of urban households, typically containing 
assets used in urban households. Even though 60 percent of Africa’s population is rural (United 
Nations Population Division, 2018), the best that has been done to accommodate rural 
households has been to add variables for poor sanitation and basic water.  
 
This study addresses the first and second shortcomings by analysing changes in household 
welfare in Zimbabwe; the only African country that has experienced hyperinflation. By using 
the specific years covered in the study, another coincidental contribution is that this is the first 
time that an asset index is created and used in an analysis for Zimbabwe using the 2005 and 
2010 ZDHS datasets. The existing empirical studies have used Zimbabwe DHS data from 1988, 
1994 and 1999 (Booysen et al., 2008; Sahn and Stifel., 2000). As a means of addressing the 
third shortcoming, this study uses Uncentered Principal Components Analysis (UCPA). 
According to Wittenberg and Leibbrandt (2017), this is the most suitable method for creating 
an asset index if the majority of households are rural. This is because all assets are assigned 
weights with positive values, even rural assets which are often deemed inferior and would be 
assigned negative values by the conventional welfare index methods listed above. To further 
represent rural households, land, livestock and cellular phones are included in the asset index. 
These assets are common in rural households which constitute 65 percent of the Zimbabwean 
population. In summary, this empirical study of the changes in household welfare and poverty 
during Zimbabwe’s first hyperinflation makes these four contributions to existing literature.   
 
3.3 Methodology  
This study uses a technique of asset poverty measurement like that used by Sahn and Stifel 
(2000). The analysis uses ZDHS data from the years 2005 and 2010 i.e. just before and just after 
the hyperinflation. Because inflation was already very high in 2005, a robustness check is then 
performed by extending the pre- and post- inflation periods, using data over the 20-year period 
1994 – 2015.  
 
The method has four steps. First, an asset index is generated for each economic period. 
Second, the summary statistics for the asset index and asset variables, are compared between 
the two economic periods. Third, the cumulative density functions for the asset index in each 
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of the two periods are compared. Fourth, an analysis of asset poverty is performed by 
computing the poverty headcount and poverty gap indices (FGT 0 and 112). The results for the 
two economic eras are then compared. All calculations are first conducted on a national level, 
and then after disaggregation between the rural and urban sectors.  
 
Deriving the asset index  
The asset index is a linear combination of the household assets listed in the data section. 
Indexation makes the asset and access variables comparable so that they can be combined to 
capture household wealth. Banerjee’s (2010) technique of Uncentered Principal Components 
Analysis (UCPCA) is adopted to create the asset index. This varies slightly from the Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) of Filmer and Pritchett (2001); it is more relevant to the 
Zimbabwean context, which is 65 percent rural, because it gives positive values to rural assets 
such as Blair13 toilets. As Wittenburg and Leibbrandt (2017) explain, the difference is due to 
the standardization method. In an UCPCA index, unlike a standard PCA index, the asset 
variables are divided by the mean. In the case of binary variables that are used in the index, 
they are divided by the probability of owning the asset. This method places the entire index in 
the positive orthant, and there are no assets with negative coefficient values. This reflects an 
underlying assumption that all assets add value to a household, including those assets, typically 
found in rural areas, even though these may be perceived to be inferior to assets more 
prevalent in urban areas. For example, the Blair toilet, which is often seen to have less value 
than the flush toilet. While people are pleased to have one in the rural areas, it is frowned 
upon in urban areas; yet it is still better than having a conventional pit latrine or no toilet at all. 
With the UCPCA index, both flush and Blair toilets are given positive coefficient values. Another 
advantage of this index is that it can be used to measure inequality. Like conventional PCA, this 
method precludes the arbitrary application of weights as the resultant weights are based on 
the asset data. Imposing equal weights would conceal the actual value of the assets in relation 
to household wealth, which is the latent variable. The structural equation of the asset index is: 
 
𝑊𝑖 =  𝜔1𝑎𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝜔𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘          (1) 
Here, 𝑊𝑖is the asset index for households i=1…N; the 𝑎𝑖𝑘 ’s denotes the k=1…K assets and 𝜔’s 
represents weights14. The weights that emerged upon creating the wealth index with the ZDHS 
 
12 Foster, J. E., Greer, J., & Thorbecke, E. (1984) “A class of decomposable poverty indices.” 
13 A Blair toilet is a ventilated cement lined improved pit toilet with a chimney and fly trap which connects the 
pit to outside air. See: http://www.csir.co.za/Built_environment/santechcentre/docs/Blair_info_sheet.pdf . 
Blair toilets are the common substitute for flush toilets among households in Zimbabwe, where piped water is 
rarely available. They are designed to prevent the contamination of ground water by human sewage while 
keeping house flies from leaving the latrine (Root, 2001). 
14 See Table A2.2 in the Appendix 
51 | P a g e  
 
data are shown in Table A1.1. These are coefficients showing the relationship between the  
respective asset and the latent variable – wealth. It would not be prudent to use asset prices 
as weights in an economy like Zimbabwe’s, where market prices have been so badly distorted.  
UCPCA is also used to derive weights for the construction of the asset index. The common 
factor which explains most of the variation in asset ownership is wealth (𝜃𝑖).  The assets are 
related to wealth in a linear manner: 
𝑎𝑖𝑘 =  𝜌𝑘𝜃𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑘           (2) 
The relationship between the asset and wealth component is computed as a correlation 
coefficient. Wealth and other common factors (latent variables) are derived from the pattern 
of correlation between the assets. The common factors, other than wealth, which also 
determine variation in the assets, are contained in the uniqueness element. The correlation 
matrix is derived from the original asset variables but once the assets are standardized, the 
result is a covariance matrix, the eigenvalues being used as the weights for the asset index in 
equation 1. The less common assets thus receive greater weights.  
 
The following assumptions are made in the construction of the asset index:  
A1 – Households are distributed independently and identically (iid)  .   (3) 
A2 – Error zero mean:Ε(𝑢𝑖|𝜃𝑖) = 0        (4) 
A3 – Constant variance of error: 𝑉(𝑢𝑖) =  𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔
𝐾𝑥1{𝜎1
2, … , 𝜎𝑘
2}    (5) 
Once the asset index is created, the mean asset index, which represents average wealth, is 
then compared between the pre-hyperinflation and hyperinflation periods.   
Poverty Profile 
Next, the asset index is used to measure the poverty. Two relative poverty lines are used in the 
analysis. Following Filmer and Scott (2008), the 20th percentile of the asset index distribution 
is used as the lower poverty line, which is the mark of extreme poverty, in the pre-
hyperinflation period. Then, following Sahn and Stifel (2000), the 40th percentile of the pre-
hyperinflation asset index distribution is used as the upper poverty line. Based on these two 
poverty lines, the pre-hyperinflation and hyperinflation poverty headcounts and gaps are 
measured. It is worth emphasising that these poverty lines are based on the asset index 
distribution of the pre-hyperinflation (or base) period and they remain fixed for comparison 
with the asset index distribution of the post-hyperinflation period. These calculations are done 
at a national level then decomposed into two sub-pools, one for rural and the other for urban 
households. Poverty is measured for the combined dataset as well as for each wave and 
separately for rural and urban households. The results will be valid, even though this is not a 
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panel study, because the repeated cross-sections that are used in this analysis are nationally 
representative. 









𝑖=1 )^𝛼          (6) 
The poverty headcount index 𝑃0 which is calculated when 𝛼 = 0 is a measure of the proportion 




∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑖=1 (𝑊𝑖 < 𝑧)         (7) 
If a household’s asset index score 𝑊𝑖 is below the poverty line 𝑧, then the indicator function 
𝐼(. ) will be equal to 1, showing that the household is poor.  
Apart from the headcount index 𝑃0 , the poverty gap 𝐺𝑖 is also computed.  
𝐺𝑖 = (𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖)𝐼(𝑦𝑖 < 𝑧)         (8) 
The poverty gap applies to poor households. It is the difference between the poverty line and 
a household’s actual asset index score. Each household is assigned a poverty gap score, with 
non-poor households getting 𝐺𝑖 = 0, by virtue of the indicator function, as they are situated 








𝑖=1 )          (9) 
 
The next step is to apply standard tests of wealth dominance in order to compare the asset 
wealth index distributions over time and assess the direction and magnitude of the change in 
poverty between the pre-hyperinflation and hyperinflation periods.  
 
3.4 Data 
The ZDHS (1994, 1999, 2005, 2010, 2015) datasets used to quantify the impact of 
hyperinflation on household welfare and poverty, are compiled at regular intervals by the 
Zimbabwe Central Statistics Office (ZimSTAT), with sponsorship from the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID). A major advantage of the ZDHS data is that they are 
standardised and can therefore be used in an intertemporal analysis and results can be 
compared for different time periods. These datasets are used in all empirical chapters of this 
thesis.  
 
A preliminary assessment of the asset ownership and poverty rates was conducted using a 
pooled cross section of nationally representative ZDHS datasets from 2005 to 2010. These 
datasets represented 19,041 households; 9,285 surveyed in 2005 and 9,756 in 2010. They 
represent a population size of 12.08 million and 12.7 million in 2005 and 2010 (United Nations, 
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Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2019). Both waves of data 
were nationally representative, in the respective years. The unit of analysis for this study is the 
household. In both datasets, the majority of households are rural. Rural areas provided 67.09 
percent of the households in the 2005 dataset, and 65.92 percent of households in the 2010 
dataset. The standard ZDHS survey consists of the household, female and male adult members, 
children and service availability questionnaires. These cover a wide array of topics which 
include demography, fertility, childhood mortality, maternal health, nutrition, AIDS and STDs. 
In this chapter and the next, only data from the household questionnaire are used.  
The household samples are stratified over two stages. The first stage is the stratification 
between urban and rural, with equal probability. The second stage is stratification by land use. 
The four land use categories are communal land, large scale farming, small-scale farming, and 
resettlement areas. The primary sampling unit is the enumeration area (EA). The 395 EAs that 
were sampled throughout the years of analysis were determined in the 1992 population 
census. The main limitation is that the data does not include income or expenditure 
information, which would have been ideal benchmarks for an asset index. However, this USAID 
derived data is believed to be robust, having already been used in academic studies (Sahn and 
Stifel,2000; Alkire and Santos, 2010).  
The ZDHS datasets provide high quality detailed information about household characteristics. 
The data include the assets owned by each household and the public services available to it. 
The asset and access variables which are common among all five datasets are used in 
constructing the asset index. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001), the asset variables are split 
into five categories. The first group consists of binary variables for the ownership of movable 
durable assets such as radio, television, refrigerator, bicycle, motorized vehicle, livestock and 
cellular phones. The second category has an energy binary variable for whether or not a 
household uses electricity when cooking. Here, 1= improved energy (electricity) and 0= 
Paraffin, coal, charcoal, wood or straw. Third is the dwelling quality category which has binary 
variables for floor quality. Where 1= improved floor (vinyl strips, ceramic tiles, cement or 
carpet) and 0= earth or sand floors. Fourth is the water and sanitation category with the binary 
variables for access to water and toilet type. For the improved water variable, 1= piped or 
borehole water, while 0= well, spring, rain, tank or surface water. For the improved toilet 
variable, 1= flush or Blair toilet and 0= pit latrine or no toilet. The final category is the binary 
variable for the ownership of agricultural land.   
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The poverty analysis uses two main asset categories, public and private15. The main reason for 
splitting the assets into these two categories is that ownership of the private asset does not 
automatically imply full utility because, in some cases, there may be limited access to the 
requisite public assets. For instance, while a household may have flush toilet, deriving full utility 
from it requires reliable access to water (which tended to fail in many areas of Zimbabwe 
during the country’s economic collapse).  
3.5 Descriptive overview 
In this section, changes in the rates of ownership of assets as well as use of key public services 
during the hyperinflation period are computed. Percentage as well as percentage point 
changes are included in the tables to give a clear picture of the magnitude of shifts in asset 
ownership. Typically, percentage changes would be large when changes occur off a low base 
i.e. where very few households had use of a particular asset in the initial period. The t-statistics 
are included to show whether the change in ownership between the two periods was 
significant (a t-statistic of 1.96 or more indicating that the change was statistically significant 
at 95% confidence interval). Information on the changes that occurred in terms of ownership 
of private assets is shown is shown in tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows the summary statistics for 
rural households, while Table 4 does the same for urban households.  
 
The mean values for the asset index show that the average rural household had less asset 
wealth than the average urban household. This was true in 2005 before hyperinflation and in 
2010 after hyperinflation. However, between the two periods, the direction of change was 
different for the two sectors. While asset wealth significantly increased for rural households 
during the hyperinflation period, their urban counterparts experienced a decrease.  
Two reasons seem likely. First, remittances which were sent in cash and kind from household 
members abroad during the economic crisis. As indicated by Cross (pers. com. 2020), the 
majority of remittances went to rural households. Second, proceeds from the sale and barter 
of farm produce, particularly grains and vegetables, continued to accrue to rural households. 
Both factors would have contributed to the increase in asset wealth for rural households. On 
the other hand, there were two main reasons for the decrease in asset wealth for urban 
households. First, the selling of private assets in order to buy food and other basic necessities. 
Second, the deterioration in the provision of public services such as water and electricity in 
many urban centres. This will become more evident in the data below.  
 
15 The public assets group consists of improved energy used for cooking, which in this case is electricity and 
improved drinking water sources, in particular piped and borehole water. The private assets are radio, 
television, refrigerator, bicycle, vehicle, land, livestock, cellular phones, improved floor and improved toilet. 
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As seen in the results section, during hyperinflation, private assets increased for rural 
households much more than they did for urban households. This is true of televisions, 
refrigerators, motorized vehicles, cellular phones, toilet facilities and floor materials. Among 
the three private asset classes that decreased in rural households, only one was statistically 
significant – land. The decrease in land ownership may have been due to the land reform 
program, which mainly affected commercial farms and the households supported by them. As 
a result, some rural households, especially those in commercial farming areas were 
dispossessed of their land, while urban households given land migrated back to rural areas did 
not get title (Rugube and Chambati, 2001). Though many more households had land, few had 
legal ownership of it. While there was a notable increase in the ownership of selected private 
assets among rural households, these households were starting from a very low base and in 
most cases, the new ownership rates after hyperinflation were still lower than those in the 
urban areas. This is especially true for the electrically powered assets such as refrigerators and 
televisions.  
Table 3: Private asset ownership summary statistics, rural households 







 Mean   
 Asset Index            1.29           1.69  0.39 10.43 
 Radio           0.33           0.32  -0.01 1.59 
 Television           0.10           0.16  0.05 9.05 
 Refrigerator           0.03           0.04  0.01 2.33 
 Bicycle            0.24           0.24  -0.00 0.10 
 Vehicle            0.02           0.03  0.01 2.19 
 Livestock           0.80           0.81  0.01 0.87 
 Land           0.88           0.79  -0.09 14.25 
 Cellphone           0.03           0.46  0.43 64.88 
 Improved Toilet           0.03           0.04  0.01 3.31 
 Improved Floor           0.50           0.56  0.05 5.96 
Note: Sample size (N)= 19,041 households; 9,285 surveyed in 2005 and 9,756 in 2010. 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys   
 
An interesting point of similarity between urban and rural households is the significantly large 
increase in the ownership of cellular phones16. This would partly explain why the ownership of 
radios decreased; cellular phones have become good radio substitutes. Figure A1 in the 
 
16 Cellular telephones were introduced to Zimbabwe in 1997 and demand grew when 3G technology was 
introduced. This coincided with the era of high inflation. Econet Wireless (https://www.econet.co.zw/about-
us/history), which is the largest provider, indicates that its subscription grew from 140,000 in 2003 to 640,000 
in 2008, and then to 8.02 million in 2011, up to 11.4 million in 2018. The rapid expansion came after inflation 
and it confirms the increase seen in tables 3 and 4.  
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appendix shows the growth rate in cellular phone subscriptions in Zimbabwe over during this 
time. As the public and household telephone systems stopped working, cellular phone usage 
gained traction in Zimbabwe. With the arrival of 3G systems, the cellular phones came with 
music and media streaming functions which became substitutes for conventional radios. As 
many working adults in the formal sector became unemployed and resorted to informal sector 
activities, cellular phones became a necessary means to link themselves to suppliers and to 
customers. This theme is further developed by Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, & Martens, 
(2011) who noted that the informal economy was further stimulated during the hyperinflation 
period as wages lost value and workers had to supplement their incomes. This was especially 
the case in the public sector, mainly in hospitals and schools. It is these teachers and doctors, 
in both rural and urban sectors, who were using the cellular phones for business transactions.  
The increased ownership of electrical assets in rural areas may be explained by the increase in 
use of electricity shown in Table 5. While there were new connections in rural growth points, 
electricity delivery was unreliable. It seems likely, therefore, that the increase is largely due to 
remittances. This increase is most likely due to remittances from household members who 
remitted money for solar installation. While there is no data for these variables in 2005, the 
2010 ZDHS dataset shows that 24.6 and 13.82 percent of rural households were using solar 
and generator energy, respectively. Some of these solar home systems were installed by 
families using their own incomes, but approximately 85,000 of these had been installed by the 
government between 1993 and 1998 (Mapako and Afrane-Okese, 2002).  
There was increased connection to grid electricity due to the implementation of the Rural 
Electrification Fund Act of 2001 which had the objective of making electricity accessible to all 
rural households (Munjeri, 2002). Spearheaded by the Rural Electrification Agency, the goal 
was to connect 9,906 rural institutions to the national electric grid between 2002 and 2005. 
Indeed, under this program, rural electrification increased as Dube (2003) reports that on a 
monthly basis, 100 rural business and government centres (known as growth points) were 
being electrified. As of June 2005, 3,992 rural institutions had been connected to the electric 
grid; among these were 901 growth points, 944 primary schools, 593 irrigation systems and 
other institutions (Mangwengwende, 2005). Mapako and Prasad (2007) in a more focused 
study of the effect of the rural electrification program on growth points reveal that they rural 
areas benefited by connecting to electricity. For instance, they show that only 2.5 percent of 
businesses were using electricity before the program, and this proportion increased to 30 
percent after the program. Naturally this would imply that neighbouring households would 
also benefit. In their sample, the use of refrigerators increased from 2.5 to 12 percent and that 
of stoves increased from 0 to 2 percent. This confirms the increase in the use of electricity.  
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In this particular analysis, rural households are seen to have acquired 52.27 percent more 
televisions – coming off the very low base of 10 percent ownership, while urban households 
experienced a much lower increase of 7.42 percent – though the majority already owned 
televisions. While the proportion of rural households owning refrigerators increased by 25.13 
percent, that of urban households decreased by 3.38 percent. Ownership of bicycles decreased 
by 0.32 among rural households, but fell even faster, by 30.21 percent, among urban 
households.  As the ownership of motorized vehicles (cars and trucks) increased by 27.30 
percent for rural households, urban households experienced a 0.18 percent decrease.  
Urban households lost many of their private assets - those easiest assets to sell in order to 
compensate for lost earnings. As indicated in the ZimVAC (2009) report, urban households 
faced serious financial challenges in purchasing basic household necessities. Urban families 
that had a surplus needed to safeguard it against inflation. Another reason for the increase in 
assets in rural areas is that some urban families invested in improving their rural homes as a 
way of hedging against inflation.  Almost all private assets seemed to have done better in rural 
areas than urban ones.   
Regardless of these declines in asset ownership, there were four assets whose ownership 
increased for urban households. These were televisions, cellular phones, livestock and land. 
The increase in televisions would most likely be attributable to remittances, especially in high 
density areas, where many households did not have televisions previously. Buying televisions 
was also a way of storing the value of extra cash holdings in households. Larochelle, et al., 
(2014) suggest that the increased holdings of land and livestock were mainly due to the land 
reform program. The households that gained from this program, got land and the animals that 
were on it. These households were among the 91,000 families that the government intended 
to resettle on 5 million hectares of land. However, in actuality, Dore (2009) shows that 145,775 
households were settled on 2,288 A1 farms as peasant farmers. These farms covered 
4,137,085 hectares of arable land. Some of the urban households that gained ownership of 
land became commercial farmers, under the A2 scheme. A total of 16, 386 households were 
given these A2 farms, covering up to 2,681,642 hectares of land. A majority of the new land 
users were urban households. This reflects the reality of dual residence that is typical of many 
Zimbabwean households that live in town and own rural assets. 
Apart from gains in the agricultural sector, in terms of land and the livestock on it, urban 
households experienced loss in asset wealth. Urban households fared worse than rural 
households in this regard. This was not only the case for portable private assets but even in 
terms of sanitation and dwelling quality. Urban households also experienced a decrease in 
usage of public assets. As seen in Table 5 below, there was a significant decrease in the 
proportion of households that used improved energy (electricity) to cook. As the electrical 
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infrastructure collapsed and power shortages ensued, urban households resorted to cooking 
with wood and paraffin. The same was true with water as urban households resorted to 
borehole or well water, in the absence of reliable piped water. These results correspond with 
the ZimVAC (2009) report that the water system in urban areas collapsed during the 
hyperinflation period. Boreholes and wells were sunk as substitutes for piped water that was 
no longer being supplied by municipalities. This was necessitated by the deteriorating 
macroeconomic situation and the foreign exchange shortage which led to shortages of water 
treatment chemicals and the neglect of water treatment plants17. 











 Mean   
 Asset Index              5.96             5.94  -0.02 0.23 
 Radio             0.78             0.50  -0.28 24.54 
 Television             0.71             0.76  0.05 4.73 
 Refrigerator             0.49             0.47  -0.02 1.33 
 Bicycle              0.29             0.20  -0.09 8.17 
 Vehicle              0.15             0.15  -0.00 0.03 
 Livestock             0.22             0.30  0.08 7.40 
 Land             0.26             0.28  0.03 2.32 
 Cellphone             0.35             0.90  0.55 55.83 
 Improved Toilet             0.94             0.90  -0.04 5.87 
 Improved Floor             0.99             0.98  -0.02 5.99 
     
Note: Sample size (N)= 19,041 households; 9,285 surveyed in 2005 and 9,756 in 2010. 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys   
 





hyperinflation  Percentage point change t-statistic 
 Mean   
 Improved Energy             0.89            0.77 -0.12 11.87 
 Improved  
Water             0.98             0.93  -0.04 8.58 
Note: Sample size (N)= 19,041 households; 9,285 surveyed in 2005 and 9,756 in 2010. 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys   
 
Table 6 below shows that prior to hyperinflation, very few rural households had used piped 
water; those who had typically being situated on irrigation schemes with public taps on their 
premises. These also became dysfunctional after the land reform program which affected the 
 
17 See http://mg.co.za/article/2004-09-10-sewage-seeps-into-harare-water-supply  
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maintenance of irrigation systems. As a result, rural households that previously used improved 
water sources were left with no choice but to use well and surface water.  
On the other hand, there was a one percentage point increase in the use of electricity in rural 
areas. Because of the low base, this translates to a 25 percent increase in the proportion of 
households that used electricity in rural areas across the hyperinflation years. This finding is 
like other studies (Larochelle et al, 2014; Stoeffler et al., 2016). 





hyperinflation Percentage point change t-statistic 
 Mean    
 Improved Energy           0.04          0.05  0.01 4.12 
 Improved Water           0.51           0.49  -0.02 2.33 
Note: Sample size (N)= 19,041 households; 9,285 surveyed in 2005 and 9,756 in 2010. 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys  
The limited use of piped water that is seen in tables 4 and 5 resulted in a decline in the quality 
of sanitation facilities nationwide. It is evident that sanitation facilities were negatively affected 
by local government’s poor delivery of piped and communal tap water. The toilet types 
represent the quality of sanitation available for use in a household. Households with pit latrines 
and no toilet facilities were assigned a zero in the Improved toilet variable. While those with 
flush and Blair toilets were assigned a value of one. Table 2 shows that though there was a 
34.99 percent increase in the use of improved toilets among rural households, it was just a 
small 1 percentage point increase from 3 to 4 percent.  On the other hand, Table 3 shows that 
there was a 4.16 percent decrease among urban households using improved toilet facilities. 
The direct implication is that over 95 percent of rural households continued to use pit latrines 
and the bush, while more urban households fell into this category of poor toilet facilities during 
the hyperinflation period. Overall, the use of inferior toilet facilities increased more among 
urban households. This finding corresponds with the World Bank (2013) statistics, showing that 
76 percent of urban households were not connected to the sewer system by the time 
hyperinflation ended. This sanitation problem was largely a consequence of the decline in 
piped water provision in the urban areas during the hyperinflation period. While the urban 
squatter settlements might be contributing to this increased number of poor toilet facilities, it 
would not have been significant because this analysis covers the period soon after urban 
squatters had been cleared during the ‘Operation Murambatsvina18’ campaign (Potts, 2006).  
In general, the theme of worsening asset ownership levels in urban areas continues across the 
entire asset register.  
 
18 The expulsion from cities of informal traders and households dwelling in squatter camps and illegal shelters. 
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3.6 Poverty changes during hyperinflation  
As mentioned earlier, an asset index can be used to indicate poverty. Following Easterly and 
Fisher (2000), poverty is measured at given relative poverty lines. To show the impact that 
hyperinflation had on household poverty levels, a comparison is made between the pre-
hyperinflation and post-hyperinflation periods. Table 6, shows changes in the incidence of 
poverty. The asset index scores at the 20th and 40th percentile marks of the 2005 datasets are 
used as the poverty lines in this analysis. In so doing, it is possible to compare the two datasets 
objectively. The 20th percentile is the lower poverty line which shows the households that are 
extremely poor, while the 40th percentile is the upper poverty line, demarcating the 
households that are poor from the rest. These poverty lines are applied to the asset index that 
was created specifically in this study which includes the assets that are listed in tables 2 to 5 
only. Also, as explained in the methodology section, 𝑃0 is the poverty headcount index which 
shows the fraction of the sample that is poor. On the other hand, 𝑃1is the poverty gap index 
which shows the average amount of asset wealth needed for the poor households to reach the 
upper poverty line and cease to be technically poor.  
 
On a national level, before hyperinflation, 18 percent of the households were extremely poor, 
with asset index scores below the lower poverty line. At the same time, 46 percent of 
Zimbabwean households were below the upper poverty line. The analysis yielded unexpected 
results: the proportions of households below the poverty lines did not rise but fell markedly by 
the end of the inflation. They decreased by 27 percent during the hyperinflation period. One 
reason for this is the rural/urban divide and the very different impacts of the inflation in the 
countryside. Approximately 98 percent of Zimbabwe’s poorest 40 percent of households live 
in rural Zimbabwe (DHS, 1994, 1999, 2005, 2010, 2015). The increase in asset holdings by rural 
households therefore translates immediately into decreased poverty at a national level. 
Despite these changes, the incidence of poverty remains high amongst rural households. While 
there was a 31 percent decrease in extreme poverty among rural households, the headcount 
rate of 26 percent remains high and statistically significant. When using the upper poverty line, 
pre-hyperinflation 69 percent of the rural households lacked private assets and public services. 
Post-hyperinflation the poverty rate using the upper poverty line decreased to 47 percent of 
households, while the extreme rural poverty headcount fell to 18 percent. Even though 
poverty declined, it was still high among rural households and poverty reduction efforts, 
particularly the provision of public assets, need to target rural households.  
Prior to the inflation, poverty ranges had shown little change. Booysen et al., (2008) who 
measured poverty using the ZDHS datasets of 1988, 1994 and 1999, found that 37.1 percent 
of rural households and 0.4 percent for urban households were asset poor. Their variables 
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were slightly different, and the index formation method was the Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis, but they concurred with this analysis that water and sanitation standards had 
declined in Zimbabwe. These small changes are not surprising as asset poverty is likely to 
change far less than consumption/income poverty due to frictions associated with 
accumulating and decumulating assets. 
Using the lower poverty line, this study shows that the poverty rate in urban areas was less 
than 5 percent across the hyperinflation years. However, poverty increased by 50.78 percent, 
which was statistically significant. Yet another statistically significant change was the 87.24 
percent increase in urban poverty, using the upper poverty line. Such magnitudes of increase 
are extreme, yet not surprising in the hyperinflationary environment where annual inflation 
reached 231 million percent in July 2008.  
As a robustness check, these results are compared with the changes in the already existing DHS 
wealth index which Rustein and Johnson (2004) constructed using a Principle Components 
Analysis with similar consumer durables (The outcome is the same whether using the 20th or 
the 40th percentile as the poverty line). For the DHS wealth index, when using the lower poverty 
line, results show that during hyperinflation national and rural poverty decreased by 0.82 and 
2.35 percent respectively, while urban poverty increased by 2.39 percent. The result of 
decreased rural poverty and increased urban poverty is the same with both indices. It is evident 
that these are small changes, which is reasonable since the measure is based on illiquid durable 
assets. In this period little was added, but similarly, little was lost. It was liquid assets and cash 
denominated assets that were most often wiped out by the hyperinflation.  
Table 7: Shifts in poverty during the hyperinflation period – Lower Poverty Line Estimates 
Poverty Line:   20th Percentile in 2005  
 National   2005 2010 Change (%) Percentage point change 














 Rural  2005 2010 Change (%) Percentage point change 














 Urban  2005 2010 Change (%) Percentage point change 














Notes: P-values in parentheses.  
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys  
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Table 8: Shifts in poverty during the hyperinflation period – Upper Poverty Line Estimates 
Poverty Line:  40th Percentile in 2005   
 National   2005 2010 Change (%) Percentage point change 














 Rural  2005 2010 Change (%) Percentage point change 














 Urban  2005 2010 Change (%) Percentage point change 














Notes: P-values in parentheses.  
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys   
In addition to changes in the poverty headcount levels, the changes in the depth of poverty are 
also worth noting. Using the absence of illiquid assets as an indicator of poverty, tables 7 and 
8 above also show the changes in the poverty gap. Between the pre-hyperinflation and post-
hyperinflation periods there was a decrease in the severity of poverty at a national level. The 
extreme poverty gap decreased by 1 percentage point and when using the upper poverty line, 
the poverty gap decreased by 6 percentage points. Rural households also experienced a 
decline in the severity of poverty between the pre and post hyperinflation periods. Using the 
20th and the 40th percentile poverty lines, the rural poverty gap decreased by 3 and 11 
percentage points, respectively. Yet the opposite was true for the poor in urban areas of 
Zimbabwe, who fell much further below the poverty lines. The severity of poverty increased 
by 1 percentage point for the bottom 2 quintiles. This means that households that were on the 
poverty line were found 68% below it, post hyperinflation.   
 
The commercial farmers, large scale and small, suffered from price controls on the farm 
produce which they sold to milling companies. They were paid less than market value and, as 
a result of the hyperinflation, the earnings they received were unable to cover the cost of seed 
for the following season. As a coping mechanism, saved seed, despite the risk of yield 
depression, replaced purchased hybrid seed. Farmers would store some seed from their 
harvest and sell the rest of the surplus (Leiman and Behar, 2011). The proceeds were then 
converted into durable assets in order to store value. Apart from the typical consumer durables 
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such as radios, the rural households bought items to develop the home. Hence, we see an 
increase in boreholes and improved toilet systems.  
 
These findings resonate with Brimmer (1971) who found that rural households in the United 
States of America in a milder inflationary environment, during the Vietnam war, experienced 
significant outmigration. As a result, the households that remained in the rural farming 
communities enjoyed more income, as food remained a major component of household 
budgets across the country. In Zimbabwe too there was extensive outmigration during the 
economic crisis. According to UNICEF (2013), the crude net out-migration from Zimbabwe 
between 2005 and 2010 was -12.41 percent. On the other hand, over the same 5-year period, 
the population grew by 5.13 percent. People were leaving the country at a higher rate than 
they were being replaced. The estimated number of emigrants between 1999 and 2010 was 4 
million (UNICEF, 2013). The exact number that left the rural areas is difficult to quantify as 
many entered neighbouring countries illegally. In addition, ZimVAC (2007) shows that a 
substantial amount of internal return-migration occurred as urban households, who 
constituted 37 percent of internal migrants, moved back to rural areas in search of farming 
land. These households transferred many of their private assets from the urban to the rural 
setting. They are also likely to have purchased more assets using the proceeds of their 
agricultural output. This return migration may explain the increased number of pit toilets in 
use by rural households; these are likely to have been dug by the returnees as they settled into 
rural areas. The use of poor toilet facilities was a small sacrifice because the flush toilets in the 
urban areas were no longer working. This discomfort was outweighed by the ability to own and 
use land for crops and livestock, both for subsistence and for sale.  
 
Remittances from international emigrants would also have contributed to the accumulation of 
assets. Unfortunately, there is no accurate record of the remittances that flowed into 
Zimbabwe over the years. One reason is that the Zimbabwean diaspora is suspicious of the 
government and of official channels of remitting money. Also, the official rate of exchange was 
not nearly as good as the parallel market rate. As a result, instead of sending money through 
commercial banks and the RBZ, migrants send money and goods back home through informal 
channels including returning relatives and friends, or unofficial money carriers on busses and 
aeroplanes (Thebe, 2011). Nonetheless, ZimSTAT (2012) estimates that remittances 
contributed 5.3 percent to total annual household income. The value of remittances recorded 
officially was US$319 million per year. ZimSTAT (2012) suggested that in 2012 the rural areas 
were receiving average annual cash transfers of US$454 per household from relatives who had 
migrated to urban areas within Zimbabwe or those who had gone abroad.  
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In the urban areas, unemployment levels increased significantly as the formal sector 
contracted during the hyperinflation period. All sectors in the formal economy suffered 
negative growth and rising unemployment during the inflationary years. In addition to 
hyperinflation, which eroded the value of incomes and demotivated workers, the failure of 
property rights during the haphazard land reform program had a significantly negative effect 
on the agricultural and mining sectors which were inextricably linked to urban commerce and 
industry. Unemployment rose further with the closure of local businesses which had been net 
creditors and whose credit book lost value with the rising prices. Household income was 
therefore affected by both hyperinflation and unemployment. The resulting tendency to dis-
saving meant that, private asset ownership and usage decreased among urban households. 
These economic declines, combined with accelerating inflation, meant that civic rates and 
taxes lagged behind prices, and reduced the real incomes of municipalities. These fiscal 
challenges, and the outmigration of skilled labour, accelerated the decline in infrastructure 




The objective of this chapter was to analyse the changes in household welfare and poverty 
during Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation period which began in March 2007 and ended in December 
of 2008. The analysis was conducted using data from the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health 
Surveys. In particular, the 2005 dataset is used to represent the pre-hyperinflation period, 
while the 2010 dataset is used to represent the post-hyperinflation period. The analysis shows 
that, despite the collapse of the economy, the currency and of formal employment, there was 
an increase in households’ non-financial assets. Since the bulk of the poor had few savings in 
the form of cash and other financial assets, and since most of them resided in rural areas, this 
meant that the overall wealth of many poor households rose, and asset poverty decreased.  
 
Looking at specific assets, in the introduction to this thesis, it was made clear that cash savings 
were destroyed during the hyperinflation period, and money lost its function as a store of 
value. The result was that households which found themselves with cash immediately bought 
their basic necessities and converted the rest to assets, in particular consumer durables, such 
as cellular phones, televisions and refrigerators. The results reveal this phenomenon of 
increased asset holdings in both the descriptive statistics as well as the poverty analysis. It is 
noteworthy that the increase in asset holdings was greater in magnitude and significance 
among rural households. Rural households most likely had more assets because they earned 
more cash from selling the food that they produced on their land. On the contrary, urban 
households sold their assets in order to buy food and basic necessities. In some cases, there 
65 | P a g e  
 
was barter trade as assets were traded for food, again shifting asset wealth from urban to rural 
households. These results are not surprising as similar trends of increased urban poverty due 
to hyperinflation had been noted in Indonesia and China (Aaberge and Zhu, 2001; Frankenberg 
et al., 1999; Waters et al., 2003) 
Public assets were also affected during the hyperinflation period. In rural areas where there 
was little infrastructure for water and electricity, there was a minimal upward change during 
the hyperinflation period. However, in urban areas water, sanitation and electricity 
infrastructure collapsed during this time. As national income declined, the maintenance of 
systems suffered to the degree that many urban households lost their ability to use electricity 
for cooking along with piped water for flushing toilets and other household activities.  
Due to this dynamic nature of the majority of households, who are located in rural areas, 
gaining durable assets through barter trade and remittances; while on the other hand, the 
urban households lost financial and durable assets, as well as utility of public services, overall 
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Chapter 4 
Household Inequality and Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe 
 
4.1 Introduction    
The previous chapter showed that Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation affected urban and rural 
households very differently; the asset holdings of urban households tended to decline, while 
those of rural households tended to rise. The reasons for these changes will now be explored 
in greater detail. It is important to stress, however, that the changes may not have followed 
from the hyperinflation entirely; its ending, and the dollarization that ended it, may have also 
had effects. This issue was identified by Bulir (2001) who claims that, “The positive impact of 
price stability on income distribution is nonlinear – the reduction in inflation from 
hyperinflation levels significantly lowers income inequality, while further reduction toward a 
very low level of inflation seems to bring about negligible gains in the Gini coefficient.” The 
same two datasets from the previous chapter are used in this analysis, 2005 representing the 
pre-hyperinflation period and 2010 representing the post-hyperinflation period. A priori, a 
decrease in inequality is expected as hyperinflation had ended by 2010.  
 
In addition to assessing the direction of change in the asset wealth distribution, which 
represents household welfare, this chapter has a second objective, to determine the factors 
that contributed to inequality during the hyperinflation. This will be done using an inequality 
decomposition analysis which is based on Shorrocks’s (1982) model. In so doing this study 
contributes to the body of empirical literature on decompositions by using a non-money metric 
welfare measure, applying the methodology to ZDHS data and doing so in a hyperinflationary 
developing country context.  
 
This study uses the asset holdings of a household, and its usage of public services, as a proxy 
for its welfare, and investigates the changes in these assets and services over the hyperinflation 
period. At this juncture, it is important to stress that the asset index is a proxy for household 
welfare, it is not a measure of wealth. As shown in the previous chapter, the ownership of 
durable assets increased as inflation prompted households to convert their cash (or liquid) 
savings into consumer durables. Thus, one reason for increased number of improved floors 
was that households were incentivised to store their wealth in building materials. Indeed, as 
outlined in the thesis introduction, there was a surge in construction of homes during 
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation, as this was a means of hedging against inflation.  
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Of course, not everyone was able to save (by purchasing durable assets) and each household’s 
capacity to do so affected its ranking in the welfare distribution. Inflation’s effect on inequality 
matters. 
 
Previous studies have tended to analyse inequalities across household incomes. However, as 
explained in the previous chapter, the asset index is the welfare indicator of choice in this study 
because shifts in households’ real incomes during the period of hyperinflation were captured 
as changes in their holdings of durable assets. At a time when the value of money fluctuated 
rapidly and many households earned little or no income, asset holdings became a more reliable 
indicator of household welfare.  
 
Historically Zimbabwe has suffered chronic inequality that seemed to be growing as the 
economy imploded and inflation rose.   ZimSTAT (2003)19, used per capita income as a measure 
of living standards and found Gini Coefficients of 0.59 and 0.64 in 1995 and 2003 respectively. 
They found a difference in inequality after comparing rural and urban households as well as 
the gender of the main income earner in a household. Geographic region was also seen to 
affect inequality in Zimbabwe as there existed a gap especially amongst the urban elite and 
the other 65 percent of the nation’s citizens residing in the rural areas. There is now little 
commerce outside the two central business districts of Harare and Bulawayo, yet these cities 
house only 20 percent of the population. An analysis of the 2003 Poverty Assessment Study 
Survey shows20 higher inequality levels for households in rural provinces than their urban 
counterparts. For example, while inequality is 0.54 in Bulawayo, which consists of urban 
households, the Gini coefficient for Masvingo, a rural province, is 0.62. The inequality levels 
within rural provinces tend to be higher than the inequality levels between districts because of 
the diversity of professions. These areas often house commercial farmers, a few professionals 
who service the community, such as nurses and teachers, while most of the population consists 
of casual agricultural workers. As a result, the earnings gap is much wider. The inequality gap 
by location is more evident when comparing poverty levels. The poverty headcount ratio for 
Bulawayo (which is mainly urban) in 2003 was 56.9 percent whilst that of Masvingo (a fairly 
typical rural province) was 68.5 percent. This difference in poverty levels shows that overall 
income was distributed unequally in Zimbabwe in 2003, with mean household incomes being 
higher in urban areas than in rural ones.  urban provinces consisting of households that have 
higher incomes compared to their rural counterparts.  
 
 
19ZimSTAT, (2003). “Poverty Assessment Study Survey 2003 Main Report” 
20 See Table A1, in appendix. 
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Gender may also be a factor: when inequality among male headed households was compared 
to that of female headed households, the Gini coefficient for the former was 0.63 and that of 
the latter was 0.60 (ZimSTAT, 2003). Both values show high levels of inequality. More light can 
be shed by the poverty headcount ratios, as they show the level of unequal distribution of 
income by gender. Using the national income poverty line, at 68.48 percent, the poverty 
headcount ratio among female headed households was higher than the 60.25 percent for male 
headed households. This confirms the assertions of Malaba (2006) whose analysis suggested 
that historically, poverty has been more prevalent among female headed households. Female 
headed households are also less likely to be affluent; UNICEF Zimbabwe (2016) has 24 percent 
of male headed households in the top quintile of the wealth distribution, compared to 18 
percent of female headed households.  
 
4.2 Review of related literature 
As Lerman and Yatzhaki (1985) stated, “How economic trends and government policies affect 
the distribution of income is a central topic in economic and policy analysis.” This study 
analyses the effect hyperinflation on inequality using a theoretical model based on Shorrocks’s 
(1982). This decomposes household income into factor components and determines how each 
contributes to total income inequality. The factor components are sources of income, such as 
transfer payments, wage earnings, investment income and others. As households acquire 
different allocations of each component, they differ from each other and the distribution of 
income becomes unequal. The decomposition analysis then reveals each factor component’s 
contribution to overall income inequality in a society.  
 
While a number of studies have used factor components to investigate changes in income 
inequality, only a few did so in high inflation environments (Cardoso, 1992; Urani, 1993; Neri, 
1995; Fereirra and Litchfield, 2001; Fereirra, Leite, & Litchfield, 2008). These authors cited six 
reasons for changes in inequality during hyperinflation. First, perfect indexation is rarely a 
reality but there is better indexation for the rich since part of their income comes from indexed 
financial assets. Second, inflation reduces disposable income, which wipes out the savings of 
the middle class and pushes them below the poverty line. The result is a wider income gap and 
higher poverty rates. Third, inflation disadvantages all income earners as it causes oscillations 
in income, making consumption smoothing difficult. This is especially true of vulnerable 
households that do not have safety nets. The Brazilian data shows that variations in inflation 
and unemployment explain 30% or more of all variation in inequality. The authors conclude 
that recessions worsen income distribution because of the effect on unemployment, with 
unskilled workers being the first to lose their jobs. Inflation thus affects poor, and often-
unskilled labourers, mainly through declines in real wages. Fourth, location matters. For 
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example, in Brazil, the urban population is three times richer than the rural population. Not 
only is there inequality between the locations but within the poor areas, inequality levels are 
high. Similar results were expected in Zimbabwe because inflation has a weaker effect on 
households able to produce their own food, and in so doing avoid food inflation. Much like in 
brazil, in Zimbabwe, a household’s position in the income distribution, post hyperinflation was 
dependent on how much of their budget went to food and how much they were able to save 
in the form of assets. Fifth, the ability for a household to defend its wealth in inflationary times 
increases with income. Richer households can buy durable assets and these too can provide 
opportunities. For example, refrigerators, by allowing for storage of perishable goods, also 
enable consumption smoothing. On the other hand, households that do not earn income or 
experience a decline in income during inflationary times suffer more. Sixth, households with 
access to transfer payments suffer less and this is dependent on the state of national finances 
which are usually low during times of high inflation. It is expected that this is a key determinant 
of inequality in Zimbabwe, given the history of high remittance inflows (Bracking and 
Sachikonye, 2010).  
Another group of literature exists (Powers, 1995; Datt and Ravallion, 1997; Ravallion, 1998; 
Romer and Romer, 1998; Agénor, 1998; Easterly and Fischer, 2000; Braumann, 2004; Chaudhry 
and Chaudhry, 2008; Dessus et al., 2008; Robilliard et al., 2001; Suryahadi et al., 2000, 
Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002; Blinder and Esaki, 1978; Blejer and Guerrero, 1990; Cutler  et 
al., 1991; Adelman and Fuwa, 1992; Bulir and Gulde, 1995; Bulir, 2001; Bittencourt, 2009; 
Barros, Corseuil, Mendonca, & Reis, 2015; Cardoso and Urani, 1995; Kane and Morrisett, 1993) 
which employs methodologies other than decompositions to examine the relationship 
between inflation and inequality.  Many of these are time-series analyses and most find that 
inequality increases with inflation. However, in most contexts there was slow, steady, and 
predictable inflation. This differs from the case of Zimbabwe which was marked by rapid and 
accelerating hyperinflation. This is the case from Malaysia where inflation was 4.44 percent to 
Brazil where cumulative inflation between 1983 to 1994 was 2659 percent. They generally 
found evidence of a widening income gap with the middle class largely unaffected by inflation, 
but the income share of the highest quintile increased, while the share of the lowest quintile 
decreased. This was because the rich could protect their income in indexed assets such as 
equities, land, physical capital and foreign currency, while the incomes of the poor did not keep 
pace with the price level, leading to lower levels of consumption and higher poverty. This 
relationship also applied to in cross-country analyses, as inflation negatively affected lower 
income countries that have less sophisticated financial markets. The poor were also affected 
because they lost their jobs first, hence their real income. While this is the case in developing 
countries, Romer and Romer (1999) show that inflation benefits the poor in developed 
countries as it cancels out their nominal debt.  
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While these studies all showed inflation leading to higher levels of inequality, with the 
exception of Brazil, they were all based on moderate and predictable inflation. There are very 
few studies of the relationship between hyperinflation and inequality. Moreover, the literature 
has deficiencies. First, with the exception of the studies on Brazil, it does not explore shifts in 
inequality in hyperinflationary environments. This is peculiar considering the distortionary 
effects of hyperinflation. Second, it focusses on income rather than wealth; the existing 
literature analyses changes in income inequality with a few studies based on non-monetary 
measures of inequality.  
This chapter addresses these shortcomings by conducting a decomposition analysis using data 
from Zimbabwe, where hyperinflation peaked at 231 million percent in July of 2008. A static 
decomposition following the modified model of Shorrocks (1982) by Lerman and Yatzhaki 
(1985) is applied to the asset index which was created in the previous chapter. The index 
contains assets (factor components) in two groups, private and public. The study will reveal 
which of these contributed the most to the inequality experienced during Zimbabwe’s 
hyperinflation period.  
This is a significant contribution because in cases of high and persistent inflation, real incomes 
decline significantly and most households move away from cash to asset holdings in order to 
preserve their wealth. The limited income in households is usually stored in financial and 
durable assets. It is therefore important to assess the changes in asset inequality and the 
contributing factors. Previous inequality studies that were conducted for Zimbabwe, without 
using income, include the Gender Inequality Index (GII) in the United Nations Development 
Program (2013). The dimensions of the GII are reproductive health, economic activity and 
empowerment. The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2015) constructs a 
multidimensional poverty index and then measures inequality of the index using the positive 
multiple of variance method, adopted from Alkire and Seth (2014). Both cross-sectional studies 
concluded that Zimbabwe has high levels of inequality. However, their work was mainly 
descriptive, without a decomposition analysis included. Similarly, in its national household 
surveys, ZimSTAT constructs poverty profiles but the inequality sections tend to be skeletal 
and only construct an income Gini Coefficient.  This paper adds to the literature by examining 
the inflation-inequality relationship in the African context and contributes to Zimbabwe’s 
literature by giving an in-depth inter-temporal assessment of inequality, through the 
decomposition.  
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4.3 Methodology 
As was done in the preceding poverty paper, a weighted index of asset variables is computed 
to represent household welfare. The index consists of households’ private assets (ownership 
of a radio, television, refrigerator, vehicle, cellular phones, livestock, land, floor type in 
dwelling; toilet type in dwelling) and public assets (energy source for cooking and water 
sources). While this index includes asset variables that are representative of both urban and 
rural households, it leaves out financial assets, which would have revealed more inequality in 
urban areas. The rich held more financial assets that lost value during hyperinflation. On the 
other hand, the poor rarely possessed financial assets, but owned the consumer durables listed 
above. These asset variables are from the pooled ZHDS datasets of 2005 and 2010. it is worth 
noting that the year 2005 was characterized by sustained high and rising inflation and can be 
considered a part of the onset of hyperinflation, which technically occurred in 2007 and 2009. 
On the other hand, the year 2010 came right after the dollarization policy was implemented in 
February of 2009 (Noko, 2011). By then the domestic currency had been replaced by the US 
Dollar. Excluded from the analysis is information on the debt that leverages the household’s 
wealth base. Given this background knowledge, it becomes apparent that the changes in asset 
inequality that occurred at the same time as hyperinflation, in this paper, only refer to tangible 
asset wealth, not income, liabilities, loans, or financial assets.  
 
Following Wittenburg and Leibbrandt (2017), the asset index created in the previous chapter, 
using Uncentered Principal Components Analysis, is applied to the Gini coefficient formula. The 
Gini Coefficient measures the extent to which the actual asset wealth distribution deviates 
from a perfectly equal distribution. This index allows for direct comparison of two populations 
with different asset index distributions, regardless of their size. As a result, we use the Gini to 
compare inequality among households across Zimbabwe’s ten different provinces. The 
structural model for the Gini is: 




)] 𝑤𝑖       (10) 
𝐺’is the multidimensional Gini index which is based on 𝑊𝑖,for i=1…. N households. 𝑊𝑖 is the 
wealth indicator constructed by taking a weighted average of household assets and 
characteristics. This is the general Kolm (1977) inequality index formula which measures the 
distance between the mean welfare level and the equally-distributed-equivalent-welfare. 
Significantly different here, the multidimensional Gini uses the first eigen vector (which is 
positive), hence the weights have to be non-negative. As a result, 𝑊𝑖 distribution is in the 
realm of non-negative real numbers. If this distribution of wealth indicators 𝑊𝑖 is equal, then, 
𝐺’(𝑊) = 0. 
72 | P a g e  
 
Dividing the assets by their means makes the Gini scale independent (the axiom of ratio scale 
invariance), which is a necessary condition so that the inequality level is not altered by 
population size. The second axiom that this inequality measure satisfies is mean independence, 
in other words, doubling the asset ownership across the distribution does not affect rank. A 
third is symmetry which implies that the inequality measure is not altered by other attributes 
of households in the sample. This means that, if two households were to swap identical assets, 
there would be no change in the measured inequality. A fourth is the axiom of statistical 
testability; the quality which enables assessment of changes in the inequality index over time. 
A fifth is the continuity axiom i.e. the inequality index is continuous because it is a direct 
mapping of a continuous asset / wealth index onto the non-negative orthant. The sixth axion 
is the ‘weak uniform Pigou-Dalton Majorization’, an extension of the Pigou-Dalton Transfer 
Sensitivity axiom which postulates that a transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor should 
decrease inequality (and vice versa). The index also satisfies the axioms of ‘weighted attributes 
under unidirectional comonotonicity’ and the correlation increasing majorization axioms. 
Finally, dividing by the mean ensures that Weymark’s (1981) basic axioms of monotonicity and 
ordering are satisfied as well. 
 
The Gini Coefficient when represented by the Lorenz Curve which shows the cumulative asset 
wealth owned by all the population up to each percentile. The 45-degree line depicts an equal 
society, where each percent of the population owns the same proportion of asset wealth. The 
further the Lorenz Curve lies from the 45-degree line, the more unequal the distribution of 
asset wealth. Nonetheless, a variety of different Lorenz curves can give the same Gini 
coefficient as the Gini is not sensitive to the slope of the Lorenz curve at different points, only 
to the relative area beneath it. This limitation is addressed by General Entropy Indices (GE) 
(Shorroks, 1980). These GE indices, with values from zero to infinity, meet the required axioms 
and have the added advantage of being decomposable measures of inequality. 
The general entropy formula is given by: 











− 1]       (11) 
Where ?̅? is the mean asset index (average income, normally).  
The values of GE measures vary between 0 and infinity. Zero represents an equal distribution, 
while higher values represent higher levels of inequality. The parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] is the 
weight given to distances between the wealth levels of households in the wealth distribution. 
When alpha equals zero, the measure is sensitive to changes in the lower tail and when alpha 
equals one, the measure is sensitive to changes in the upper tail. As a result, the magnitudes 
of GE (0) and GE (1) show the section of the wealth distribution where the greatest change 
occurred.  
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GE (1) is Theil’s T index with the following formula:  
𝐺𝐸(1) =  
1
𝑁






)        (12) 
 
On the other hand, GE (0) is Theil’s L index with the following formula: 
𝐺𝐸(0) =  
1
𝑁
 ∑  𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖=1 (
?̅?
𝑤𝑖
)          (13) 
 
These formulae are used to measure the changes asset inequality of Zimbabwean households 
in the hyperinflationary period. These will be applied on a national level and then 
disaggregated by gender (male or female), geo-type (urban or rural), and province. The levels 
of asset inequality within and between these categories will also be determined. 
 
The analysis ends with a decomposition of asset inequality by source. Following Lerman and 
Yatzhaki (1985), the overall Gini is decomposed by asset type. In so doing, it is possible to show 
the contribution of the various assets towards overall asset inequality. The overall Gini shown 
above is, in this case, a summation of the products of the Gini correlation, the relative Gini 
component of an asset and the asset’s share of total wealth as seen in equation 15:  
𝐺0 = ∑ 𝑆𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝐺𝑘𝑅𝑘         (14) 
Here, k is a component of household wealth, in this case, an asset; 𝑅𝑘 is the Gini correlation 
between asset k and total asset wealth; 𝐺𝑘 is the relative Gini for asset k and 𝑆𝑘 is asset k’s 







−  𝑆𝑘           (15) 
The decomposition reveals four main findings. First is the share of a particular asset in overall 
asset wealth. Second, is the disparity within asset groups. Third, it shows the correlation 
between an asset and total household wealth and finally, the effect of a change in an asset on 
total asset inequality.  While the full decomposition is reported in the appendix, a summary 
table of private and public assets is shown and explained in the results section.
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4.4 Asset inequality changes during hyperinflation 
This section explains the inequality measures obtained from the ZDHS datasets. Zimbabwe had 
highly unequal ownership of assets both before and after hyperinflation. Table 9 and Figure 17 
show that the average asset Gini Coefficient (Gini, henceforth) values lay above 0.5 between 
2005 and 2010. Evidently, on a national scale, asset inequality decreased over the five-year 
period, with the exception of the urban areas where there was an increase. As alluded to in 
the introduction, the period of Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation occurred between 2005 and 2010, 
specifically, from March 2007 to December 2008 (Hanke and Kwok, 2009)21. As a result, the 
changes in asset inequality from 2005 to 2010, at the national and disaggregated levels 
described in the methodology are the focus of this analysis; the pre-hyperinflation period is 
represented by the 2005 data, while the post-hyperinflation period is represented by the 2010 
data.   
 
The asset Lorenz curves before and after this five-year period appear in Figure 17. They show 
that, on a national level, wealth inequality decreased across the hyperinflation period. The red 
(post-hyperinflation) curve is unambiguously closer to the 45-degree line of equality, albeit 
statistically insignificant, as shown by the test statistics. The results in tables 9 and 10, below, 
correspond to this graph and show a 6.65 percent decrease in the national adjusted Gini across 
the hyperinflation period. In like manner, the mean logarithmic deviation (GE (0)) decreased 
by 13.88 percent, while the Theil Index (GE (1)) decreased by 13.80 percent during that time. 
Each of these indicates that asset inequality declined.  
In a literal sense, this means that the distribution of private and public assets among 
households changed over the hyperinflation period. In Table 11, it is evident that prior to 
hyperinflation, the top twenty percent of the Zimbabwean society, which consisted of urban 
households, held approximately 63 percent of the asset wealth, while the remaining 37 
percent of wealth was shared among the bottom 80 percent of households. However, after 
hyperinflation, the top quintile held 5 percent less of overall asset wealth as gains were made 
by households in the middle class.  Generally, households in urban areas held a greater share 
of wealth as they used electricity and thus owned electric appliances. These households also 
used piped water and flush toilets. Very few rural households have these types of assets. The 
few rural households with piped water and flush toilets on their dwellings use borehole water. 
What rural households have, which most urban households do not possess are agricultural 
land and farm animals.  
 
21Source: file:///C:/Users/FloraKurasha/Desktop/School/Hanke%20Inflation%20paperr.pdf  
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Figure 17: National Lorenz Curve 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
 
Table 9: Changes in Inequality 
National Pre-hyperinflation Post-hyperinflation 
Proportional  
Percentage Change 
Gini 0.58 0.54 -6.65 
GE (0) 0.66 0.57 -13.88 
GE (1) 0.60 0.52 -13.80 
Rural    
Gini 0.51 0.51 -1.54 
GE (0) 0.46 0.46 0.78 
GE (1) 0.56 0.50 -10.49 
Urban    
Gini 0.36 0.37 1.88 
GE (0) 0.24 0.25 7.09 
GE (1) 0.23 0.24 3.34 
Male    
Gini 0.57 0.53 -5.69 
GE (0) 0.64 0.55 -13.58 
GE (1) 0.56 0.50 -10.85 
Female    
Gini 0.59 0.55 -6.68 
GE (0) 0.66 0.59 -10.52 
GE (1) 0.64 0.54 -15.99 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005 – 2010 
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Table 10: Changes in the Gini Coefficient  
 Gini P-values 95% Confidence Interval t-statistic 
National     
2005 0.5822 0.0031 0.5762 0.5882  
2010 0.5435 0.0031 0.5373 0.5496 0.4915 
Rural      
2005 0.5139 0.0077 0.4988 0.5289  
2010 0.5060 0.0067 0.4928 0.5191 0.0658 
Urban       
2005 0.3647 0.0043 0.3563 0.3730  
2010 0.3716 0.0046 0.3626 0.3805 0.0731 
Male Head      
2005 0.5670 0.0038 0.5596 0.5743  
2010 0.5347 0.0042 0.5265 0.5430 0.3611 
Female Head      
2005 0.5929 0.0051 0.5828 0.6029  
2010 0.5532 0.0047 0.5441 0.5624 0.4010 
Note: Total observations = 19,576 households. N=9820 in 2005. N=9756 in 2010. 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005 – 2010 
 
However, as seen in tables 3 and 4, in the previous chapter, the distribution of agricultural 
land, farm animals and cellular phones changed significantly over the hyperinflation period. 
The direction of changes in these productive assets contributed to the decrease in asset 
inequality. For instance, ownership of cellular phones which are used by households to 
communicate and often to arrange trade logistics, increased by 55 percentage points among 
urban households; from 35 to 90 percent. Similarly, there was a 43-percentage point increase 
in the usage of cellular phones among rural households; from 3 to 46 percent over the 5-year 
period. As a result, rural households which started from a very low base, moved at a faster 
pace in accessing technology and could use these mobile telephones for income generation 
through business transactions. In this period, rural households grew and sold vegetables to 
urban areas and they used mobile telephones to access these markets. As rural household 
earnings increased, they bought more assets and inequality decreased. This was more so the 
case when financial transactions were replaced by barter trade due to the loss of value of 
money (Makochekanwa, 2009). It became normal for urban households to trade in assets in 
exchange for food.  
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The ownership of land favoured urban households. While land ownership decreased by 9 
percentage points for rural households, from 88 to 79 percent ownership rate; it increased by 
3 percentage points for urban households, from 26 to 29 percent. As stated in the introductory 
chapter, the increase in use of agricultural land was largely a result of the government’s land 
reform program.  Moyo (2011) shows that 6,214 farms covering 10 million hectares were 
distributed to 168,671 households. Hence, the number of owners did not essentially change, 
but more families had access to the land. The ZHDS data does not allow for a clear distinction 
between households that got mere access to land and those that received title deeds to their 
new plots of land. However, Matondi and Dekker (2011) explain that the land was given to new 
occupants in the form of long-term leases from government. The actual proportion of 
households that were given the formal lease documents is unknown. However, urban 
households that gained access to land tended not to make permanent improvements to the 
land because in essence, it is owned by the government. The reality on the ground is that land 
was transferred from large and medium scale commercial farmers into the hands of many 
small-scale farmers.  
 
During this transition, there was an 8-percentage point increase in the quantity of farm animals 
owned by urban households; from 22 to 30 percent of households owning livestock. The 
change for rural households was an insignificant increase of 1 percentage point; from 80 to 81 
percent. As a result of these changes urban and rural households began to resemble each other 
more. While urban households acquired more land and animals, yet at the same time losing 
access to piped water and electricity; rural households acquired more electronic appliances 
such as cellular phones, both types of change contributing to the general decrease in 
inequality.  
 
Table 11: Asset indices pre- and post-hyperinflation by quintile share  

































Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
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In this study, only a few assets found in the ZDHS dataset are used to proxy overall wealth as 
well as household welfare. Using this approach, the top quintile, which had held 63 percent of 
national asset wealth, lost more than 7 percent of it during the hyperinflation period. On the 
contrary, there was a 5.72 percent increase in the bottom quintile. However, all other cohorts 
experienced an increase in assets with the lower middle class (20th to 60th percent) being the 
most positively affected. Households between the 20th and 80th percentile experienced a 
cumulative increase of 60.64 percent in the share of asset wealth that they held.  
 
Though financial assets are not included in the asset index, they were being similarly affected 
by hyperinflation. For instance, cash holdings lost their value entirely, first through the inflation 
and then through dollarization. The IMF (2005, 2009, 2011) shows that broad money (M2) as 
a percentage of GDP decreased from 31 percent in 2004 to 14 percent in 2009, with a slight 
increase to 18.5 percent in 2010, they omit the reality that all local currency was rendered 
worthless by dollarization. What the hyperinflation did not destroy, the cure of it did.  
 
Further evidence is provided in Old Mutual22 annual reports which reveal that the quantity of 
registered shareholdings in the company decreased significantly during the hyperinflation year 
of 2008. The Old Mutual shares held by Zimbabweans (mostly urban dwellers and commercial 
farmers) decreased by 22 percent between 2005 and 2010. A closer look at the data, seen in 
Table 12, reveals that the shares were increasing from 2005 to 2008 and then there was a 32 
percent decline in 2008. Njanike and Mudzura (2009) show that the increase in general 
ownership of shares in the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) during the hyperinflation period 
was a form of saving as households made an effort to hedge against inflation. However, in the 
year 2008 the stock market collapsed and these financial assets owned by households in the 
top quintiles succumbed to hyperinflation. In actuality, the ZSE stopped operating at the end 
of 2008 and resumed in February 2009 in the fully dollarized market (Ben, 2016).  
 
Table 12: Annual Changes in Old Mutual Shares 












Total Shares  4.68 7.07 14.22 -32.80 -9.37 
Number of Holders  -1.13 4.39 6.25 -0.27 -2.88 
Percentage of global stock  -22.34 7.19 14.02 -33.16 -11.20 
Source: Old Mutual (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) Annual Report and Accounts 
 
22 Old Mutual is the largest life insurance and pension company in Zimbabwe. It holds shares as a ‘nominee’ on 
behalf of beneficial owners.  
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This loss of wealth in the top quintile, (primarily urban households), coupled with the wealth 
gain in the lowest quintile explains most of the narrowing in the asset wealth gap. This decrease 
in the wealth gap can be further quantified using a Palma Index23. Calculations show that prior 
to hyperinflation, the Palma Index was 6.95 and became 6.63, post-hyperinflation. The result 
is a 4.63 percent decrease in asset inequality.  
 
Table 13, allows for a closer look at the changes in wealth ownership in the top quintile of the 
asset index distribution (80th to 100th percentile). The greatest loss was incurred by the top 5 
percent of the wealth distribution. This segment of the wealth distribution primarily consists 
of urban households, hence much of this loss seems connected to the decline in public assets, 
such as electricity and piped water. It is also very likely that these households sold some private 
assets in order to buy food and other basic necessities during the hyperinflation period. 
Nonetheless, a closer look at the data shows that some households in the top 3 percent were 
able to substitute electricity with generators and water with boreholes.  
 
Table 13: Percentile share changes of Asset Index distribution 







































Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
 
As highlighted in the introduction, income and wealth in Zimbabwe have long been distributed 
unequally among households, with key influences having included location and gender. This 
background informs the disaggregation of asset inequality that is seen in Table 9. Evidently, 
asset wealth is unequally distributed. The decrease in inequality among rural households and 
 
23 The Palma Index is the ratio of the income share of the top 10 percent to that of the bottom forty percent.  
𝑃𝐼 =  
𝑤10
𝑤40⁄          
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the increase in urban areas makes sense given that the quintile analysis has shown that the 
top twenty percent of the asset wealth distribution lost ownership of more assets. As the 
majority sold durable assets or lost use of public assets, very few households were able to 
substitute piped water with boreholes, or electricity with generators. As a result, the wealth 
gap widened. The story is different for the rural households that form the majority of the 
bottom 80 percent of the population that experience a decrease in asset inequality.  As more 
rural households used remittances and agricultural proceeds to acquire consumer durables, 
inequality decreased in the rural areas. Figure 18 shows that whilst asset inequality increased 
for urban households during the hyperinflation period, it decreased for rural households, as 
depicted by the respective shifts of the post-hyperinflation Lorenz curve. The shift for urban 
households was larger, but both were not statistically significant.   
 
Apart from the rural or urban location, the gender of the household head was also a factor 
influencing the impact of inflation and the household’s ability to recover from it. For male 
headed households, asset inequality declined by 5.69 percent, from 0.57 to 0.53 during 
hyperinflation. A decrease of 6.68 percent is seen among female headed households which 
had a Gini of 0.59 before hyperinflation and then 0.55 after hyperinflation. Figure 19 depicts 
these asset inequality changes by gender. The post-hyperinflation curves for both male- and 
female-headed households’ contract towards the line of equality.  
 
A further intertemporal analysis of asset inequality is conducted for the subgroups of location 
(rural/urban), gender and province. For all three decompositions in Table 14, the total value 
for the Theil index before hyperinflation was 0.60 and after hyperinflation was 0.52. This 
difference amounted to a decrease of 13.80 percent. These values correspond with the 
national Theil Index values in Table 9. For all three decompositions, ‘within group’ inequality 
was the main source of asset inequality in the years both before and after the hyperinflation. 
However, the between group component accounted for the change in inequality over time. 
For instance, the between residential sector component constituted 27 percent of total 
inequality before hyperinflation and dropped to 18 percent after hyperinflation. On the other 
hand, the within group component shows very little change over the hyperinflation period. It 
is therefore apparent that the observed downward trend in total inequality for households’ 
asset wealth during this period is almost entirely due to the decrease in the between group 
effect. A similar trend is observed in the gender and provincial decompositions. The between 
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Table 14: Asset Inequality within and between sub-groups 
Urban/Rural Pre-hyperinflation Post-hyperinflation 
Proportional 
Percentage Change  
Within-Group 
component 
0.33 0.34 2.66 
  55% 65%   
Between-Group 
component 
0.27 0.18 -33.59 
  45% 35%   
Total Inequality (Theil T)  0.60 0.52 -13.80 
  100% 100%  
Male/Female       
Within-Group 
component 
0.59 0.52 -11.77 
  97% 100%   
Between-Group 
component 
0.02 0.00 -92.06 
  3% 0%   
Total Inequality (Theil T)  0.60 0.52 -13.80 
  100% 100%   
Provincial       
Within-Group 
component 
0.45 0.40 -10.73 
  75% 78%   
Between-Group 
component 
0.15 0.11 -23.26 
  25% 22%   
Total Inequality (Theil T)  0.60 0.52 -13.80 
  100% 100%   
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
 




Figure 18: Urban and Rural Lorenz Curves, 2005 and 2010 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
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Figure 19: Intertemporal Lorenz Curves, by household head gender 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys
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What were the sources of these shifts? Table 15, shows the national level changes in the variables 
used to construct the asset index. These show a significant decrease in use of public assets, 
especially electricity and piped water (hereby represented by the ‘improved energy’ and 
‘improved water’ variables). For example, the use of electricity decreased by 11 percentage points 
in urban areas. Prior to hyperinflation, 89 percent of urban households used electricity to cook. 
Over the five-year period of hyperinflation, many lost the ability to use electricity and only 78 
percent were using it for cooking in 2010, after hyperinflation ended. By 2010, the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) was supplying limited quantities of electricity and most 
households were experiencing load shedding. According to Kaseke, N. (2013), “Firms and 
households experienced power failures about five times a week, each lasting an average of four 
hours.”  This shortage in electricity supply, particularly in urban areas contributed to the increase 
in urban inequality because most households reverted to candles for illumination and wood for 
cooking, while very few were able to afford generators and solar systems. While one would expect 
a decrease in inequality since the urban rich were losing services that the poor never had, the 
observed increase in inequality, though not statistically significant, was due to the fact that very 
few urban households gained assets during this period when the majority were experiencing loss.  
 
While this was the case in urban areas, the opposite was true in rural areas where the use of 
electricity increased off a low base, by 1 percentage point (or 42 percent). This was a statistically 
significant change given that only 4 percent of rural households used electricity for cooking prior 
to hyperinflation. The increase was most likely due to electricity connections to rural town centres, 
locally known as growth points. Indeed, this change in the availability of electricity resulted in a 
redistribution of household welfare. The dominant substitutes for electricity were firewood and 
gas. The smoke from backyard fireplaces that replaced internal electric stoves became a common 
sight in urban cities like Harare and Bulawayo. As the economic crisis worsened, urban areas began 
to resemble rural areas.  
 
The decline in supply of treated municipality water was met by an increase in the use of alternative 
water sources, such as boreholes, wells and rivers (surface water). In rural areas, the use of safe 
drinking water (piped, communal tap, boreholes and protected wells) decreased from 51 to 49 
percent, while urban households witnessed a decrease from 98 to 93 percent. In both urban and 
rural areas, the main substitute was underground water. Those who could afford it, dug wells or 
sank boreholes. So, while only 1 percent of the urban population had boreholes, prior to 
hyperinflation, by the end of the period, 11 percent were using borehole water. Due to the 
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significant decline in safe drinking water, the effectiveness of waterborne sanitation also 
decreased. Urban households moved from using flush toilets (represented by the ‘improved toilet’ 
variable) to using pit toilets, while others opted for open defecation, especially in squatter camps. 
Results in the previous chapter showed a 4 percent decrease in the use of flush toilets. Before 
hyperinflation, 94 percent of urban households used flush toilets, but by the end of the period, 
only 90 percent could use their flush toilets.  
 
The decline in the provision of basic services such as water and electricity partly explains the 
increase in inequality within urban areas where few households, in affluent neighbourhoods, could 
afford to dig boreholes when water infrastructure collapsed. Few too could afford the diesel 
generators needed to power the borehole pumps in order to have piped water in their homes. 
The majority of urban households, found in high density areas, bore the brunt of the collapse in 
electricity and water infrastructure. As a result, many resorted to shallow well and surface water, 
as well as pit toilets and open defecation. As the households that previously had use of public and 
private assets lost them, and only a few managed to maintain their assets, urban inequality 
increased. Another possible contributor to this widening gap would have been remittances, as the 
few households with members living outside the country and making substantial earnings were 
often receiving gifts in the form of assets or cash to purchase assets. Bracking and Sachikonye 
(2006) show that only 7 percent of cash remittances were consumer durables such as those found 
in the asset index of this study. Most of the money was used to buy food and fund transportation. 
Hence the increase in inequality between the few who received these goods and the majority who 
suffered the loss of assets.   
 
In the rural areas, asset inequality decreased between rural households. In terms of sanitation, 
there was a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of rural households using improved 
toilets (flush and Blair); from 3 to 4 percent. However, a large proportion of rural households, 
along with urban households who moved back to rural areas during the hyperinflation still 
struggled to access basic services, and the proportion of households using pit toilets more than 
doubled. The proportion of rural households using pit toilets increased from 19 to 34 percent 
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Table 15: Aggregate asset ownership changes 
National  Pre-Hyperinflation Post-Hyperinflation 
Percentage 
point change t-statistic 
Radio 0.48 0.38 -0.10 14.03 
Television 0.30 0.36 0.06 8.88 
Refrigerator 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.83 
Bicycle 0.26 0.23 -0.03 4.79 
Vehicle 0.06 0.07 0.01 1.50 
Livestock 0.61 0.63 0.02 3.51 
Land 0.67 0.61 -0.06 8.69 
Cellphone 0.13 0.61 0.48 77.66 
Improved Toilet 0.33 0.34 0.01 0.74 
Improved Floor 0.67 0.70 0.03 5.07 
Improved Energy 0.32 0.30 -0.02 2.89 
Improved Water 0.66 0.64 -0.02 3.38 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
When the table above is decomposed by location, it becomes apparent that the drivers of 
inequality were different for rural and urban households. See Table 16 where changes show how 
‘within group’ inequality contributed the most to asset inequality changes during the 
hyperinflation period. As for public assets, the percentage point changes by location paint a picture 
of inequality by location during the hyperinflation period. While electricity usage increased 
marginally, from 4 to 5 percent, among rural households, it decreased for urban households; going 
down from 89 to 78 percent. Provision of piped water fell in both, but the proportionate fall 
amongst urban households was double that of rural households. The results are further 
substantiated by the significant increase in the use of alternative water sources for both rural and 
urban households.  
 
As previously mentioned, the decay of water infrastructure negatively affected sanitation and 
caused some households to change the toilet types used. The proportion of rural households with 
improved toilet facilities increased, while the opposite happened among urban households. The 
use of Blair toilets decreased in both cases, especially in rural areas. On the other hand, pit latrine 
usage increased for both rural and urban households. One plausible explanation is that households 
dug pit latrines as contingency measures while they waited for the flush toilet systems to work 
again; as and when piped water would be reintroduced to dwellings. More disturbing was the 
increase in the number of households that reported having no designated toilet facility in the 
dwelling. While in 2005, only 9.29 percent of urban households claimed not to have toilet facilities, 
the proportion had increased to 50.88 percent by 2010. An implication of this movement away 
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from the flush and Blair toilets was an increased likelihood of ground-water contamination, and 
hence of diarrhoea among children in urban households. The data reveals that the proportion of 
children with diarrhoea in urban areas increased from 19 percent in 2005 to 30 percent in 2010. 
The opposite was true in rural areas where there was a marginal decrease from 30 to 29 percent. 
Again, this is evidence of the narrowing gap in inequality, as the rate of infection in urban 
households reached similar levels to rural households. 
Table 16: Contrast of asset ownership shifts, by location6 
Pre and Post Hyperinflation Percentage Point Changes 































































Notes: *** shows statistically significant changes. Estimates are statistically different if t-statistics>1.96 in 
parentheses.  
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
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The increased proportion of pit toilets in rural areas may also be a consequence of urban-rural 
migration. Between 2005 and 2010, there was an increase of 1.38 percent in the rural population, 
while there was a decrease of 2.67 percent in the urban population. Three reasons stand out: First, 
in the year 2005 there was Operation Murambatsvina, the expulsion from cities of informal traders 
and households dwelling in squatter camps and illegal shelters. Second, with the rising inflation 
rates the cost of living in urban areas rose faster than household incomes, without alternative 
means of support some households moved back to their rural homesteads where they could grow 
their own food and avoid purchasing it. Third, some urban households were given land in the land 
resettlement program. So, they moved to the rural areas as well. Whatever the reason for their 
move, households arriving at a new location would need to dig a temporary toilet facility while 
constructing permanent residence and ablution facilities.  
It is worth noting that in urban areas, when the water system stopped working, many households 
began to share toilet facilities. The ZDHS data shows that the percentage of shared ablution 
facilities increased from 34.4 to 48.7 percent during the hyperinflation period.  
Inequality was not only seen in household use of public assets, such as water, sanitation and 
electricity but also in the private assets that were used by households.  Looking at Table 16, the 
first point of note is the significant decline in the ownership of radios and bicycles among urban 
households in contrast to the insignificant changes in these assets, among rural households. This 
may reflect the sale of movable assets to obtain basic necessities. For example, bicycles may have 
been used in barter trade in exchange for food from rural households. Also, some just got old or 
broke down and did not get fixed because spare parts, including tyres, were difficult to get. There 
is also a high probability that the radios were replaced by cellular phones which can connect to 
radio stations. 
In contrast to urban areas, ownership of private assets – televisions, refrigerators, vehicles and 
cellular phones increased among rural households. This increase was also a contributor to the 
decrease in inequality in rural areas as certain households moved up in the asset index 
distribution. Inequality would have decreased within the rural sector because of the drastic 
increases in these private assets, especially the productive ones like cellular phones, as they no 
longer belonged to a small minority. Though, there is little data-based proof, anecdotal experience 
points to remittances as the source of these increased private assets in rural households. 
According to Cross (pers. com. 2020), “Much of the money that is remitted into Zimbabwe goes 
to rural families and some of that money goes to rural homes. You can drive through 
rural/communal areas and you can see some decent houses with television aerials on the roof, 
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solar panels and all that sort of thing.” It is reasonable to assume that remittances have largely 
contributed to the improvement in the construction material for dwellings indicated by the 
increase in the proportion of cement, wooden and tiled floors among rural households.  
While the results above are for decompositions by location and gender, the analysis now 
concludes with a decomposition of inequality, by source. Using the same asset index derived from 
the ZDHS data, tables 17 and 18, below, show the results of the decomposition before and after 
hyperinflation. These results show the magnitude of the assets’ absolute and relative 
contributions to total household wealth and the inequality thereof. While the contribution of the 
assets to total wealth are revealed by the weights in Table A2.2, in this section, the focus is on the 
contribution of each asset to overall inequality. Prior to hyperinflation, private assets constituted 
79 percent of the asset wealth distribution and contributed 74.3 percent to inequality. On the 
other hand, the share of public assets in the asset index was 21 percent and they increased 
inequality by 25.7 percent. After hyperinflation, private assets constituted 82.1 percent of the 
asset wealth distribution and contributed 76.5 percent to inequality. By then, the share of public 
assets in the asset index was 17.9 percent and they increased inequality by 23.5 percent. Evidently, 
the decrease in inequality on a national level was mainly attributable to the increase in private 
assets among poor households. 
Table 17: Decomposition of asset inequality, by elements of asset index – Pre-hyperinflation 




































































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
 
Table 18: Decomposition of asset inequality, by elements of asset index – Post-hyperinflation 



















































































Land 0.126 -0.169 0.232 -0.039 -0.029 
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys 
 
The third column shows the Gini correlation 𝑅𝑘 from equation 5 above. These values show the 
correlation that exists between the particular asset and the entire asset index. The average Gini 
correlation for private assets decreased by 4.7 percent, while that of public assets decreased by 
5.96 percent. The average Gini for private assets before and after hyperinflation was 0.19 and 
0.15, respectively. While for public assets, the average Gini coefficient 0.22 both before and after 
hyperinflation. This confirms the earlier observation that the decrease in inequality that occurred 
on a national level, during hyperinflation is mainly attributable to the change in inequality among 
private assets.  
 
Ultimately, this shows that increased ownership of private assets resulted in a decrease in asset 
inequality. As seen in the previous chapter, many of these increases accrued to poor (rural) 
households, decreasing the asset wealth gap. The increase in private asset holdings of rural 
households were largely funded by crop sales and remittances. These rural households constitute 
98 percent of the bottom two quintiles of the asset wealth distribution. They also experienced a 
marginal increase in the use of public assets as remittances enabled them to connect their homes 
to the electric grid. On the other hand, urban households, which were largely located in the top 
three quintiles of the wealth distribution, experienced significant losses in use of public assets 
when national infrastructure collapsed and their private asset portfolio did not improve due to the 
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decrease in real wages. The inflation forced urban households to redirect their income and 




There seems little doubt that Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation affected the distribution of household 
welfare. At a national level, and in rural areas, inequality in asset holdings decreased; but in urban 
areas it rose. An initial decomposition reveals that the observed inequality levels were mainly 
found within subgroups. However, the observed decrease in inequality was due to inequality 
between subgroups. In this case study, the observed increase in inequality was within the urban 
areas and the observed decrease was within the rural areas. A further decomposition by asset 
wealth source revealed that private assets contributed the most to the observed inequality levels. 
A household’s ranking in the asset index distribution was largely determined by ownership of 
private assets.  
 
As shown in the results above, households responded differently to hyperinflation. Many, 
especially in rural areas converted their cash savings into assets, as a means of storing value. Hence 
the observed increase in private assets. However, differences were apparent in the type of assets. 
For instance, households that could afford more, went beyond the purchase of electric appliances 
to renovating existing houses, building new houses, installing solar systems, installing boreholes 
and in some rare cases, acquiring electric generators. In addition, while some households bought 
new assets, others sold the assets that they had. In general, rural households were acquiring assets 
using proceeds from food production. On the other hand, urban households were disposing of 
their assets in exchange for food and other basic necessities. This was made clear not only in the 
asset register used to create the asset index, but also in the reduction in the number of shares 
held in Old Mutual, which mainly apply to urban households. This reflects the reality that 
households in the formal economy suffered most from hyperinflation, while the opposite was true 
for those who were self-sufficient. This explains the existence of inequality in asset wealth, and 
especially the observed increase in inequality among urban households during hyperinflation.   
Tables 9 and 10 show that asset inequality increased among urban households and decreased 
among rural households. Indeed, the erosion of the urban asset base was an equalizing factor, as 
it contributed to the overall decrease in inequality on a national level. 
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While most assets included in the asset index were contributing to inequality, this was not the 
case for land and livestock. Access to land and livestock resulted in a reduction in inequality 
because they are productive in nature. Arable land would be used to grow crops for sale and the 
earnings would improve household welfare. As this happened for more households, inequality 
would decline. Animals were also used in the food production process, as they were either sold as 
food or used to cultivate crops. Either way, they were useful in improving household welfare and 
reducing inequality. Since these land and livestock were mainly found in rural areas, they reduced 
inequality among these households, while urban households suffered more inequality during the 
hyperinflation period. Productive private assets are therefore part of the solution to the problem 
of inequality, especially in the presence of hyperinflation.  
With the current release of micro-level data by ZimSTAT, further research can be conducted on 
the topic. Potentially an analysis of variance could be conducted, which includes variables that 
measure the state of political instability during the hyperinflation period. A worthwhile addition 
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Chapter 5 
Child nutrition and hyperinflation in Zimbabwe 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that Zimbabwe’s period of hyperinflation was accompanied by 
changes in the distribution of asset wealth across households. While the whole nation was 
affected by the economic conditions prevailing during hyperinflation, urban households suffered 
more. In particular, the asset holdings [which are taken to proxy household welfare] of urban 
households decreased significantly, while in rural areas they tended to rise. Since rural households 
tended to be poorer, the result was a reduction in overall asset inequality. Major contributors to 
the changes in asset inequality were the transfer of land and livestock to some urban households 
that relocated to rural areas during the land reform program; the acquisition of private assets by 
rural households using agricultural proceeds and remittances; the disposal of private assets by 
urban households in order to buy food and other basic necessities; and finally, the deterioration 
(especially in towns and cities) of public assets, with growing shortages of electricity and piped 
water, and with sanitation facilities becoming increasingly dysfunctional.  
 
While these results give a good picture of what happened on a household level, they omit the 
effects of hyperinflation on children. This chapter focuses on the changes that occurred in child 
nutrition levels and the factors contributing to these changes amongst children under the age of 
5. The hypothesis is that the disparity in child health widened during Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation 
period, and that children under the age of five – the typical victims of a dilapidated healthcare 
system – were especially vulnerable to malnutrition due to the economic crisis. As a means to 
examine the hypothesis, a multivariate Logistic regression analysis based on the proximate 
determinants analytical framework is conducted (Mosely and Chen, 1984).  
 
This study contributes to an existing body of literature on the relationship between economic 
crises and child health (Frankenberg, et al., 1999; Strauss and Thomas, 1998), in particular to the 
use of nutrition as a measure of health (Waters, et al., 2003; Stillman and Thomas, 2004). The 
literature on the relationship between hyperinflation and malnutrition (Darnton-Hill and Cogill, 
2010; Paxson and Schady, 2005; Christian, 2010) is noticeably thin, especially in the African 
context, a gap that this paper endeavours to fill, using the peculiar case study of Zimbabwe, a Sub-
Saharan African country that recently experienced the highest levels of inflation recorded in Africa.  
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In Zimbabwe, the combination of political instability and poor economic policy led to 
hyperinflation and a significant slowdown in overall productivity. These conditions resulted in 
income loss, inadequate food production and a collapse of infrastructure which included the water 
and sanitation systems. Households that were affected by the increase in food prices and the 
reduction in food production experienced food shortages. Over the 20-year period under study, 
droughts occasionally contributed to food inflation. However, as Mazvimavi (2010) shows, there 
were only 3 droughts during this period, in 2002, 2012 and 2015; none of which coincided with 
the peak of the hyperinflation (2007 to 2008). Another potential contributing factor to food 
inflation could have been foot and mouth disease amongst cattle, which makes movement of 
livestock difficult. However, even this seems unlikely to have been a concern; the disease was not 
unusually prevalent and there were only 5 recorded cases during the hyperinflation period24. 
Clearly food inflation during this time was not the result of natural causes, but was indeed linked 
to the general price increases occasioned by poor economic policies. As mentioned in chapter 1, 
the two main coping mechanisms adopted by the public were to reduce the number of meals and 
to consume an undiversified diet, with very little meat protein.  
 
In addition to the food shortages, most of Zimbabwe’s urban households lost use of clean piped 
water and few were able to replace municipal supplies with private boreholes. The country had 
become accustomed to clean piped water, safe for drinking and washing, and available for use in 
flush toilets. Its absence encouraged the spread of diseases such as Cholera and Diarrhoea. 
ZimVAC (2009) mentions that sanitation and water supply became dysfunctional in urban areas.  
The infrastructure breakdown resulted in the cholera outbreak of 2008/9 that claimed 
approximately 4 600 lives of the 98 000 who fell ill in 60 of the country’s 62 districts (World Health 
Organization, 2008). Causal factors mentioned were the absence of a refuse collection system and 
purified water, as well as the collapse of the sewage and public health systems; which all occurred 
progressively during the economic crisis. The World Bank (2013) mention that only 24 percent of 
urban household sanitation systems were connected to sewer. Most of the remaining households 
use open defecation or pit latrines, and untreated sewers often run into water sources. According 
to the report, water and sanitation systems collapsed because of insufficient treatment chemicals 
and chronic power shortages which disrupted the pumping and treating of water. As a result, when 
water was supplied to dwellings, it was contaminated contaminated and unfit for drinking.  
 
 
24 See https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/statusdetail  
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Although the directions of causality are sometimes ambiguous, a priori, a positive relationship is 
expected between the rate of inflation and the incidence of malnutrition amongst children 
(Paxson and Schady, 2005). Since malnutrition can be caused by both disease and shortage of 
food, the likely drivers would be inflation’s effects access to food, to clean water, to efficient 
sanitation and to modern healthcare. Following Blackley et al., (2004), Figure 20 hypothesizes a 
transmission mechanism between hyperinflation and child nutrition.  
 
 
Figure 20: Socioeconomic position and risk factor pathways to health 
Source: Blackley et al., (2004). “Assessing the distribution of health risks by socioeconomic position at national and 
local levels.” 
 
As macroeconomic conditions affect households differently, so they have differential effects on 
the health levels of children in them. As a result, macroeconomic shocks often have unequal 
impacts on child health. Cutler et al., (2002) suggest that economic crises marked by hyperinflation 
affect child health through three main channels.  
o First, child health is affected by declining private expenditure on medical care and nutrition. As 
prices rise and the average family income (and wealth) decreases due to job loss and a decline in purchasing 
power, households spend less on medical care and a balanced diet.  
o Second, as a means to counter household income loss, children join the labour force. Some working 
conditions can have an adverse effect on these weaker younger household members.  
Macroeconomic 
influences such as 
Hyperinflation
- Devalued income
- Employment loss 
Limited access to health 
services as well as 
improved water and 
sanitation systems. 
Ill health, measured by 
malnutrition
- Disability 
- Mortality  
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o Third, macroeconomic crises marked by hyperinflation often result in a decline in public sector 
expenditure on healthcare. Generally, public health facilities suffer a lack of maintenance and eventual 
destruction. Not only are the super structures of hospitals and clinics dilapidated, but their functionality 
suffers because of the failure of other public resources, such as water and electricity.  
 
In Zimbabwe, the first and third scenarios certainly transpired. However, dangerous child labour 
was not prevalent. Instead, the common means of supplementing lost income was the sale of 
household assets. In addition, the hyperinflation period was accompanied by structural changes 
in the healthcare system. Medical personnel migrated to countries that offered them better 
earnings and working conditions. According to the Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, 
(2010), at the peak of hyperinflation in 2008, the country was operating at 31 percent capacity for 
doctors, 39 percent for nurses and 20 percent for midwives. The availability of drugs fell to 29 
percent and vital hospital items, which should have been at 100 percent, were at 22 percent 
capacity. The majority of the medical equipment in hospitals was either obsolete or non-
functional. In terms of public health expenditure, the per capita budget allocation towards 
healthcare was US$7 in 2008, down from US$9 in 2005 and US$21 in 2000. This was significantly 
below the recommended minimum of the World Health Organisation (WHO henceforth), which is 
US$34 per year (Sambo, Kirigia, & Orem, 2013).  
 
This situation led to escalating mortality rates. The World Health Organization (2009) shows that 
the mortality rate for children under the age of 5 was 85/1000 in 2006, which was higher than the 
global rate of 71/1000. This was the highest it had been since the catastrophic drought year of 
1992, when the rate was 77/1000. On the other hand, Zimbabwe’s infant (children 2 years old and 
younger) mortality rate was 790/100000 live births at the peak of hyperinflation. This was much 
higher than the global mean of 191/100000 and the Africa region mean of 425/100000 at the 
same time. Not only were children dying, but so too were their mothers. Todd, Ray, 
Madzimbamuto, & Sanders, (2010) show that the maternal mortality rate in the year 2007 was 
725/100000, which was a large increase from the 168/100000 recorded in 1990. Overall life 
expectancy, which had been 62 years in 1990, declined to 43 years in 2006. This is not unexpected, 
given that there were 1.6 doctors and 7.2 nurses left to service 10,000 citizens in 2010 (Zimbabwe 
Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, 2010). Approximately 18,000 healthcare personnel had 
emigrated between 1998 and 2008. The result was that children were being born into a society 
where their chances of both short- and long-term survival were low.  
 
Figure 21 reveals how child mortality fluctuated over the years. As stated in chapter 1, Zimbabwe 
achieved majority rule in 1980. The graph shows the state of child mortality thenceforth. The 
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graph shows high mortality rates at the beginning of this period. This was due to a combination of 
factors such as the war of liberation, limited health infrastructure in the rural areas where the 
majority of the population was located and the drought of 1982 which resulted in low food 
production. These mortality rates decreased soon afterwards as rainfall patterns recovered, 
economic sanctions were lifted and as the government invested more in primary and preventative 
healthcare, especially at district level across the country.  Public health expenditure increased by 
94 percent in real terms during the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence and this improved 
health in households. For instance, Kanyenze et al., (2011) suggest that, because of the increase 
in child immunization from 25 to 80 percent between 1980 and 1988, child malnutrition decreased 
from 22 to 12 percent; and infant mortality declined from 90 to 53 deaths per 1000 live births. 
This explains the significant drop in all measures of mortality rates of children seen in Figure 21.  
In the decade 1990 - 2000, however, Zimbabwe’s child mortality rates began to rise steadily. A 
number of factors may explain this.  
One was the decline in the quality and availability of primary healthcare in rural areas due to the 
decrease in government expenditure as part of the cost-recovery scheme under the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). While in 1991 public health expenditure constituting 
6.2 percent of the national budget, by 1996 this had decreased to 4.2 percent. With a less 
equipped health system due to minimal funding, survival rates of children declined. Apart from 
the austerity measures that were necessitated by the stagnant economy and ESAP, the drought of 
1992 negatively affected national income, leaving even less money available for investment in the 
health sector. While the contingency plan was for hospitals to retain user fees for internal use, 
these were insufficient to meet the health department’s needs. So, the financially constrained 
health system of the second decade of independence failed to meet prenatal and postnatal health 
care needs, leading to higher rates of child mortality.  
A second reason for the increase in child mortality rates during this decade was the emergence of 
the HIV and AIDS pandemic around the year 1997. This added to the disease burden and children 
born of victims often died in infancy because of late diagnosis of the parents and insufficient 
protective measures for unborn children and neonates from the virus.  
A third reason for the increase in child mortality was that many health centres in remote areas, 
were supported by missionaries and farmers. These were significantly disrupted by the land 
invasions which began in 1997. The compound effect of these last two reasons is visible in the 
graph, as a peak in child mortality in 1997. The health sector experienced a storm as both the HIV 
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pandemic and the land invasions were unexpected and only in later years were mitigating 
measures put in place.  
 
Figure 21: Zimbabwe’s Child Mortality and Inflation trends, 1980 - 2018  
Source: World Bank, United Nations 
 
It is evident in the diagram above that the situation did not improve as child mortality rates 
remained high in the 3rd decade of the independent Zimbabwe. Basically, there was a plateau, 
followed by a subsequent peak in 2007 and 2008.  The high rates of child mortality seen in this 
period resulted from a combination of factors. Leading these was political instability: it led the 
government to adopt a number of populist policies including the encouragement of the land 
invasions that destroyed the agricultural sector and much of the economy; repeatedly printing 
money in order to finance a budget deficit largely based on payment of gratuities to war veterans, 
purchases of armaments and munitions for the Congolese war and other quasi-fiscal activities 
(IMF, 2001). These encouraged capital flight which left Zimbabwe’s economy with little money to 
maintain the health care system. As a result, children died young from a lack of vaccines and 
medicines as well as a shortage of hospital personnel and equipment.  
 
Related to the fiscal shortfall was failure to invest in the maintenance of the water and sanitation 
systems. Without clean water and flush toilet systems, Zimbabwe experienced a cholera epidemic. 
In the short period between August 2008 and September 2009, 98,309 individuals were infected 
and 4,300 died (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The death rate affected both adults and children, hence 
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The third reason was inflation. Unlike the previous decades where child mortality rates would 
oscillate, during this crisis period, the high death rates of children were sustained until the inflation 
was solved by dollarization in 2009. The steeply rising prices negatively affected the resources of 
the households in which the children were being born and raised. Income levels of parents were 
declining in real terms, and gradually private healthcare unaffordable while public healthcare was 
increasingly unavailable. In addition, clean water and sanitation systems were not available; the 
number of health personnel declined; vaccine and medicine supplies became scarce and 
unaffordable. At the height of hyperinflation, even food became a struggle for many to attain. 
Hence, child health declined and mortality increased, as a result of poor diet, a lack of medicines 
and infrequent health check-ups. 
 
A simple correlation is not evidence of causality. The multitude of factors that drove prices up may 
also have been impacting directly on child health. For example, low rainfall affecting the yield of 
maize would simultaneously cause hunger and higher prices. However, while data constraints do 
not allow for the determination of a causal relationship, this pre-post comparative analysis and 
the subsequent regression analysis do help explain some of the changes in child nutrition and its 
distribution during the hyperinflation period.  
 
Malnutrition is a state of deficient nutrition caused by either poor diet or repeated infections (De 
Onis, Blossner, Borghi, Morris, & Frongillo (2004). Malnutrition is commonly found in children who 
live in areas with low food production due to economic conditions, poor climate or 
overpopulation. Indicators of childhood malnutrition are obtained using combinations of body 
measurements and age. These are relevant because the response of a child’s body to inadequate 
food intake or disease is to stop or slow down growth. The most common of these measures are 
stunting and wasting. These indicators are based on reference curves for healthy children which 
were determined by the WHO (1995a). In terms of these measures, children are considered 
malnourished when their z-scores for either of these measures fall more than -2 standard 
deviations below the international reference median.  
Stunting occurs when a child is unusually short for its age. This is often due to repeated illness or poor 
nutrition during the first two years of life, which leaves lingering effects thereafter. It is an indicator of 
chronic malnutrition, due to sustained food deprivation and disease.  
Wasting is marked by a low weight-for-height score. It describes significant weight loss, due to a recent 
famine or severe disease in the recent past. Wasting indicates acute recent malnutrition.  
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Figure 22 shows that the prevalence of stunting and wasting increased over the years of high and 
hyper-inflation and then decreased after the hyperinflation ended, when dollarization was 
implemented. The period of economic crisis was accompanied by growing crises in child health. 
These are believed to have continued until 2009, however, due to a lack of annual data, the 
analysis is based on 5-year intervals and significant information is lost in between. The graph 
shows a decrease in wasting and stunting in the post-inflationary period that followed dollarization 
in 2009; a period of economic revival when food and health care were more affordable and 
accessible. 
Table 19 shows the stunting prevalence rates for children aged 5 years and younger, in Africa and 
on a global level (World Health Organisation, 2010). On both a global and regional level, 
malnutrition decreased. Though more detailed analysis is provided in the results section, it is 
worth noting that the malnutrition levels in Zimbabwe, during the hyperinflation period were 
below the regional average, yet above the global average rates. Data on a global and regional level 
were not available for wasting. However, the 2017 estimates, noted below the table, are within 
the same range as the Zimbabwean prevalence rates for wasting.  
Table 19: Global and regional trends for malnutrition in children 5 years and younger 
 2005 2010 Percentage Change (%) 
Global    
Stunting 0.295 0.261 -11.5254 
Africa    
Stunting 0.399 0.372 -6.76692 
Source: Global Health Observatory data repository of the World Health Organisation.  
Notes: No values were available for wasting in 2005 and 2010, however, the regional average for 2017 was 7 percent, 
while the global average was 7.5 percent.  
 
The pre-post analysis used in the table above is similar to the methodology that will be employed 
for Zimbabwe, with the structural shift being the hyperinflation period that occurred from year 
2007 to 2008. A further disaggregation will be conducted in order to reveal the role of location 
(rural or urban), child’s gender and asset wealth rank of their households.  
 
Currie et al., (2009) identify child age, gender, family affluence, parent’s education, country health 
patterns, communication with parents, positive peer relations, and supportive school 
environment as common sources of variations in child health. This analysis will use factors relevant 
to the Zimbabwean context, along with the household’s asset index as a measure of living 
standards. Initially, one might expect that a hyperinflationary economic crisis would have an 
unambiguously negative impact on child nutrition. The results of this study show, however, that 
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the relationship is far more nuanced. A closer reading of the literature suggests that this outcome 
should not have been surprising.  
 
5.2 Review of related literature 
The existing literature on health effects of economic crises marked by high inflation shows mixed 
results. Zimbabwe is not the first country to face this problem and among existing case studies, 
there are profound variations. It is therefore worth surveying the experiences of other countries 
during periods of economic crisis, to see how child heath, in particular nutrition, was impacted. In 
Peru, Paxson and Schady (2005) found no significant changes in food consumption patterns during 
the economic crisis. Between 1986 and 1990, inflation increased from 86 percent to 7,500 percent 
in Peru (Kiguel and Liviatan, 1995). When real GDP per capita reached its lowest in 1988, infant 
mortality increased significantly. At this point, both private and public healthcare expenditure had 
declined significantly. Public health expenditure decreased by 58 percent and its share of the state 
budget declined from 4.3 percent of the national budget in 1985 to 3 percent in 1990. Not only 
were medical supplies expensive, but the real earnings of health workers had decreased 
significantly, leading to repeated strikes and large-scale loss of medical personnel. The result was 
very poor healthcare across the nation of Peru, to the extent that 50 percent of births occurred at 
home between 1988 and 1990. When Peru’s hyperinflation period ended in 1991, infant mortality 
had risen. 
 
Paxson and Schady (2005) comment that, during Peru’s hyperinflation, when GDP decreased by 
30 percent and real wages declined by 80 percent, cheaper staple foods – mainly starch – replaced 
proteins, dairy, and vegetables. Children were at risk of malnutrition through illness because the 
number of households that purchased medicine dropped by 50 percent. On the other hand, the 
authors show that households purchased more durable goods to protect income against 
hyperinflation. During the crisis, both food and medication prices became inhibitive, however it 
was poor healthcare that became the main avenue through which child health suffered.  
Approximately a decade after the Latin American crisis, the 1997 to 1998 East Asian Economic 
Crisis had significant negative effects on the urban population of Indonesia (Waters et al., 2003). 
At the time, Indonesia’s annual inflation rose to 58 percent and food prices increased at a rate of 
80 percent. The crisis came unexpectedly; it was an exogenous shock, effectively a knock-on effect 
after the devaluation of the Thai Bhat. The health sector was negatively affected as medicine and 
medical treatment became more costly as input costs rose. As the value of money decreased, 
healthcare’s share of household budgets fell. As a result, anaemia and vitamin A deficiency 
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increased among mothers and children under the age of 5. Wasting increased among mothers. 
Importantly, however, child malnutrition levels did not increase. In fact, overall child malnutrition 
decreased from 32.6 to 28.5 percent between 1995 and 1999. The percentage of children who 
were stunted and underweight also fell. The reason why child malnutrition decreased, while food 
and overall inflation increased might be that adults decreased their own nutritional intake in order 
to feed children in their households. While this explains why malnutrition did not worsen among 
children, it still does not clarify why it decreased. Could it be that families cut down on junk (non-
nutritious) food? Or perhaps they narrowed down their budgets to mainly just food expenditure?  
It is worth noting that the effect of the crisis was different in Thailand where the economic 
contagion had originated, but where households had access to good public healthcare. The 
nation’s insurance schemes, such as the Voluntary Health card were useful to households. As a 
result, child malnutrition did not increase. However, the macroeconomic shock was felt by 
mothers and children at the micronutrient level. According to Block et al., (2004) haemoglobin 
concentration levels declined for both mothers and children. However, overall child malnutrition, 
proxied by wasting, remained unaffected.  
Further evidence of the far-reaching consequences of the 1997 East Asian crisis was provided by 
Stillman and Thomas (2004), who show that, during the related Ruble crisis the following year, the 
Russian economy contracted by 25 percent and food expenditure decreased at the same rate. As 
the value of real individual incomes decreased, per capita expenditure declined by 20 percent. The 
result was a decrease in protein and fat intake in Russian households. Nonetheless, calorie intake 
did not decline significantly during the crisis because households increased staple food 
consumption. Similarly, McKenzie (2006) shows that households’ energy intake was maintained 
during the Peso crisis in Mexico. This is mainly because households replaced milk, meat and fruit 
with staple foods. Consumer durables were used as a smoothing mechanism, either through the 
sale of or the reduction in the purchase of assets. 
The impact of the Asian economic crisis on child health and nutrition was also assessed by Bhutta, 
Bawany, Feroze, & Rizvi (2008). Their study showed that food prices in Indonesia increased by as 
much as 300 times, while in Laos, they were 10 times the pre-crisis levels. The analysis revealed 
that, despite the price rises, child malnutrition did not change significantly in Laos and actually 
decreased in the Philippines and Indonesia. Overall, among these Asian economies, including 
Thailand, there was a minimal and insignificant increase in wasting among children under the age 
of 5. However, the same age group experienced a decrease in stunting and mortality, especially in 
rural areas. West and Mehra’s (2010) study the effects of the 1998 financial crisis on the 
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Indonesian reported that Indonesia’s GDP per capita declined by approximately 40 percent. 
However, they point out that in addition to the Asian contagion, it was also affected by cyclones, 
by an El Niño event, and by political unrest. The weather extremes led to food shortages which 
resulted in a significant increase food inflation. The most negatively impacted demographic were 
urban households who consumed less protein and vitamin A-rich food sources as they could no 
longer afford animal source foods and fruits. The results included increases in night blindness and 
anaemia.  
Approximately a decade after the Asian economic crisis came the world food crisis of 2008. 
Christian (2010) chronicles how during this time, there was a 24 percent increase in the prices of 
staple foods such as sugar, rice and corn. Oil prices increased by 87 percent and dairy by 58 
percent. On a global scale, this led to an overall increase in food insecurity, a decrease in nutrition 
and an increase in starvation-related deaths. Young children under the age of 5 were not spared 
from this reality as the mortality rates of under-5s around the world tend to be highest in the 
poorest quintile, with 55 percent of deaths typically resulting from malnutrition (Pelletier et al., 
1995). Malnutrition, due to a lack of food, often led to infectious diseases. Wasting and stunting 
were responsible for causing the largest disease burden. This study of 9 different countries 
revealed that approximately 21 percent of deaths of children under 5 were due to restricted 
intrauterine growth, stunting and wasting. As the prevalence of malnutrition increased, the child 
mortality rate followed suit. In this global study, Christian (2010) estimates an 8 to 16 percent 
increase in wasting and a 3 to 7 percent increase in stunting in Asia. At the same time, child 
mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa was expected to increase by 3 to 15 percent. The main contributing 
factor being a decrease in micronutrient intake. The specific micronutrients that were expected 
to decrease among children on a global scale were Zinc, by 4.4 percent and vitamin A by 6.5 
percent. The latter alone would result in a 23 to 30 percent increase in child mortality risk (Black 
et al., 2008) while the former would increase the risks of pneumonia, stunting and diarrhoea.  
A closer look at the East Asian and Pacific regions, reveals significant increases in child malnutrition 
rates during this crisis of 2008. This was more so the case for urban households that did not grow 
their own food and instead relied on food purchases (Darnton-Hill and Cogill 2010). While rural 
households have the advantage that they can grow their own food and collect fruits and 
vegetables from the wild, urban households rely on food purchases. Economic pressures mean 
that many urban households end up selling assets, taking loans and reducing non-food 
expenditures in order to survive. In such circumstances, the trend seen among the urban-poor 
during the crisis was that animal-based foodstuffs were the first to be excluded from the diet. As 
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a result, household members experienced protein and micronutrient deficiencies as they ate less 
fish, milk, vegetables, eggs, meat and fruits. The new diets consisted largely of fats and 
carbohydrates i.e. staple foods. As the crisis worsened, households coped by reducing the size and 
frequency of meals, for adults first, then children. For example, in Indonesia, the effects of the 
food crisis were mainly felt by mothers. Wasting increased among women due to food shortages. 
A similar story of a rise in food insecurity during the global crisis is told by Sophal (2011) who shows 
that food shortages increased in Cambodia. Food prices there increased by 36.8 percent between 
2007 and 2008, suggesting that 70 percent of the budget of the poorest 40 percent had been 
distorted. As a result, 50 percent of the poor households decreased their food intake during the 
crisis.  
While most literature has shown these negative effects that were being experienced on the 
demand side, Brinkman et al., (2010) do the same and then go further to show how the crisis 
affected the suppliers of food. According to the authors, the 2008 global economic crisis resulted 
in general price increases, and as such, food price inflation. This was a welcome advantage to 
farmers who earned more profit from food production. Non-farm households that were 
dependent on food expenditure struggled to keep up with the food price increases and resorted 
to coping by either selling assets or stopping children from going to school. These were the 
consumption smoothing mechanisms on the demand side. In Burundi, for instance, 83 percent of 
households complained about the 40 percent rise in the price of staple foods during the global 
economic crisis. Similarly, in Ethiopia where staple food prices increased by between 100 and 180 
percent, the proportion of food insecure households increased, especially in urban areas. In 
Guinea, 29 percent of urban households ate less frequently and 87 percent ate smaller meals. In 
Uganda, food prices increased by 10 percent, leading to fewer food purchases until 50 percent of 
food came from own production.  
With these effects of the food crisis having been observed in other contexts, it is reasonable to ask 
whether there was spill over effects into Zimbabwe. Might the global crisis have been a 
contributing exogenous factor to Zimbabwe’s economic crisis, given that they occurred 
simultaneously? Or were Zimbabwe’s food shortages solely an internal problem?  
This survey of global literature has shown that, during various economic crises, the risk of food 
insecurity tended to increase with inflation, even though the incidence of malnutrition varied by 
context. While most of the available empirical evidence shows that malnutrition and mortality 
increase with economic crises, their impacts may be felt asymmetrically. Quite often, during crises, 
women are described as forgoing their own meals to ensure food for their children. In such cases, 
106 | P a g e  
 
child malnutrition does not increase significantly. However, maternal malnutrition does, leading 
to low birth weight for neonates. However, it is more common that as real household incomes 
decline, households reduce dietary diversity, micronutrient and energy intake. In addition, as the 
deficiency in micronutrients increases, children became more susceptible to infections and suffer 
from poor growth and slow cognitive development. Even if caloric intake is undiminished, the 
likelihood of child stunting and wasting increases when food inflation forces households to 
decrease proteins and micronutrients. The remainder of the chapter analyses the changes that 
happened in child nutrition levels in Zimbabwe’s history, paying particular interest to the 
hyperinflationary period.  
5.3 Methodology  
This chapter is a study of changes in child nutrition from 1994 to 2015, with a keen interest on the 
hyperinflation period. The nationally representative ZDHS 1994, 1999, 2005, 2010 and 2015 
datasets are used in this analysis. In addition to the household data used in previous chapters, this 
analysis, specifically utilizes the women’s datasets which carry health information for 28,254 
children (14,246 girls and 14,608 boys) who were under the age of 5 at the time of the surveys. 
The ZDHS women’s datasets contain information on adult women, household characteristics, birth 
history as well as pre- and post-natal data for up to 6 children under 5 years of age. This includes 
vaccination and health care information (Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994, 1999, 2005, 
2010, 2015). National aggregates for inflation25, remittances26, annual rainfall27 and maize yield28 
are also included in the analysis.  
 
The analysis begins with a descriptive section showing the prevailing rates of child malnutrition 
and the changes that occurred during hyperinflation. This is important since high levels of 
malnutrition, specifically stunting and wasting, signal problems with general child health. Stunting 
(extremely low height-for-age) reflects cumulative growth deficits, i.e. ongoing chronic 
malnutrition. It shows past growth failure, due to prolonged food deprivation and/or sustained 
illness (World Health Organization, 2006; Akombi et al.2017). Wasting (extremely low “weight-for-
height) describes a child’s current nutritional status i.e. acute malnutrition due to recent food 
 
25 Robertson, J., personal communication, January 9, 2020. 
26 The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2018). “Zimbabwe’s foreign currency inflows from Money Transfer Agencies”  
27 Centre for Hydrometeorology and Remote Sensing (2020). Data Portal. Retrieved from 
http://chrsdata.eng.uci.edu/  
28 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2020). FAOSTAT. Retrieved from 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC  
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deprivation or illness (World Health Organization, 1999). For both measures, the malnourished 
child is located two or more standard deviations below the reference median. The ZHDS stunting 
and wasting variables are calculated using the World Health Organization (2006) Child Growth 
Standards. The descriptive and regression analyses for malnutrition use simple binary variables for 
stunting and wasting. These variables show the proportion of children who are stunted and 
wasted, without specifying the extent for each child.  
 
After computing and comparing the malnutrition prevalence rates, the next stage involves 
multivariate regression analyses to establish whether inflation and other variables are significantly 
related to the rates of stunting and wasting amongst children. As mentioned earlier, correlation is 
no proof of causality, however, the implicit presumption being tested is that inflation leads to 
changes in household asset wealth, which in turn impact diet and healthcare and thence child 
health. This hypothesis is tested through the application of the proximate determinants framework 
of Mosley and Chen (1984), which was influenced by Palloni (1981) and Schultz (1979). The specific 





) =  ∅(𝑥𝛽)          (16) 
The dependent variables are stunting and wasting, which are non-specific measures of child health 
(Cole and Parkin, 1977; Mata, 1978). The subscript 𝑖 in equation 16 refers to the individual child. 
In this case, the objective is to measure the probability that a child is malnourished (stunted or 
wasted) depending on the following proximate determinants which have an influence on the risk 
of morbidity and eventually lead to stunting and wasting:   
1. Maternal factors - 𝑀𝑖 
i. Mother’s height  
ii. Number of children born to mother  
iii. Duration of breastfeeding, in months 
2. Environmental contamination - 𝐸𝑖 
i. Child had fever in the last 2 weeks  
ii. Child had diarrhoea in the last 2 weeks  
iii. Household has electricity  
iv. Household has piped or borehole water  
v. Household has a flush or Blair toilet  
3. Nutrition deficiency - 𝑁𝑖 
i. Child ate food made from local grain in the last 24 hours  
ii. Child ate food made from local tuber in the last 24 hours  
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iii. Child ate eggs, fish or poultry in the last 24 hours  
iv. Child ate beef, pork or lamb in the last 24 hours  
v. Child ate pumpkin, carrot or squash in the last 24 hours  
vi. Child ate dark green leafy vegetables in the last 24 hours  
4. Personal illness control - 𝑃𝑖 
i. Child received BCG vaccination  
ii. Child received DPT vaccinations  
iii. Child received Polio vaccinations  
iv. Child received Measles vaccination  
v. Mother visited a doctor for prenatal health reviews  
5. Socioeconomic factors - 𝑆𝑖 
i. Mother’s education level – None, Primary, Secondary, Tertiary  
ii. Mother’s employment status – Employed or not  
iii. Frequency of household visits to a health centre in the last 24 months  
iv. Asset index score for household (measured between XX and YY). 
v. Log of national annual aggregate for remittances  
vi. National annual rainfall  
vii. Log of national annual yield of maize 
viii. Log of annual inflation rate  
The resulting empirical model is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  ∅𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
3
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝐸𝑖  + ∑ 𝜕𝑖
6
𝑖=1 𝑁𝑖  + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑃𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
8
𝑖=1 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜗𝑗  (17) 
Here, the subscripts 𝑖𝑗 in equation 17 refer to the individual child 𝑖 in household 𝑗. This equation 
measures the level of malnutrition based on the proximate determinants. In the final section of 
the analysis concentration indices are constructed. These show the levels of malnutrition 
inequality during the years covered by the study. The concentration index and concentration curve 
quantify, “the degree of income-related inequality in a specific health variable” (Lambert and 
Aronson, 1993; Kakwani, Wagstaff, & Van Doorslaer, 1997; and Wagstaff, Paci, & Van Doorslaer, 
1991). The concentration index is always defined in reference to the concentration curve. On the 
x-axis of the concentration curve is the cumulative percentage of the sampled households ranked 
from poorest to richest. The y-axis is a plot of the cumulative percentage of the health variable 
that corresponds to each cumulative percentage of the distribution of the living standards 
variable. In this analysis, the X axis uses the asset index which was constructed in chapter 2. The 
health variables are stunting and wasting, which are also proxies for ill-health.  
 
If the concentration curve 𝐿(𝑝) lies on the diagonal, there is no inequality in malnutrition. This 
means that, when households are ranked by asset holdings, the same proportion of children are 
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found to be malnourished in each quintile. However, if 𝐿(𝑝) is above the diagonal, there exists 
inequality in malnutrition, with children from poor households being more disadvantaged. In other 
words, ill-health is concentrated among the poor. On the other hand, if 𝐿(𝑝) were to lie below the 
diagonal, the malnutrition levels amongst children would be greater in wealthy households. The 
further 𝐿(𝑝) is from the diagonal, the greater the degree of health inequality. It is from these 
concentration curves that the numerical measure – concentration index (𝐶) – of health inequality 
is derived. 𝐶 is twice the area between 𝐿(𝑝) and the diagonal. 𝐶 = 0 when 𝐿(𝑝)overlaps with the 
diagonal. 𝐶 < 0 when 𝐿(𝑝)  lies above the diagonal and 𝐶 > 0, 𝐿(𝑝) is found below the diagonal. 





∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑅𝑖 − 1
𝑛
𝑖=1           (18) 
 
Where 𝑛 =  sample size; 𝑦𝑖 = malnutrition indicator for child 𝑖; 𝑅𝑖 = relative rank in the wealth 





𝑖=1  is the mean level of malnutrition. In this context, where an 
asset index is used to represent living standards, the rank of the child in the wealth distribution is 
derived from the continuous factor score used in the creation of the wealth index. The 
concentration curve below illustrates the situation immediately prior to the hyperinflation: 
 
 
Figure 22: National Concentration Curve for Stunted Children, 2005 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005 
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5.4 Results 
As seen in the thesis introduction, as well as in Figure 26 at the beginning of this chapter, the onset 
of Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation period was really the year 2003 when annual inflation first ran above 
350 percent. This is when rapid general price increases became the norm and this continued into 
the years of the technical hyperinflation – 2007 and 2008. Nonetheless, as shown in the thesis 
introduction, the economy was in trouble much earlier on. As a result, accessing good medical 
care and a balanced diet was already difficult in the early years of this millennium. It is therefore 
no surprise that stunting and wasting were on the rise from as early as 1999 onwards, as seen in 
Figures 22 and 23. While the years in the graphs show a rise in malnutrition up to 2006, 
supplementary data29 shows that this upward trend continued until 2009 when hyperinflation 
ended due to dollarization. Thereafter as the economy improved and prices decreased, the 
purchasing power of real incomes also increased. As a result, healthcare and food was more 
accessible to households resulting in a decrease in child malnutrition.  
 
 
Figure 23: Zimbabwe’s child stunting prevalence rates, 1994 – 2015 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
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Figure 24: Zimbabwe’s child wasting prevalence rates, 1994 – 2015 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
 
It is worth noting that the change in malnutrition rates after hyperinflation was more drastic in the 
case of wasting than stunting. This is expected since wasting is indicative of the immediate effects 
of a famine on children’s weight. It is a good signal of the rate of recovery from starvation and 
infections that characterize economic crises. Zimbabwe was no exception, as the graph for wasting 
shows a sharp decline between 2006 and 2010. Due to this structural break of the technical 
hyperinflation from the year 2007 to 2008, the data can be split into two groups, with the years 
before 2007 being labelled as pre-hyperinflation years and the years after 2008 being labelled as 
post-hyperinflation years. Upon making this demarcation, Table 20 shows the overall picture. Its 
causes being cumulative, the high rate of stunting only changed slightly after hyperinflation, but 
wasting decreased significantly. For both stunting and wasting, prevalence rates were generally 
higher in rural areas and among male children, than they were in urban areas and among female 
children. These numbers show malnutrition before and after the hyperinflation period, allowing 
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National      
Stunting  27.70 27.89 0.69 0.25 
Wasting 6.57 3.74 -43.07 7.79 
Rural      
Stunting  29.41 29.79 1.29 0.42 
Wasting 7.11 4.25 -40.23 6.31 
Urban      
Stunting  22.34 23.91 7.03 1.18 
Wasting 4.89 2.67 -45.40 3.80 
Male child     
Stunting  29.57 31.07 5.07 1.41 
Wasting 7.43 4.04 -45.63 6.28 
Female child     
Stunting  25.82 24.67 -4.45 1.13 
Wasting 5.71 3.43 -39.93 4.67 
Note: T-statistic > 1.96 is statistically significant.  
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005 – 2010 
 
The next table shows the malnutrition prevalence rates by asset wealth quintile. Over the 20-year 
period under study, both stunting and wasting were most prevalent among households in the 
bottom 40 percent of the asset index distribution - Quintiles 1 and 2. This is the poorest segment 
of the Zimbabwean society, with the majority of these households being in rural areas. Stunting 
and wasting are also high in the 4th quintile which mainly comprises poor urban households. The 
lowest levels of malnutrition are seen in the wealthiest quintile of the asset index distribution, 
which mainly consists of affluent urban households. For this wealthy segment of society, the 
change in malnutrition after hyperinflation was negligible, albeit positive as there was a decline in 
both stunting and wasting. The significant changes were declines in malnutrition rates among 
households in the 4th quintile. In addition, there was a significant decrease in wasting amongst 
children of households in the bottom 40 percent of the asset index distribution.  
The high rates of wasting and stunting among the urban poor are expected because this is the 
group with the least ability to produce its own food directly, but also the one whose wage income 
113 | P a g e  
 
is under threat the most. The previous chapters have shown that these urban households 
experienced the greatest increase in asset poverty during hyperinflation. The decrease in 
resources, would have been a constraining factor from accessing healthcare. These are also the 
same households that suffered most from food inflation, dysfunctional sanitation systems, as well 
as electricity and water shortages.    
 









Quintile 1 37.48 35.89 -4.24 0.66 
Quintile 2 29.52 31.67 7.28 0.94 
Quintile 3 33.94 29.15 -14.11 1.97 
Quintile 4 34.06 27.95 -17.94 2.22 
Quintile 5 27.61 26.85 -2.75 0.24 
 Wasting 
Quintile 1 8.84 3.58 -59.50 4.36 
Quintile 2 7.41 4.30 -41.97 2.70 
Quintile 3 6.06 4.18 -31.02 1.65 
Quintile 4 7.13 2.59 -63.67 3.63 
Quintile 5 4.56 2.55 -44.08 1.55 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015  
 
There were certainly the high rates of wasting and stunting among children in poor rural 
households and it seems likely that these reflected decreased access to healthcare, especially 
during the hyperinflation period. On average, 57 percent of rural households visited a health 
facility in 1994. This number had declined to 30 percent in 2006 and gradually recovered after 
hyperinflation. As Figure 24 shows, the story was not much different for urban households over 
the years. However, a stark difference is seen in Figures 25 and 26 which show that, while the 
proportion of women who consulted with health personnel for prenatal medical care was low for 
all households, it was especially so for women in rural households during the hyperinflation years 
of 2005 and 2006. Figure 25 drives the point home by showing a sharp decline in the percentage 
of women who visited nurses for prenatal care between 2006 and 2010. It is evidence that the 
hyperinflation years of 2007 and 2008 affected access to prenatal care and likely had negative 
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consequences on child health. Healthcare only recovered to its original level after a decade. But 




Figure 25: Proportion of households visiting health centres  
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
 
Figure 26: Proportion of women consulting with nurses for prenatal care 
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Figure 27: Proportion of women consulting with doctors for prenatal care 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
 
Once the children were born, they were generally immunized at the same rate, regardless of 
location – rural or urban. However, Figure 27 makes it apparent that the rates of immunization 
dropped during the hyperinflation period. From the year 1999 to 2006, the ZDHS show a steady 
decline in immunization for BCG, DPT, Polio and Measles. Recovery only occurred after 
hyperinflation. Rural households lagged behind in all cases and this would have contributed to the 












1994 1999 2005 2006 2010 2011 2015
Average Prenatal Doctor's Visits
National Rural Urban




Figure 28: Proportion of immunized children 
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An additional factor contributing to malnutrition among children in rural households is poor access 
to safe drinking water – piped into the dwelling, communal tap, protected well and borehole 
water. Figure 28 makes this constraint very apparent. The national average is pulled down by low 
access in rural areas. While the proportion of households using water from these four protected 
sources increased in the early years, it eventually plateaued slightly above 50 percent. Though in 
actuality, rain water, that is collected in closed containers would have been safer to drink than the 
piped water in cities such as Harare which increasingly became contaminated (Maponga, 2013). 
Be that as it may, the data shows that half of the households in rural Zimbabwe have been drinking 
contaminated water and thus risking the health of their children. The harsh reality is that over 
these 20 years, only 2.5 percent of rural households have used piped water, while a meagre 4.6 
percent use communal tap water.  
 
 
Figure 29: Proportion of households using safe water 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
 
This inability to use piped water also constrains the rural households from being able to use flush 
toilets. Only 3.8 percent of rural households have flush toilets in their homes, 22 percent use Blair 
toilets, which are lined pits covered by a cement slab, importantly they have a fly trap in a vertical 
flue so they minimize the health risks and other externalities associated with pit latrines. 22 
percent of the rural population use external toilets in the form of pits dug in the backyard. The 
remaining 55 percent of rural households have no toilet facilities. This raises the likelihood of 
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While the rural sanitation infrastructure is virtually non-existent, the urban infrastructure has 
become increasingly dysfunctional over the years. The reality is that many households that own 
flush toilets found them inoperable during the hyperinflation period. As explained earlier, the 
Zimbabwean government failed to invest in the maintenance of the fresh water and waste-water 
purification infrastructures during the economic crisis, and households suffered real 
consequences such as the Cholera pandemic of 2008 (Mason, 2009). Figure 29 shows the decline 
in the use of flush toilets from the year 1999 onwards. The sharpest decrease is seen during the 
hyperinflation years, from 2005 to 2010. 
 
 
Figure 30: Proportion of households using flush toilets 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
 
The final prominent factor related to the malnutrition of children was diet. As highlighted in the 
thesis introduction as well as the literature review of this chapter, a common coping mechanism 
among households during the hyperinflation period was to alter their diet. Generally, in response 
to price increases, households either reduced meal frequency, meal quantity or meal diversity. In 
many cases, it was a combination. Urban households tended to suffer more from food inflation 
because they had to purchase most of their food. In contrast, rural households coped better 
because the majority produced their own food while others sent members to do agricultural work 
in order to earn money to purchase food (ZimVAC, 2009).  The differences in dietary diversity are 
seen in Figures 30 and 31; these were constructed from responses given by mothers about the 
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Figure 31: Diet composition for rural children in Zimbabwe 
Note: The 1994 and 1999 data sets do not have comparable variables. 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005 – 2015 
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Figure 32: Diet composition for urban children in Zimbabwe 
Note: The 1994 and 1999 data sets do not have comparable variables. 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005 – 2015     
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Looking at the pie charts for the years at the onset of hyperinflation – 2005 and 2006, children 
from both rural and urban households consumed very little protein in the form of poultry and 
meat. Their meals mainly consisted of vegetables and carbohydrates. By 2006, protein comprised 
less than 25 percent of children’s daily diet. At this point, green vegetables and pumpkins made 
up a third of the diet of urban children while over 50 percent consisted of carbohydrates in the 
form of grain and tubers. The urban diet was less balanced than the rural diet during 
hyperinflation. However, this changed noticeably after hyperinflation when urban children 
consumed a more diverse diet with increased proportions of protein.   
 
Clearly a variety of factors contributed to the levels of malnutrition that are observed in the data. 
Acute malnutrition in the form of wasting increased during hyperinflation and later decreased 
after dollarization. A similar pattern in observed for the indicators of morbidity – fever and 
diarrhoea. Both increased during hyperinflation and decreased when it ended. There is an obvious 
correlation and it is highly likely that diarrhoea cases were exacerbated by the failures of functional 
piped clean water and flush toilet systems in urban areas. On the other hand, instances of fever. 
which is indicative of infection, may have increased due to the decreased access to vaccines, 
infrequent health centre visits, limited protein consumption, and the ingestion of food cooked 
incompletely due to electricity shortages seen in Figure 32.  
 
 
Figure 33: Proportion of households using electricity   
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While the descriptive statistics have shown likely correlates with malnutrition, the regressions 
below give more clarity on the most crucial variables which are likely to have influenced changes 
in stunting and wasting.  
 
Table 22: Individual, household and community level factors of children aged 0-59 months    
Variables  Mean Standard Deviation 
Stunted 0.28 0.45 
Wasted 0.05 0.22 
Child Age 4.28 4.82 
Child Age Squared 41.58 91.25 
Female Child 0.49 0.50 
Household size 5.68 2.87 
Number of children in household 1.01 0.99 
Healthcare Visits 0.43 0.50 
Mother's education  0.95 0.21 
Months of breastfeeding  12.79 7.49 
Mother's height (cm) 159.18 65.99 
Asset Index  2.70 6.36 
Improved Toilet 0.51 0.50 
Safe Water 0.60 0.49 
Electricity 0.38 0.48 
BCG 0.86 0.34 
DPT 0.76 0.43 
Log Remittances 6.25 1.13 
Log Inflation 2.64 2.21 
Log Maize Yield 16.09 0.37 
Notes: Sources for remittances, inflation, maize yield and rainfall in end notes. The data is for the years 1994 to 2015.  
 
Table 22 contains the summary statistics of the covariates used in the econometric analysis. The 
average for stunted children in Zimbabwe over the 20-year period is 28 percent, while that of 
wasting is 5 percent. This corresponds with the results in Table 20 showing that the prevalence 
rates are in similar ranges. The average age is 4.3 months, which is rather worrisome given that 
the study includes children up to 5 years of age. This might be an indicator of infant mortality 
which averaged 54.77 percent over the 20 years (World Bank, 2015). The household size variables 
are representative of the Zimbabwean society which does not have extremely large families and 
also lost members to migration over the years. The mean for health care visits shows that over 
half the population can go for a year without receiving medical attention. Another problematic 
factor are the immunization rates which are less than 1. Maternal variables show that 95 percent 
of the women have at least primary level education, are of average height and they breastfeed 
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their children for an average of 12 months. The safe water, electricity and improved toilet averages 
point to infrastructure problems. The averages for the log of remittances and inflation show that 
quite a lot of money flowed into the country as inflation increased. On the other hand, the maize 
yield average shows high productivity over the years, though it later tapered down. In tables 23 
and 24 below, the results of the Logistic regressions are shown.  
 
Table 23: Multivariate Analysis of Wasting (Weight-for-height index) 
Variables  Odds ratio 95% CI P>z 
Dependent Variable: Wasting 
Gender of Child     
Male 1   
Female 0.764*** (0.65, 0.89) 0.001 
Mother’s education    
None 1   
Educated  0.824** (0.72, 0.94) 0.005 
    
Household size 0.980 (0.95, 1.01) 0.181 
Electricity    
No electricity  1   
Electricity 0.672*** (0.52, 0.87) 0.003 
Toilet    
Basic Toilet 1   
Improved Toilet 0.943 (0.77, 1.15) 0.566 
Water    
Unsafe Water 1   
Safe Water 0.921 (0.77, 1.10) 0.359 
    
Log Remittances 1.094 (0.92, 1.29) 0.297 
    
Log Inflation 1.143*** (1.03, 1.26) 0.008 
    
Log Maize Yield 1.268 (0.64, 2.49) 0.492 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; z-scores in last column.  
2) 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2 = 0.012; p-value=0.0000; 𝑋2 (19)=144.67. 3) Observations=12,949. 4) Remittance values are derived 
from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe as shown in Figure 14. For this analysis, values for the years corresponding to the 
household data are used. 5) Inflation values are derived from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe as shown in Figure 1. For 
this analysis, values for the years corresponding to the household data are used. 6) Maize yield values are derived 
from the Food and Agriculture Organization as shown in Figure 5. For this analysis, values for the years corresponding 
to the household data are used. 
 
Among the determinants of wasting, the first significant variable and a 99 percent confidence 
interval was child’s gender. The odds that a female child is wasted are 23.6 percent lower than for 
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a male child. This result corresponds with the descriptive statistics in Table 20 which show a lower 
prevalence rate of wasting among girls than boys. Prior to hyperinflation, the prevalence rate for 
wasting among boys was 23 percent more than girls, and it was 15 percent more after 
hyperinflation. Given that the mean of wasting is 5 percent, that implies that many more boys 
suffered from wasted than girls, during the hyperinflation period. It is indeed the expected result 
as a similar finding was made by Awoyemi and Abaniwonda (2019) in Nigeria. They find that 
wasting is 9.8 percent higher among boys than girls. So, while the pattern is the same, the 
difference in wasting by gender was greater in Zimbabwe, which is indicative of the severity of the 
consequences of hyperinflation on malnutrition.  
 
The next significant determinant for wasting is the level of education attained by the mother of 
the child. The odds of wasting are 17.6 percent less for children with educated mothers than those 
without. This is the expected result given that educated mothers are more likely to make more 
informed decisions in prenatal, delivery and postnatal care. For instance, an educated mother will 
most likely apply the latest knowledge in treating their child’s illnesses, feeding them, immunizing 
them and so forth (Mosley, 1983).  
 
Household size is also a significant determinant of wasting, with each additional household 
member decreasing the odds of wasting among children by 2 percent.  This signals an important 
aspect of economic crises. In a situation of hyperinflation like the one that was experienced in 
Zimbabwe where real income declined, the value of each working household member increases 
as their financial contributions assist in consumption smoothing. In addition, access to electricity 
significantly influenced the chances of wasting among children. The odds that a child from a 
household with electricity will be wasted were 32.8 percent less than a child in a household 
without electricity. This is the expected result as electricity is useful in the sterilization of utensils, 
preparation of hot meals, boiling of water, and the refrigeration of food; all which prevent 
infections in young children (Mosely and Chen, 1984).  
 
While the other household level variables changed in the expected direction, they were not 
statistically significant. On a country level, the variable that was statistically significant from zero 
in terms of its effect on wasting was inflation. The odds of wasting increased in Zimbabwean 
children by 0.03 percent with each extra percentage increase in inflation. This means that in 2007 
when the annual inflation rate was 6,724 percent, the chances of being wasted were 2 percent.  
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These results were relatively similar to those of stunting. However, in the ensuing discourse, it 
shall become apparent that the prevalence rate of stunting was affected by more long-term 
variables. Much like it was with wasting, the regression results in the table below show both 
inflation and remittances increasing the odds of stunting among children. It makes sense that the 
two variables move together because remittances increased during the hyperinflation period and 
have often been termed the lifeline of Zimbabwean households (Von Burgsdorff, 2012). The odds 
of stunting increased in children by 0.02 percent increase in inflation and by 0.04 percent increase 
in remittances. It is worth noting that the odds are lower for stunting that they are for wasting. 
This is because stunting is a long-term condition that outlasted the hyperinflation famine and was 
necessitated by many other factors, mainly at the household and individual levels.  
 
For similar arguments as in wasting, the odds of stunting were 23.5 percent lower for female 
children than their male counterparts. Nonetheless, the other two significant socio-demographic 
characteristics were child’s age and household wealth. Results show that the odds of stunting 
among children increased with age, albeit at a decreasing rate over time. Household wealth also 
mattered as each extra unit increase in the asset index was associated with a 0.2 percent decrease 
in the likelihood of stunting. A similar finding to Martorell and Young (2012) who show the role of 
household wealth in reducing stunting.  Apart from wealth, household size was significant, as each 
extra household member resulted in a 0.1 percent reduction in the odds of stunting among 
children. Even though larger households seemed advantageous to children, as they number of 
children in the household increased, the chances of stunting followed suit. The regression shows 
that each extra child increased the odds of stunting by 17.6 percent. This confirms the previous 
assertion that the adult working household members were the helpful ones in preventing stunting.  
 
Apart from demographic factors, healthcare proved to be important in determining the likelihood 
of stunting among children. It appears that if a household had visited a health centre in the last 24 
months, the children were 10.7 percent less likely to be stunted. This is the expected result as 
access to healthcare is often associated with lower levels of stunting (Aoun, Matsuda, & Sekiyama, 
2015). In addition, the odds of being stunted were 35.9 percent lower for a child given the BCG 
vaccine, that one who had not been immunized. has 0.23 less probability of being stunted. 
However, the odds that a child who receives all shots of DPT will be stunted are 34.8 percent 
higher than one who has not been vaccinated. While the earlier result is expected, the latter is an 
anomaly. However, Prendergast (2015) shows that the effect of DPT vaccines vary in child 
population, depending on geographical location, as children born in harvest season respond 
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differently to those who are not. This potentially applies to Zimbabwe too, as it is an agricultural 
society.  
 
Table 24: Multivariate Analysis of Stunting (Height-for-age index) 
Variables  Odds ratio 95% CI P>z 
Dependent Variable: Stunting 
Gender of Child     
Male 1   
Female 0.765*** (0.68, 0.85) 0.000 
Age of Child    
Child Age 2.023*** (1.67, 2.46) 0.000 
Child Age Squared 0.828*** (0.79, 0.86) 0.000 
    
Household size  0.999 (0.97, 1.02) 0.924 
    
Number of children in household 1.176*** (1.09, 1.27) 0.000 
    
Health visits in a year 0.893 (0.80, 1.00) 0.047 
    
Months of breastfeeding 1.050*** (1.04, 1.06) 0.000 
    
Mother’s height  0.993*** (0.99, 1.00) 0.000 
    
Asset index 0.998 (0.99, 1.01) 0.720 
BCG vaccine     
None 1   
Vaccinated 0.641*** (0.50, 0.82) 0.001 
DPT vaccine     
None 1   
Vaccinated 1.348 (1.08, 1.68) 0.008 
    
Log Remittances 1.246*** (1.15, 1.35) 0.000 
    
Log Inflation 1.133*** (1.09, 1.18) 0.000 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; z-scores in last column.   
2) 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2 = 0.090; p-value=0.0000; 𝑋2 (23)=682.14. 3) Observations=8,066. 4) Remittance values are derived 
from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe as shown in Figure 14. For this analysis, values for the years corresponding to the 
household data are used. 5) Inflation values are derived from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe as shown in Figure 1. For 
this analysis, values for the years corresponding to the household data are used.  
 
There were also some significant maternal factors in the regression. First, each unit increase in the 
mother’s height was associated with a 0.7 percent decrease in the likelihood of stunting in their 
child. Second, each extra month of breast feeding increased the likelihood of stunting in the child 
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by 5 percent. This was an unexpected result. However, Syeda, Agho, Wilson, Maheshwari & Raza, 
(2020) shows that prolonged breastfeeding has an adverse impact on child nutrition. In Zimbabwe, 
it is possible that the 2.85 percent of mothers who breastfed their children past 24 months did so 
to supplement solid food during the hyperinflation period. 
 
Now that the regression output has revealed the variables that are strongly related with 
malnutrition, it is reasonable to assume a varied effect of these socioeconomic indicators, 
depending on each households’ endowments. This chapter will therefore end with an assessment 
of inequality levels in child malnutrition. Table 25 shows that stunting and wasting have been 
disproportionately distributed over the 20-year period under study. With all values of the 
concentration index being negative, it is apparent that children from poor households are suffering 
more from malnutrition that the rest of the child population. While this trend had improved 
between 1994 and 2005, inequality in stunting and wasting increased from 2006 onwards during 
the peak of hyperinflation and only declined after dollarization in 2010.  
 
Table 25: Child malnutrition inequality in Zimbabwe, from pre to post-hyperinflation 








1994 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.52 -0.28 0.00 
1999 -0.11 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 0.04 
2005 -0.02 0.25 0.01 0.48 -0.02 0.52 
2006 -0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.23 -0.14 0.10 
2010 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.23 -0.04 0.06 
2011 -0.05 0.10 -0.03 0.27 -0.04 0.51 
2015 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.14 0.00 








1994 -0.13 0.03 -0.16 0.04 -0.20 0.16 
1999 -0.12 0.01 -0.01 0.83 -0.26 0.12 
2005 -0.09 0.09 -0.05 0.32 -0.02 0.89 
2006 -0.07 0.36 -0.04 0.63 -0.26 0.00 
2010 -0.07 0.25 -0.01 0.94 -0.15 0.13 
2011 -0.04 0.52 -0.06 0.54 0.37 0.13 
2015 -0.16 0.00 -0.16 0.01 0.01 0.90 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
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It appears that the urban poor were significantly affected during hyperinflation. The children in 
poor rural households appeared to suffer from wasting in 2015, long afterwards. Both cases are 
most likely due to food shortages. While food inflation affected diet for urban households in 2005 
and 2006, the 2012 and 2015 drought seasons most likely affected diet for rural households in the 
time interval between 2010 and 2015 (Mazvimavi, pers. com. 2020). A similar trend was observed 
by Alderman, Hoddinott, & Kinsey, (2006) for children who lived through the drought of 1982 to 
1984. The graphs in Figure 33 give a clear picture of the progression of child health inequality over 
time.  
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Figure 34a: Rural Concentration Curve for Stunted Children, 1994 – 2015 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
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Figure 34b: Urban Concentration Curve for Stunted Children, 1994 – 2015 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
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Figure 34c: Rural Concentration Curve for Wasted Children, 1994 – 2015 
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Figure 34d: Urban Concentration Curve for Wasted Children, 1994 – 2015 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The objectives of this chapter were to show the relationship between hyperinflation and child 
malnutrition in Zimbabwean. This was achieved through a multi-step process of analysis. First, 
child malnutrition measures were created using anthropometric data – height and weight – of the 
28,254 children below the age of five in the ZHDS datasets from 1994 to 2015.  The resulting 
measures capture ill-health. In particular, ‘stunting’ was used to measure chronic (long-term) 
malnutrition, while ‘wasting’ was used to measure acute (short-term) malnutrition.  
 
The second step in the analysis was to assess the prevalence of ill-health using these malnutrition 
measures.  This was done on a national scale, as well as for urban and rural households. A further 
disaggregation was made for child gender. The results show that malnutrition is more prevalent 
in rural households and among male children. While malnutrition increased during the 
hyperinflation period, post-hyperinflation only wasting decreased significantly. The third step was 
a quintile analysis which gave more information of how malnutrition levels changed in different 
parts of the asset wealth distribution. The fourth step involves Logistic regression analyses which 
revealed factors that were strongly correlated with child malnutrition. The fifth and final step was 
designed to show child malnutrition inequality and in so doing reveal policy targets. 
 
The graphs in Figures 27 and 28 made it apparent that both wasting and stunting were at their 
highest in 2006, which was the onset of hyperinflation. Supplementary data from the World Bank 
which is cited in the results section shows that stunting continued to rise through the 
hyperinflation period and only decreased after dollarization in 2009. This confirms that the harsh 
economic condition resulted in an increase in child malnutrition. The prevalence rate of stunting 
decreased after hyperinflation, in both rural and urban areas. However, the rate was higher among 
children in rural households. This in itself is an indication of inequality in child health, dependent 
on location. The prevalence rate also varied across the gender of children, as male children 
suffered more from stunting than girls of the same age. The quintile analysis shows that the 
highest proportions of malnourishment were among rural households in the bottom 40 percent 
of the asset index distribution, as well as in the 4th quintile where the urban poor are located. The 
observed levels of stunting inequality were mainly a result of unequal access to healthcare which 
is here quantified by hospital visits, during and after pregnancy as well as vaccines. Access to 
theses was strongly related to household welfare, measured by the asset index as well as the 
mother’s level of education.  
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Nonetheless, the effects of hyperinflation were mainly seen through the drastic changes in the 
prevalence rate of wasting among children. Unlike stunting which did not change significantly after 
hyperinflation, wasting decreased by an average of 43 percent. This shows that wasting was the 
form of malnutrition that was mainly affected by the hyperinflation conditions. It is a reasonable 
finding given the acute nature of wasting, which is mainly necessitated by food shortages and 
repeated infections during famines.  
 
While a comparison between rural and urban shows higher prevalence rates of malnutrition in 
rural areas, changes within the urban areas were more significant. Much like stunting, wasting did 
not affect all children in the country. Significantly more urban children suffered from wasting, than 
did children in rural households, especially boys. Fewer children from rural households were 
wasted because their households had access to land and livestock for the production of food and 
maintenance of a good diet. This was not the case in urban areas where households typically 
purchase food yet prices were very high due to hyperinflation.  As a result, many urban households 
traded assets for food, and even then, could not afford to maintain a balanced diet. They coped 
by eating fewer meals with little to no protein. This resulted in wasting among children.  
 
Another contributing factor to wasting during the hyperinflation period, more so in urban areas, 
were repeated infections. This was due to a significant decline in the use of improved water 
sources such as piped water into dwellings and communal taps. Many urban households resorted 
to digging unprotected wells or using rain water, both with high probability of contamination. This 
is the water that the majority of children in urban households were drinking, hence the upsurge 
in diarrhoea during and after hyperinflation. Due to the dysfunctional water systems, urban 
households were not able to use the flush toilets within their dwellings, with many resorting to 
the use of pit toilets which increased the probability for environmental contamination. This also 
contributed to the increase in repeated infections among children in urban households, during 
and after hyperinflation. These various factors resulted in wasting being unequally distributed 
among children in Zimbabwe.  
 
The regression results revealed that indeed inflation is significantly correlated with child 
malnutrition. Both wasting and stunting increased with inflation and wasting more so. Other 
significant determinants of malnutrition are child gender, with girls suffering less. Electricity is 
negatively related with malnutrition as access leads to less wasting and stunting. Educated and 
taller mothers fared better during harsh economic times as their children were less likely to be 
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wasted. Asset wealth also mattered as more of it reduced the likelihood of stunting. This confirms 
the long-term nature of asset holdings in reducing poor health. Also significant was household size 
as children from larger households had a lower chance of being wasted, most likely because these 
households had more income earners to procure food and fund medical care. Another covariate 
with long term effects was use of health centres, which significantly reduced the likelihood of 
stunting. Finally, more rain and maize yields decreased chances of wasting. Which confirms the 
fact that wasting is an indicator of famine.  
 
In conclusion, these findings are relevant in the formation of policy. First, is the obvious reminder 
that inflation management is vital in order to maintain stable and affordable prices for households. 
In so doing the purchasing power of real income is preserved enabling access to food, vaccines, 
electricity, water and other inputs necessary for the production of child health. Second, developing 
Zimbabwe’s agriculture sector is vital in order to avoid food shortages and to earn national income 
that can be used for investments in infrastructure such as electricity and health centres. So, 
investing in agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation is also important as it removes 
dependence on rain and ensure adequate production even during drought years. Third, national 
policy should ensure the education and feeding of women as mothers of strong physical stature 


















This thesis set out to analyse the effect of hyperinflation on household welfare by assessing 
changes in asset poverty, asset inequality and child malnutrition in Zimbabwe, identified using 
data from the five-yearly Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys (ZDHS). The ‘March 2007 to 
December 2008’ period of hyperinflation was used as a structural break; the pre-hyperinflation 
period being represented by the 1994, 1999 and 2005 data sets, while the post-hyperinflation 
period is represented by the 2010 and 2015 sets.  
 
The first two empirical chapters focused on household wealth measured in terms of physical assets 
and key services, many of them being things needed to meet Maslow’s basic physiological needs. 
A key and unexpected result emerged: overall poverty and inequality appeared to decrease during 
hyperinflation. The finding that poverty in Zimbabwe decreased during the period of 
hyperinflation is surprising. Nonetheless, it is convincingly justified by the evidence that inflation 
encouraged accumulation of physical assets (especially livestock and buildings) in rural areas. The 
finding that poverty decreased rests on the application of an asset index as a welfare measure, 
rather than, say, income or consumption. A closer analysis revealed that the outcome was mainly 
driven by the inflation’s effects on the rural poor who form the majority of Zimbabwe’s population 
(65 percent). These households, who tended to be poorer than their urban counterparts, were 
insulated from the formal economy by their subsistence lifestyles. 
 
First, since they produced their own food, they did not have to drastically change their diet due to 
high food prices. In contrast, meal frequency and diversity were directly affected in urban areas 
where households had to purchase most of their food.  
 
Second, following the collapse of formal agriculture due to the farm invasions, most rural 
household members were engaged in intermittent work on farms, with only a few having formal 
non-agricultural employment such as teaching. As a result, when many urban Zimbabweans lost 
jobs and experienced loss in real income due to hyperinflation, those in rural areas were less 
affected. Working in the agricultural sector was not only advantageous because of the availability 
of free food or the avoidance of unemployment; it became a source of asset accumulation for 
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rural households. As food grew increasingly expensive in the formal market, urban households 
resorted to sourcing foodstuffs, especially vegetables and maize meal, directly from the rural 
households, paying for them with cash or durable assets. Due to the hyper-inflation, rural 
households would quickly convert the cash into durable assets in order to store the value of their 
money. So, either directly (through barter trade) or indirectly, rural households accumulated 
private assets, while urban households decumulated asset wealth. This was also the case with 
financial assets, which lost value at the peak of the hyperinflation. In the rural areas, the 
convention of saving through livestock and grain stores was already established. Prior to the 
inflation, people in urban areas had much of their savings in financial assets such as pensions, bank 
and building society accounts and the post office savings bank. With the exception of equities 
traded on the ZSE, the inflation effectively destroyed the financial savings of (typically urban) 
Zimbabweans. 
 
Third, rural households did not suffer the loss of services experienced by urban households who, 
as municipalities lost real income, lost access to public assets such as piped water, flush toilets and 
electricity. Urban households were battered by the hyperinflation as they lost in every way. Due 
to these three reasons, the asset wealth gap decreased. The cash income, financial assets, 
consumer durables and public assets that had formerly distinguished urban households from rural 
ones, simply disappeared.  
 
Sadly, the hyperinflation also had a negative effect on the health of Zimbabwean children. The 
final empirical chapter shows that measures of child nutrition – especially wasting – worsened 
significantly during the hyperinflation period. Despite good rains during this period, the lag 
between earnings and product prices during the hyperinflation meant that food was increasingly 
unaffordable and this necessitated a change in the diets of children, especially among urban 
households. Proportions of protein decreased, and the typical urban diet increasingly consisted of 
starch and vegetables. In addition to diversity, the quantity of food consumed was also 
compromised and meal frequencies decreased for net buyers. Child health also suffered due to 
the rise in prices for general medical and prenatal consultations, as well as vaccines. The lack of 
medication, coupled with a contaminated water system and dysfunctional sanitation resulted in 
increased rates of diarrhoea and fever. These repeated infections, along with poor diet, 
contributed to weight loss and ultimately wasting among many children. The situation worsened 
as inflation rose, but children in households with electricity and educated mothers who received 
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remittances were less likely to be wasted. The fact that wasting decreased significantly after 
dollarization further emphasizes the real negative effects of hyperinflation on child health.  
 
As Zimbabwe enters its second hyperinflation in twelve years, my hope is that this thesis will be 
read by a policy maker who cares about the people of Zimbabwe. Political power requires the 
support of the majority. In Zimbabwe, that majority reside in the rural areas. As has been shown, 
the rural poor seem to have marginally benefitted from the inflation. Perhaps it is not surprising 
that the government has been so willing to replicate its old inflationary policies. However, the last 
hyperinflation was accompanied by a grand destruction of wealth for those in the formal economy 
and the health of children in the nation’s town and cities. The survival of durable assets at the 
expense of financial assets shows the asymmetric impact of hyperinflation. Despite the narrowing 
gap between rich and poor, there are no winners when prices rise uncontrollably (as they are 
doing once again), and we risk losing the health of another generation to malnutrition. The current 
generation of aspirant entrepreneurs is unable to start and grow viable businesses because 
inflation is again destroying their savings. Without business, general output suffers and the 
country descends further into a cycle of poverty. 
 
The solution is a government that people trust to serve their interests. Not one that accumulates 
debt and funds its activities by increasing money supply. Without such a government and such 
trust, confidence in local currency will continue to falter and inflation will not cease. The vicious 
cycle of inflation has been persistent in Zimbabwe because citizens do not trust the local currency 
and will convert it into foreign currency or consumer durables as fast as they can. The result is a 
high velocity of cash circulating in the economy which, coupled with inflationary expectations, 
further fuels inflation. In the process, Zimbabwe has become a nation which consists of households 
that live from hand to mouth, keeping just enough cash to live on, and instead of saving money in 
an unreliable financial system, quickly convert it to consumer durables which do not yield interest 
and cannot be easily sold to make profit. Effectively, this is how business has died – Adam Smith, 
(1776, ch 14,) saw savings as the foundation of capital accumulation and subsequent growth. 
However, the capacity to save productively is being destroyed. Households now find themselves 
with fixed and unproductive capital, and without circulating capital that can be used to yield profit. 
The few firms that try to brave it out cannot compete on a global level because of dysfunctional 
infrastructure which compromises quality and quantity of output. Until Zimbabwe’s government 
stops trying to inflate away their debt, the economy will not grow and poverty will become a 
hallmark of our society.  
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Appendix 1 – For Chapter 3 
 
Results for the analysis for data starting in 1994 and ending in 2015 













Radio 0.74 0.47 -36.83 -27.30 34.57 
Television 0.58 0.76 31.66 18.20 23.60 
Refrigerator 0.39 0.56 44.79 17.40 21.13 
Bicycle 0.24 0.19 -22.88 -5.6 8.12 
Vehicle 0.15 0.21 41.53 6.1 9.56 
Surface Water 0.00 0.01 302.71 0.8 5.83 
Well Water 0.01 0.07 426.05 5.7 16.76 
Borehole Water 0.01 0.11 1,338.68 10.20 25.85 
Earth Floor 0.01 0.01 23.96 0.3 1.43 
Wood Floor 0.03 0.03 12.40 0.3 1.19 
Tiled Floor 0.03 0.10 255.20 6.5 16.52 
Carpet Floor 0.06 0.02 -65.60 -4.4 12.96 
Cement Floor 0.87 0.84 -3.21 -2.8 4.70 
Flush Toilet 0.95 0.90 -4.73 -4.5 10.08 
Blair Toilet 0.03 0.02 -33.70 -0.9 3.68 
Pit Toilet 0.02 0.05 176.91 3.4 10.77 
No Toilet 0.01 0.03 397.11 2.1 9.97 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys   
 




Figure A1: Zimbabwe’s mobile phone subscriptions, 1994 – 2010  








































Appendix 2 – For Chapter 4 
Results for the analysis for data starting in 1994 and ending in 2015 














Manicaland       
2005 0.12558 0.10967 1.17433 0.90193 2.2161 2.9553 
2010 0.14718 0.08753 1.22058 0.89832 2.1494 2.9637 
Mashonaland Central       
2005 0.10335 0.02594 0.33756 0.76502 1.2263 1.9158 
2010 0.09122 0.15444 3.47458 0.93757 3.1087 2.8719 
Mashonaland East       
2005 0.09845 0.06138 0.83841 0.86837 1.8947 2.6857 
2010 0.10685 0.04515 0.86728 0.88473 1.9835 2.6831 
Mashonaland West       
2005 0.09955 0.0531 0.71725 0.78018 1.4454 1.9957 
2010 0.11043 0.0391 0.72673 0.79104 1.4333 2.0051 
Matebeleland North        
2005 0.06644 0.02923 0.59152 0.89316 2.1245 2.5622 
2010 0.05077 0.01087 0.43956 0.81849 1.5965 2.2387 
Matebeleland South       
2005 0.05079 0.02365 0.62626 0.82705 1.6075 2.3223 
2010 0.05234 0.01748 0.68542 0.86554 1.8072 2.8481 
Midlands       
2005 0.13656 0.10859 1.06935 0.87604 2.0794 2.643 
2010 0.11815 0.05897 1.02435 0.86766 1.9711 2.5705 
Masvingo       
2005 0.11493 0.0474 0.55464 0.87985 1.9284 3.1591 
2010 0.10923 0.0932 1.75116 0.94582 2.9443 3.3541 
Harare       
2005 0.13452 0.37222 3.72094 0.79333 1.3451 1.8919 
2010 0.16033 0.36677 4.69477 0.82917 1.6381 1.8616 
Bulawayo       
2005 0.06982 0.16882 3.25161 0.72352 1.0055 1.5269 
2010 0.0535 0.12648 4.8518 0.7884 1.3158 1.6895 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005 – 2010 
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Table A2.2: Asset index weights  
 Pre-hyperinflation Post-hyperinflation 
Radio 0.0163 0.0302 
Television 0.0255 0.0436 
Refrigerator 0.0385 0.0690 
Bicycle 0.0079 0.0229 
Vehicle 0.0571 0.0990 
Surface Water 0.0004 0.0100 
Well Water 0.0010 0.0055 
Borehole Water 0.0018 0.0090 
Earth Floor 0.0003 0.0021 
Wood Floor 0.9950 0.1687 
Tiled Floor 0.0219 0.0533 
Carpet Floor 0.0108 0.9711 
Cement Floor 0.0024 0.0067 
Flush Toilet 0.0238 0.0469 
Blair Toilet 0.0024 0.0085 
Pit Toilet 0.0006 0.0047 
No Toilet 0.0010 0.0027 
Electricity 0.0224 0.0430 
Piped Water 0.0225 0.0437 
Communal Tap 0.0038 0.0187 
Source: Own calculations, Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys, 1994 – 2015 
